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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will apply the constructivist theory of International Relations (IR) to 
the study of Chinese foreign policy, beginning with an examination of the IR 
theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism, and how each theory explains 
Chinese foreign policy and its aid behaviour. It will focus on norms and their 
implications for the making of China's foreign aid policy. Four norms, Asianism, 
internationalism, sovereignty, and developmental ism are discussed and related to 
their specific roles in China's policy making. Asianism involves the construction 
of an Asian identity within Asia, internationalism involves the development of 
international responsibility, sovereignty entails non-interference in other 
countries' affairs, and developmentalism involves the transmission of the Beijing 
Consensus. The analysis continues by linking China's identity to each norm in an 
historical overview of Chinese foreign policy since 1949. The overview 
demonstrates how China's identity has become transformed at critical stages 
throughout the history of the PRC, from victim to neutral actor, to its present great 
power state, and how these changes in identity have influenced China's 
subsequent behaviour. By examining three cases, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, this thesis seeks to explain China's foreign policy within each region 
and highlights how China's policies have been guided by its identity and the 
mutually constituted norms during its periods of regional activity. The Southeast 
Asia study is focussed on all four norms, whilst the African and Latin American 
studies address internationalism, sovereignty and developmental ism. Particular 
attention is placed upon China's changing identity and its impact on China's 
future foreign policy and application of foreign aid. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my 
supervisor Professor Tim Wright. Without his knowledge, expertise and 
encouragement, I do not believe I could have completed this thesis. His support in 
providing resources and material crucial to my research is greatly appreciated. I 
would like to thank Professor Wright for his understanding, patience, and 
endurance in reviewing and commenting on my drafts, along with the 
encouragement and advice he offered during my field surveys and research trips 
to China. 
I would also like to thank Professor Hugo Dobson for his undying effort in 
keeping me focused and on track. He was very understanding and generous with 
extensions and late submissions of my drafts. Without his knowledge and 
guidance on IR theory, I would not have been able to make a theoretical analysis 
of the research. I consider myself fortunate to have had Professor Tim Wright and 
Professor Hugo Dobson, two experts in China and IR Theory, supervise my PhD 
and provide me with the confidence to see it to completion. Their kindness and 
support I will carry with me for the rest of my life. Thank You. 
I would like to express my appreciation to the University of Sheffield with 
special thanks to the School of East Asian Studies and its staff for its financial and 
academic support. I would also like to thank the University Excellence Scheme 
for providing me with a scholarship to carry out my fieldwork at the Shanghai 
Institute for international Studies (SIIS) Sept.-Dec. 2006. Finally, I would like to 
thank the Universities' China Committee in London (UCCL) for providing me 
with a research grant to conduct fieldwork at Peking University and Renmin 
University of China in Beijing Sep. 2007 - Feb. 2008. 
I am also grateful to the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), 
Peking University and Renmin University of China's Schools of International 
Studies, for hosting me and providing me with access to their research and experts 
on Chinese foreign aid policy. Let me also thank the interviewees who took time 
off their busy schedules to answer my questions. Their candid responses and 
insights were extremely valuable to my research, knowledge, and understanding 
of China's foreign aid policy. Special thanks to: Professor Chen Vue, Professor Li 
Baojun, Professor Li Yihu, Professor Guo Shuyong, Professor Yu Xintian, and 
Professor Zhang Haibing, for their kindness and support. Their aid and support in 
making it possible to interview policy planners and scholars was crucial to my 
11 
research. 
Finally, I would like to thank my internal and external exammers 
Professors Glenn Hook, Zhang Yongjin for their time and guidance towards the 
completion of this thesis. 
\II 
AN OTE ON THE TEXT 
All Chinese sources, including interviews, have been translated into English by 
the author, with Chinese pronunciation translated into English via the Pinyin 
method. Key Chinese terminology has been written according to the pinyin 
system and written in italics. It is the convention in China to use family names 
first followed by their given name. This thesis adheres to this convention, unless 
the author has adopted an English name, where the given name precedes the 
family name. 
IV 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
A NOTE ON THE TEXT 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
ABBREVIATIONS 
GLOSSARY 
PART ONE 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The intention of the thesis 
1.2 Question 
1.3 The contribution to Chinese Studies 
1.4 The importance of the research findings to IR theory 
1.5 The organisation of the thesis 
CHAPTER 2 CHINAAND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
2.1 IR theory and the Chinese case 
2.2 Realism 
2.2.1 What does realism reveal about China's foreign relations? 
2.2.2 The implications of realism for the understanding of 
China's foreign aid 
2.3 Liberalism 
2.3.1 What does liberalism reveal about China's foreign relations? 
2.3.2 The implications of liberalism for the understanding of 
China's foreign aid 
2.4 Constructivism 
2.4.1 The impact of norms on foreign policy 
2.4.2 What does constructivism reveal about China's foreign relations? 
2.4.3 The implications of constructivism for the understanding of 
China's foreign aid 
CHAPTER 3 NORMS AND CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Internationally embedded norms 
3.2.1 Asianism 
i) Definition 
ii) Evolution and influence 
3.2.2 Internationalism 
i) Definition 
II 
IV 
VlIi 
IX 
XlI 
1 
2 
2 
4 
5 
7 
9 
11 
11 
12 
17 
19 
22 
25 
28 
30 
31 
35 
39 
42 
42 
45 
45 
45 
46 
50 
50 
ii) Evolution and influence 51 
3.3 Domestically embedded norms 5-1-
3.3.1 Sovereignty 54 
i) Definition 5-1-
ii) Evolution and influence 55 
3.3.2 Developmentalism 62 
i) Definition 62 
ii) Evolution and influence 65 
iii) How China presents the Beijing Consensus 68 
iv) How the world perceives the Beijing Consensus 70 
v) The features of developmental ism in China's foreign aid 72 
3.4 The trajectory of identities and norms in China's foreign relations 72 
since 1949 
PART TWO 84 
CHAPTER 4 CHINA'S FOREIGN AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 85 
4.l The significance of the Southeast Asian case 85 
4.2 Historical relations with Southeast Asia 90 
4.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Southeast Asia 94 
4.3.1 Asianism 94 
i) The 1997 Asian financial crisis 95 
ii) 2003 SARS epidemic and 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami crises 97 
iii) 2007 Global financial crisis 99 
4.3.2 Internationalism 102 
4.3.3 Sovereignty 106 
i) The sovereignty norm in the case of Myanmar 108 
4.3.4 Developmentalism 110 
i) Forms of developmental assistance 111 
ii) A regional focus 113 
4.4 Summary 115 
CHAPTER 5 CHINA'S FOREIGN AID TO AFRICA 126 
5.1 The significance of the African case 126 
5.2 Historical Relations with Africa 129 
5.2.l Years aligned with the Soviets 129 
5.2.2 Years of isolation 132 
5.2.3 China's activities following its admission to the UN 135 
5.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Africa 140 
5.3.1 Internationalism 1-1-0 
5.3.2 Sovereignty 145 
i) 'Non-interference' in the political context 148 
ii) 'Non-interference' in the economic context 150 
VI 
iii) The Sudan case 151 
5.3.3 Developmentalism 153 
i) The Case of Tanzania 155 
ii) Comparison of developmental ism with the Western model 158 
5.4 Summary 161 
CHAPTER 6 CHINA'S FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA 167 
6.1 The significance of the Latin American case 167 
6.2 Historical relations with Latin America 172 
6.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Latin America 181 
6.3.1 Internationalism 181 
i) The evolution of internationalism in Latin America 182 
6.3.2 Sovereignty 187 
i) The effectiveness of the sovereignty norm 187 
ii) Limitations of the sovereignty norm 190 
6.3.3 Developmentalism 192 
i) The practice of the Beijing Consensus 193 
ii) Limitations to developmental ism in Latin America 195 
6.4 Summary 197 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 204 
7.1 Findings of the study 204 
7.1.1 The role of norms for the making of China's foreign aid policy 204 
since 1949 
7 .1.2 Norm implications for China's foreign aid 211 
7.1.3 Factors contributing to and resulting from shifts 213 
in China's identity 
7.2 Contributions and future work 
APPENDIX 1 
China's identity and behaviour between the 1950s and 201 Os 
-- Southeast (SE) Asia, Africa and Latin America 
APPENDIX 2 
214 
216 
Factors inducing evolution of the norms between the 1950s and 201 Os 219 
APPENDIX 3 
Published data used for estimating regional norms 221 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 229 
VIl 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure 
Figure 2.1 The norm life cycle 32 
Figure 3.1 Relationship between norms, identity, and image 83 
Figure 4.1 The number of ASEAN and ASEAN related summits per five year 118 
period 
Figure 4.2 The cumulative number of cooperative agreements signed 119 
between ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea, between 1993-2009 
Figure 4.3 The number of international organizations joined by the PRC 121 
Figure 4.4 The variation of a coefficient of non-interference from 1950-2010 123 
Figure 4.5 The increase in uptake of developmentalism between 2002 and 125 
2008 in Southeast Asia 
Figure 5.1 The cumulative membership of international organisations by 163 
decade from 1950-2010 
Figure 5.2 The variation ofa coefficient of non-interference from 1950-2010 164 
Figure 5.3 Comparison of norm unintended rhetoric and norm intended 166 
practice of Developmentalism between 2002 and 2008, in Africa. 
Figure 6.1 The cumulative membership of international organisations by 199 
decade from 1950-2010 
Figure 6.2 The variation ofa coefficient of non-interference from 1950-2010 201 
Figure 6.3 The increase in uptake of developmentalism between 2002 and 203 
2008 in Latin America 
Figure 7.1 The evolution of norms affecting China's foreign aid policies 210 
between 1950 to 2010, reflected through its corresponding identity 
Table 
Table 3.1 Comparison of developmental paths 64 
Table 3.2 The life cycle of norms in China's foreign relations 82 
Table 5.1 Examples of activities within Africa's four main technology sectors 154 
Table 6.1 Chinese aid supported projects in Latin America 193 
VIII 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACFTA 
ADB 
AFDB 
AFP 
ALADI 
AMBDC 
AMM 
ANC 
APEC 
ARF 
ASEAN 
ASEAN+3 
ASEAN+3+3 
ASEAN-IO 
AU 
BC 
BRICSAM 
CABC 
CAFTA 
CASS 
CCP 
CD 
CDB 
CG 
CMI 
COREMO 
CPC 
CRS 
CSCAP 
DAC 
DPRK 
EALAFI 
FEALAC 
ECLAC 
ECOSOC 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (Agreement) 
Asian Development Bank 
African Development Bank 
Armed Forces of the Philippines 
Latin American Integration Association 
ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
African National Congress 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (forum) 
ASEAN Regional Forum 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEAN, South Korea, China, and Japan 
ASEAN, South Korea, China, and Japan, India, Australia and New 
Zealand 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar 
African Union 
Beijing Consensus 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico 
China-Africa Business Council 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (Agreement) 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Chinese Communist Party 
Conference on Disarmament 
China Development Bank 
Consultative Group 
Chiang Mai Initiative 
Comite Revoluciomirio de Mozambique 
The Communist Party of China 
(US) Congressional Research Service 
Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
East Asia-Latin America Cooperation 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(UN) Economic and Social Council 
\.\ 
EHP 
EU 
EXIM Bank 
FDI 
FOCAC 
FNLA 
FRELIMO 
FTA 
GATT 
GDP 
GMS 
GNI 
G2 
G7 
G8 
G20 
HIPCs 
ICG 
IDA 
IDB 
IDCPC 
IGO 
IIC 
IMF 
INGO 
IPRCC 
IR 
KMT 
LDC 
MERCOSUR 
MFA 
MINUSTAH 
MOCOM 
MPLA 
MRC 
NATO 
NIEO 
NGOs 
NLD 
OAS 
Early Harvest Program 
European Union 
Export & Import Bank of China 
foreign direct investment 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
Frente Nacional de Libertac;ao de Angola 
Frente de Libertac;ao de Mozambique 
Free Trade Agreement 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
gross domestic product 
Greater Mekong Sub-region 
gross national income 
United States and China 
Group of Seven industrialized countries 
Group of Eight industrialized countries 
Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
International Crisis Group 
International Development Association 
Inter-American Development Bank 
International Department of Central Committee of CPC 
international governmental organization 
Inter-American Investment Corporation 
International Monetary Fund 
international non-governmental organization 
International Poverty Reduction Center in China 
international relations 
Kuomingtang (Chinese Nationalist Party, ROC) 
Least Developed Countries 
Mercado Comun del Sur ISouthern Common Market 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
Movimento Popular de Libertac;ao de Angola 
Mekong River Commission 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
New International Economic Order 
non-governmental organizations 
(Myanmar) National League for Democracy 
Organization of American States 
ODA 
OECD 
PAC 
PKI 
PKO 
PLA 
PRC 
RMB 
ROC 
ROK 
SADC 
SARS 
SCO 
SEZs 
SLORC 
SSC 
SWAPO 
TAC 
TAZARA 
TICAD 
UN 
UNCTAD 
UNDP 
UNECLAC 
UNESCO 
UNFCCC 
UNITA 
UNPKO 
UNSC 
US 
USSR 
WB 
WC 
WHO 
WTO 
ZANLA 
ZANU 
Official Development Assistance 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 
Parti Kommunis Indonesia 
peacekeeping operations 
People's Liberation Army 
People's Republic of China 
Renminbi 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
Southern African Development Community 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Special Economic Zones 
(Myanmar) State Law and Order Restoration Council 
South-South cooperation 
South West African People's Organisation 
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
Tanzania-Zambia Railways Authority 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
United Nations 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola 
United Nations peacekeeping operations 
United Nations Security Council 
United States 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
World Bank 
Washington Consensus 
World Health Organisation 
World Trade Organization 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
Zimbabwe African National Union 
X\ 
GLOSSARY 
Chinese 
chengdan daguo zeren 
daguo 
daguo guanxi 
dingwei 
Juguo qiangbing 
Ju zeren de daguo 
mingzheng yanshun 
mulin, anlin, Julin 
huoban guanxi 
san ge daibiao 
san ge tiejin 
yiji 
youhao de daxiang 
yulinweishan, yilinweiban 
zou chuqu 
undertaking a big power's responsibility 
great power 
great-power relations 
to define one's position 
prosperous nation and powerful military 
a responsible great state 
when names are right, speech is consequential 
an amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighbourhood 
partnership relations 
Three Represents 
Three Closeness 
a systematic great power 
a friendly elephant 
becoming friends and partners with neighbours 
go out 
Xli 
PART ONE 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The intention of the thesis 
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly becoming recognised as an 
emerging significant aid donor (Chin and Frolic 2007; Glosny 2006a; 2006b; Lum 
et al. 2008; Manning 2006; Woods 2008). Following a decline in the levels of 
financial support from ideological allies that typified the Cold War, developing 
nations over the last two decades have had little or no alternative but to accept the 
advice and aid of the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB). This has induced a significant transformation in the 
topography of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as nascent aid donors 
have become important actors in challenging the Western-oriented aid paradigm 
through their provision of support to developing countries. Disputes have arisen 
over how the role of aid from emerging donors may have subverted not only the 
position of the traditional donor community, but also the importance of good 
governance, environmental assessment, and poverty reduction. ODA from China 
represents a particular case that has received increased attention. China's elevated 
international status, due largely to its economic growth and potential, has led 
many in the developing world now to believe that there is an alternative to the 
Western economic model. This alternative model of development, as will be 
discussed in depth later, has become known as the 'Beijing Consensus' (Dirlik 
2006; People s Daily 2004a; Ramo 2004). 
The designation of China as an emerging aid donor, however, is a 
misnomer, as the PRC's role in aid donation has remained prominent since the 
early 1950s (MOCOM 2008). This role expanded during the 1960s and 1970s 
before decreasing in the 1980s, when its role as a donor was moderated by its role 
as a recipient of development assistance. By 2006, however, according to reports 
from the United Nation's World Food Programme, China had transformed itself 
from an aid recipient into the world's third largest food aid donor (WFP 2006). 
These variations in aid activity are linked to the changes that have transpired 
within China over the past sixty years. These changes have affected China's 
subsequent behaviour and have resulted in the reshaping of its aid policies. 
Chinese policy planners and researchers have nurtured an interest in Chinese 
development assistance since the early 1970s, in an attempt to explicate how such 
assistance has transformed from advancing international commUnIsm and the 
Maoist model of economic growth and modernization, into ensuring regime 
survival in China along with its alignment of international assistance with national 
interests (Interview 2006a; 2006h; 2006i; Liu 1998; Yang 2006). Debates have 
proliferated over how the country pursued such rational developmental goals 
while remaining both a socialist state and protagonist of developing countries' 
interests (Xiao 2002). In light of these discourses, there was a shift in official 
policy from the mid-1980s onwards towards development assistance projects 
aimed at generating mutual economic benefits for both China and recipient 
countries (Wei 1999; Xing 1996). During this period, China has, through the 
disbursal of its foreign aid, enhanced its interest in acquiring natural resources 
from across the developing world (Zha 2005; Zweig and Bi 2005). As its interest 
in meeting its resource needs has increased, the PRC leadership has placed greater 
importance on diplomatic and business relations, in order to make up for its lack 
of experience in international trade bodies and other organisations (Interview 
2006f). The impact of this foreign policy adjustment has resulted in enhancing the 
PRC's image, and is reflected in the visibility of Chinese trade and diplomatic 
representatives at international trade meetings and the tables of multinational 
corporations. However, the PRC's continued status as an aid recipient country 
perpetuates the idea that internally, the 'Chinese tend to see themselves as 
currently weaker than outsiders do'(Lampton 2001: 78); therefore, China's 
'particularly heightened sensitivity to status' shows that it views 'international 
status', in some ways, as 'better than power' (Deng 2004: 51, 53). This view is 
likely to change as China is destined to become more powerful as its international 
status becomes enhanced and its position more secure. 
Given this sensitivity, China's economic advancement has continued to 
help it maintain strong control and influence over its politics, values, and ideas 
(Xiang 2008). Perceptions and opinions of its growing presence, 'befitting a 
power of its stature', are noticeable both inside and outside of China (Pang 2006: 
10). As such, China will assume a greater leadership role, through' developing the 
norms, rules, and institutions that will define the international order of the 21 st 
century' (ibid.). China's awareness of its increasing presence internationally has 
caused it to become increasingly preoccupied with the trajectory of its own ascent 
(Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 2005). Though lacking superpower status, China 
has, by its own achievements, become a regional power in Asia and, as a result of 
this 'power shift', its neighbours have become increasingly interested in China's 
activities at home and abroad (Shambaugh 2005: 23). As such, China's march 
towards great-power status can be followed by considering its relations with other 
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regIons. As Rex Li (2004: 23) argues, since 'the profound effects of China·s 
growing process cannot be underestimated', the suggestions in the 1990s about 
how to deal with China presupposed the belief that it would become a particularly 
significant actor (Burstein and Keijzer 1998; Kristof 1993: 59-74). 
1.2 Question 
The question of the thesis concerns whether or not norms shape China's standards 
of appropriate behaviour, which in tum inform its interests and policies. The 
answer to this question attempts to go beyond power-based explanations that rely 
upon the international structure, such as balance of power, and adopts a 
norm-based social constructivist perspective, to address the effects of norms on 
China's foreign behaviour. The aim is to identify which norms shape China's 
approach to its international relations, particularly its foreign aid policy, whilst 
gaining a better understanding of the norms China espouses. In this respect, this 
thesis goes beyond the boundaries of International Relations (IR) studies, which 
concentrate on the role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy (Copper 
1976; Hook 1995; Packenham 1966). 
The question arises from the fact that China does not belong to the group 
of traditional aid donors, generally known as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and as such, has operated its aid 
programme overseas largely independently of the rest of the donor community. 
Therefore, Chinese foreign aid policy is often viewed suspiciously by the 
dominant traditional aid donors, who highlight, for example, Chinese support for 
corrupt governments as a means of criticising China's foreign aid policies (The 
Guardian 2007a; 2007b; The New York Times 2007). It is not argued that these 
perceptions are false, but rather, that the concentration on the role of norms that 
China follows in the process of providing foreign assistance makes a discussion of 
China's views possible. Therefore, by focussing upon the norms which China 
follows to formulate its foreign policy, this thesis identifies and investigates four 
salient domestically and internationally embedded norms in its foreign behaviour. 
The internationally embedded norms pertinent to this thesis, Asianism and 
internationalism, originate from China's interaction with the outside world, and 
the domestically embedded norms which are pertinent, sovereignty and 
developmentalism, originate from China's domestic desire to maintain its own 
autonomy and development. These norms will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 
and then in their regional contexts throughout the case studies. 
Since 'the state's identity in international relations is acquired, constructed 
and reconstructed', this highlights the importance of the role of social 
construction within state affairs. Much of Deng Yong's (2000:44) analysis of 
China's foreign behaviour similarly stressed the explicit 'drawing on 
constructivist theory'. While the logic of the approach adopted by Chinese 
policy-makers may be perceived as straightforward, the process of promoting and 
strengthening the norms through their interaction with external conflict, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, is complex. This thesis studies the interaction of Chinese 
foreign relations with the following three regions: Southeast Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. 
1.3 The contribution to Chinese Studies 
By studying the foreign aid policies of China, during the period between 1949 and 
the present day, this thesis contributes to understanding of the ideational factors 
affecting China's foreign aid behaviour, and consequently, its relations with its aid 
recipient countries. This thesis will facilitate an interpretation of China's foreign 
aid policy from its own perspective, since foreign perceptions of China may be 
influenced subjectively, as 'China's concern for its international image' has 
become a major influence on its foreign behaviour (Foot 2001: 15; also see Wang 
2002) and is reflected in its identity. Gries (2005: 235) highlighted this point when 
he stated: 'Who do we see? A cuddly panda or a menacing dragon?'. This author 
argues that the use of the normative approach 'can start with the recognition that 
nations like individuals [ ...... ] develop visions, dreams and prejudices about 
themselves and the world that shape their intention' (lriye 1990: 100-1). 
During the Cold War, international security was a priority, with many of 
the world's developing nations looking to one of the 'superpowers' for guidance 
and aid in their economic development. In the early years following the 
Communist victory in 1949, the PRC was under the patronage and tutelage of the 
Soviet Union (Bo 1992). However, after China's separation from the Soviet model 
of economic development, following irreconcilable differences between the two 
personality driven systems, the PRC opted to go it alone and modernise by 
developing what has become known as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', 
in order to reinvent itself' as the guarantor of the people's "economic livelihood" 
and defender of China's position in the world' (Gittings 2005: 2-3; also see Peng 
2002: 57-64). 
The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) success in its economic reforms, 
which led to the opening of its market to international trade, has strengthened the 
confidence of the Chinese leadership, showing that 'the emergence of China as a 
great power is arguably the single most important development in the post-Cold 
War world' (Li 2004: 23). With increasing awareness of the effects of reforms on 
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China's economIC development, the CCP leaders are firmly conSCIOUS of the 
inherent danger of political reform (Goldstein 2005: 49). When the communist 
bloc in Central and Eastern Europe sought economic reform to solve structural 
problems within their economies, their people demanded corresponding political 
reforms. These factors contributed to the ultimate collapse of their communist 
governments. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe acts as a reminder to the CCP, that changes in economic policy must not 
be made at the expense of political control and authority. The PRC also recognises 
that they remain under constant scrutiny from the international community. As 
Zheng Yongnian (1999: 138) highlighted, China was positioned to establish a 
novel precedent demonstrating that it was 'capable of pursuing power in the 
international system'. China's pursuit of power posed a challenge to the global 
balance of power, through their discerning of how China would react to the 
change that its presence would induce. In line with this view, the study of norms 
expands the understanding of Rozman's (1999:383-402) notion of 'China's quest 
for great power identity'. By addressing China's rationalisation of its power 
relations in terms of increased multilateralism, greater tolerance of US strength 
through adherence to sovereignty, and an expectation of the mutual improvement 
in its international relations, these rationalisations reconcile the continued 
counter-balancing of cooperation and conflict, in light of China's perception of 
the motivations of other powers. 
The study of China's foreign aid policy through constructivism broadens 
the understanding of its relations with developing countries and its response to 
Western agendas. This makes an important contribution to Chinese Studies, since 
an investigation of the changes and continuity in China's international position is 
helpful in comprehending its involvement in the global economy and international 
relations. While increasingly opening up its markets to international trade, China 
remains a relatively unknown and secretive state. For this reason, governments, 
policy planners, and businesses alike, look to China researchers for insight into 
China's behaviour. While predictions about 'China's rise' and impact on the 
global economy and international relations abound, academic research illuminates 
the changes taking place in China, and how these changes affect its foreign 
behaviour (Keyser and Lin 2007: 41-62; Pu and Zhang 2007: 63-82). 
Contributions to the field of foreign aid research in Chinese Studies began 
to appear from the mid-1960s onwards. Most studies, such as the works of 
Eckstein (1966), Muller (1964), Goldman (1967), and Kovner (1968), focus 
primarily on its communist ideology and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The instrumental 
perspective focus was shared in both Van Ness's (1971) Revolution and Chinese 
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Foreign Policy and Copper's (1976) China's Foreign Aid. Bartke's (1975) China's 
Foreign Aid includes information on the mechanics of China's overseas economic 
assistance and foreign aid statistics, and also provides information on China's 
foreign aid agreements and projects. There are several studies that focus upon 
Africa, such as Hutchinson (1975) and an extensive number of essays in 
Weinstein's (1975) Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa. Yu (1970), Hall and Peyman 
(1976), and Bailey (1976) all focused on in-depth studies, such as the Tan-Zam 
Railway's economic importance for Africa. Law's (1984) Chinese Foreign Aid 
relates the features of China's aid projects to China's own development 
experience, that is, self-reliance and independent economic development. 
Generally speaking, these early studies mostly analyse China's foreign aid by 
discussing China's political and economic interests. The most prominent analysis 
is the notion of viewing China's aid as an instrument, by enhancing the weight of 
its geo-political and economic considerations, while additionally, supporting its 
recognition as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people, and of China's 
seat in the United Nations. There are no recent publications that focus specifically 
on foreign aid. In fact, it is only referred to in research in the field of China's 
foreign policy in general, or China's 'soft power' or 'natural resources' in 
particular (leG 2008; Taylor 2006b; The Washington Post 2006b; Zhang 2008). 
Recent studies (Chin and Frolic 2007; Kassenova 2009; Manning 2006; Woods 
2008) observe China as an 'emerging' aid donor, whilst focusing on its oil 
interests to fuel its own economic growth or its perceived threat to the existing 
dominant powers, for example, the US and Japan. This has led some to suggest 
that in the regions 'where China is most active, access to energy resources and 
raw commodities to fuel China's domestic growth plays a dominant role in 
Beijing's [aid] activities' (Dumbaugh 2008: 5). In addition, media announcements 
in China appear to indicate there are clear patterns where the investment and aid 
from China is greatest. Countries that supply China with primary resources, such 
as oil, metals and wood are strategically important, and appear to receive more in 
both aid and investment than countries that are less resource rich. 
While the study of China's foreign relations serves as a comprehensive 
platform for a more focused investigation of China's foreign aid policy, the norms 
that expedite these policies facilitate an assessment of international relations from 
a Chinese perspective, and will be investigated in Chapter 3. 
1.4 The importance of the research findings to IR theory 
Another area of importance in this thesis relates to its contribution to IR theory. It 
raises the question of whether the existing mainstream theoretical frameworks in 
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IR can render adequate insight and understanding of Chinese international 
relations, which in this case focuses on China's foreign aid policy. 
China's enhanced role as an aid donor, in both regional and international 
affairs, has consequentially prompted a growing number of scholars to focus upon 
the analysis of China's economic assistance behaviour. However, these IR 
approaches for interpreting Chinese foreign policy mainly employ realist and 
liberal perspectives, and attempt to compete with an alternative paradigm like 
constructivism. Although the constructivist perspective has been recently 
embraced as an important agenda, the incidence of its application to the 
norm-based analysis of Chinese international relations remains limited. 
The analysis of norms is significant in reflecting the changing nature of 
China's self-perception and its relationship with the rest of the world. Therefore, 
by looking at the period from 1949 to the present, and forward into the future, this 
study argues that various ideational strands affect tangible actions and events at 
play between China and the world. Consequently, China's identity 'influences 
attitudes and policies alike, being the psychological foundation for the role and 
behaviour patterns of a country in the international arena' (Scalapino 1993: 215). 
In this regard, a change in a state's foreign behaviour is also triggered by a shift in 
the identity variable, a point that realists have neglected in their analyses. 
While norms play a role in shaping and maintaining aid provision, the 
manner in which aid is framed by those norms is also important. Since the end of 
the Second World War, international norms have been concerned with 
development assistance, particularly that of an official nature, and have matured 
and assumed a distinctive shape. The international norms, such as 
internationalism, have emerged and been adopted by the Western aid donor 
community as a whole. Yet, while donors may not always adhere to or comply 
with these norms, major donor states in the GECD at least feel compelled to 
explain away their deviances from these norms and generally accepted practices, 
thereby implying acceptance of the legitimacy of these norms. Today, however, 
these norms are subjected to greater pressure from many forces such as the 
different consensus of aid norms that China is promoting. A major implication of 
these findings is that although the rendering of aid to poor recipient countries by 
the donor states is promoted as coordinated and benevolent, the norms that shape 
the motivations and competitive interests of the respective donor governments are 
subject to differing interpretations. Clarification of these differences and their 
implications will contribute to our understanding of IR with substantial insight 
into China's foreign aid policy. 
This raises the questions of what constitutes the norms influencing 
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Chinese foreign aid, and where these norms originated. It thereby highlights the 
explanatory identities that correspond to the norms. The study of China's identity 
transformation provides insights across a range of topics. It serves to demonstrate 
how these changes affect its foreign behaviour, as well as contributes to the study 
of international relations through the increased understanding of the norms 
influencing its behaviour. A key indicator of the norms influencing Chinese 
international behaviour is therefore reflected through its involvement in foreign 
aid. This thesis examines the roles of norms in China's foreign aid policy through 
three regional case studies based upon empirical evidence for the claims made. 
Each case study addresses how norms guide, or do not guide, Chinese foreign 
behaviour, and how they interact with spheres of interests and power from the 
constructivist perspective. The impact of both internationally and domestically 
embedded norms on China's foreign behaviour is considered. 
Mainstream approaches to studying China's international relations identify 
some of the extant issues such as power seeking or cooperation, which will be 
illustrated later in the next chapter. However, they have yet to exclusively provide 
a thorough explanation of all of the observed changes. These shortcomings arise, 
in part, from the perception of the importance of factors, such as norms, in 
causing the changes. By highlighting the potential benefits that may result from 
applying IR theory to the examination of Chinese foreign policy, this thesis serves 
as a valuable contribution to the continued expansion of traditional IR theory, by 
not only relating the importance of norms and identity to foreign policy planning, 
but also by demonstrating how foreign aid is used in foreign policy. This thesis 
seeks to explore this issue from an alternative perspective, namely through a 
norm-based constructivist approach. Its aim is to supplement the current findings 
of the existing traditional approaches, thereby highlighting the importance of 
additional factors, namely, how the changes in identity affected the uptake of 
norms that informed China's subsequent foreign policies, which may enhance 
their future evaluations and provide more thorough explanations of the observed 
changes in China's foreign policy. 
1.5 The organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of two main parts: Part One focuses on the introduction 
of the theoretical aspects of the discussion, while Part Two provides case study 
evidence and conclusions drawn from the investigation. 
Part One comprises the introduction (Chapter 1) and two substantive 
chapters, which build upon the published literature on general Chinese foreign 
policy and foreign aid policy. Chapter 2 begins with a detailed review of IR 
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theories. This overvIew provides the background for the following three 
mainstream IR theory perspectives utilised to study Chinese international 
relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism. This review examines Chinese 
foreign policy and serves to provide insights into the development and interactive 
nature of the main approaches used to understand China's foreign aid policy. 
Following the review, a constructivist norm-based approach is adopted as the 
principal method of investigation for this research, and is used as a foundation for 
constructing the framework in the following chapter. Chapter 3 constructs a 
framework of the role of norms to help explain the shaping of China's 
international relations, initially by mounting the definition of the norms and their 
relation to China's foreign aid, in order to provide a structure for the detailed case 
studies outlined in Part Two. The chapter concludes with an overview of the 
trajectory of identities and norms in China's foreign relations since 1949, which 
offers a precursory review of the background to the case studies. 
Part Two is comprised of three case study chapters and a conclusion. The 
case study chapters, chapters 4, 5 and 6, draw largely upon primary sources of 
data in order to illustrate and develop the overall framework from Part One. These 
primary sources include numerous interviews, as well as extensive analyses of 
both government documents and media resources from within China, for both 
local and international consumption. The case studies focus upon Southeast Asia 
(Chapter 4), Africa (Chapter 5) and Latin America (Chapter 6), with the emphasis 
in each chapter placed on particular episodes and issues. The choice of the case 
studies in this thesis is dependent upon the significance of China's role in the 
different geographical areas, and upon a history of Chinese foreign relations to 
provide substantial material for the enquiry. Each case study provides a precis of 
the historical background to the region's bilateral relations and importance to 
China. Without neglecting the materialist implications, the normative approach 
highlights how internationally and domestically embedded norms have influenced 
China's aid policy decisions. The conclusion (Chapter 7) brings together the 
findings of the norms to the understanding of China's international relations and 
foreign aid policy from the three case studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY 
In order to establish a framework of analysis to explain Chinese foreign aid I 
policy, it is necessary to examine and integrate relevant concepts, drawn from the 
literature available on Chinese foreign policy and IR theory. This chapter 
conceptualises the research and different interpretations of Chinese foreign policy 
and foreign aid in the context of international relations. It provides a review of 
past literatures, which outline the backgrounds of existing IR theories (realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism) and their applications to China's foreign relations. 
2.1 IR theory and the Chinese case 
IR theories have been, and continue to be, articulated as conceptual hypotheses 
for explaining and understanding phenomena, such as the behaviour of states. By 
drawing on the examples of history and the works of its recorders, writers 
concerned with explaining the behaviours of states have focused primarily ot! the 
causes and consequences of war in forming the manner by which states 
interrelate. 
The quality of human nature has remained a central topic in IR theory 
discussions. Each of the IR theories discussed in this chapter will deal with 
varying views on the nature of human relations, and how they contribute to the 
behaviour of states. Organized war, as it is known, is a corollary of civilization 
and the grouping of communities on a mass scale. Any discussion of the nature of 
relations between organized groups, in this case states, will naturally draw upon 
the complexities of human social relations, whether it focuses upon the individual, 
family, kin, tribe, community, or state. This examination of IR theories will begin 
with a review of realism, which is considered the pioneering theory of IR. It has 
long enjoyed a 'hegemonic position' in the discipline, especially during the Cold 
War when the insecure nature of the international system could credibly be seen to 
dictate the prioritisation of security through military power and relative gains over 
1 Foreign aid (assistance) is also often referred to in other terms such as economic aid 
(assistance), development aid (assistance) or Official Development Assistance (ODA). Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is termed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). 
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others (Walt 1998: 31). Realism and its concentration on power, distinct human 
nature, and anarchy will be investigated, to determine its relevance to Chinese 
foreign policy generally and Chinese foreign aid more specifically. Secondly, this 
examination of IR theory will consider liberalism, which recognizes the anarchic 
nature of international relations, but concentrates on the cooperation of states, 
rather than on power and state security. A factor that is intrinsic to liberalism is 
cooperation and involvement in international organisations and institutions. The 
chapter will conclude with an examination of constructivism. Due to the change 
of international structure at the end of the Cold War, social constructivism has 
featured significantly in the study of IR since the 1990s. According to certain 
scholars in the field, constructivism facilitated the rise in prominence of the 
rationalist (neo-realism and neo-liberalism) versus constructivist debate (Price and 
Reus-Smit 1998; 263; Zehfuss 2002). Constructivism does not support the idea 
that the existence of conflict can be accounted for by the presence of anarchy 
alone, but rather because there is no inherent nature to international anarchy. The 
fact that 'anarchy is what states make of it' provides an explanation for the nature 
of international anarchy (Wendt 1992). Therefore, if states behave in a conflictive 
manner towards each other, then the nature of anarchy appears conflictive, 
whereas when they behave in a cooperative manner, the nature of international 
society becomes cooperative. In order to understand conflict and cooperation in 
international relations, attention must be focused upon what states actually do, 
rather than upon the supposed nature of international anarchy. As a result of this, 
constructivism attributes significance to a state's behaviour in the determination 
of the nature of, and transitions in, international relations. 
Reviewing the IR theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism will 
contribute to the explanations of a state's international behaviour, in this case, 
Chinese foreign policy and foreign aid. 
2.2 Realism 
Realism considers international relations in the light of three core assumptions, as 
concluded by Robert Keohane (1986: 7). Firstly, sovereign states, rather than 
international institutions, non-governmental organisations, or trans-national 
corporations, are the primary actors in international affairs. Secondly, each state 
seeks to maximize its power. Uncertainty is pervasive because knowledge of other 
states is limited, and therefore, states are motivated fundamentally to survive, with 
the primary goal of each state being to ensure its own security. Thirdly, each state 
is a rational actor that always acts in its own self-interest, thereby restricting 
international cooperation. The behaviour of a state is primarily determined by its 
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concern for permanent security, and results in the focussing of military power 
towards goal resolution. The enhancement and sustaining of such power by a state 
is deemed fundamental for not only its security, but also for its ability to influence 
other nations. This requirement to regulate power against perceived threats is 
manifested through a combination of increasing a state's military potential, 
alongside the construction of mutual alliances with other states facing similar 
security threats (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 5-7, 44, 58). The primary goal under 
such anarchic conditions is to survive. Hence, while classic realism postulates that 
the source of international insecurity lies within the egotistical human desire for 
power, the concept of neo-realism, which evolved from these theories, determines 
that the anarchic nature of the international system in the 'absence of 
super-ordinate power to impose order', and therefore prevent war, creates this 
source of insecurity (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 41). 
Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, stress the centrality of 
national interest, by arguing that states are like human beings who have an innate 
desire to dominate others, which, therefore, leads them to fight wars (Walt 1998: 
31). The concept of 'interests' is defined in terms of 'power', which provides 
'reason and facts' to show how interests dominate the actions of men and states 
(Morgenthau 1973: 4-17, 38-9). Neo-realistKenneth Waltz (1979: 16-41,80-123) 
disagrees with the argument that human nature was responsible for causing wars. 
He argues that the structure of the international system, rather than human nature 
itself, is the dominant factor that leads states into war. Since the structure of the 
international system shapes behaviour, this inherent insecurity pressures all states, 
'independent of wishes and actions', into the pursuance of power (Viotti and 
Kauppi 1993: 40, 47, 62). Due to this, states behave in the same way as 'like 
units', viewing each other as 'black boxes', and therefore pay attention to other 
states' observable behaviour, rather than the nature of their governments, along 
with the decision-making processes of the leadership (Waltz 1986: 71). In this 
structure, the distribution of power, multi-polar or bi-polar, at a specific point in 
time, dictates the overall state of insecurity. Waltz (2000) argues, in contrast to the 
views of Morganthau, that the bi-polarity observed during the Cold War became 
the optimum structural order ensuring international peace and stability. The 
imbalance of this structure, resulting from the end of the Cold War, has led to a 
period of American domination internationally that has created instability and led 
to enhanced interstate competition. Attempts to redress this balance by other great 
powers will create further instability in the international security environment 
(Walt 1998: 31). 
When a rising power challenges the security environment, the supremacy 
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of a hegemonic state becomes insecure, causing the hegemony of the dominant 
state to become destabilized. Christopher Layne (1993: 9) highlights that this 
'structurally based phenomenon', whereby any hegemonic power that formulated 
its strategies more on benefaction than on coercion to maintain its leading status, 
will be confronted by great powers with different preferences and interests. The 
international power structure becomes subjected to constant and inevitable 
interstate challenges due to the rise of the great powers, whose economic success 
enhances their economic growth as a rising state's international interests and 
commitments grow. Consequently, its economic growth fuels its ambitions and 
capacity to challenge the global status quo (Gilpin 1987), thereby, impacting upon 
the dominance of the hegemonic powers. Advancement within this anarchic state 
only becomes achievable by the rising power competitively balancing its position 
relative to the hegemonic power by seeking to imitate its rival, and by nurturing 
an inherent 'sameness' (Li 2004: 25). This induces a 'structural impact' upon the 
international system causing a transition from a hegemonic-centred to a 
multi-polar world order (Li 2004: 25). Economic power becomes a critical factor 
as it transforms the primacy for security, where military power becomes 
fundamental to security resolution, by inducing a relative zero sum game on 
international trade and economics (Berger 1996: 323). Fear of disproportionate 
economic cooperation motivates players to usurp distinct power advantages, 
rather than attain mutually beneficial positive sum games. Following the end of 
the Cold War, Europe, Asia and the Third World shared mutual concerns of the 
United States' unchallenged dominance in international politics (Layne 1993: 
35-7), with China expressing its greatest suspicion of the US-centred world, 
indicative of the behaviour of a rising power (Li 1999: 115-49). 
The nature and accretion of power may also result in states adopting more 
optimistic strategies for handling such transitions in their power structure. 
Defensive realists, such as Taliaferro (2000/01: 128-61), argue that a state will 
primarily adopt moderate strategies for attaining optimum security, as this ensures 
the least offensive means of defending itself. Through such an approach, a state's 
goal is to survive, and great powers secure their own security through optimal 
alliances, which choose to engage defensive military force only on retaliatory 
terms (Walt 1998: 31). Due to this, a state engages in actual conflict only when 
this option becomes the sole resolution for threats to its interests or cooperation 
(Glaser 1994: 50-90; Jervis 1999:42-63; Kydd 1997: 114-55). The modal 
behaviour of a state, in the case of great powers, is to counterbalance dominant, or 
opposing and threatening powers. In the case of weaker states, they may 
occasionally opt to align with greater powers, through seeking conciliatory or 
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collaborative goals (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). Such coalitions and balancing may 
occur through the alignment of a state with a distant great power in order to 
reduce potential hostility, and counterbalance more immediate proximity threats, 
such as those from their neighbours, and results in the lesser state becoming 
subservient to key foreign policies of the greater power (Walt 1987). Under 
particular conditions, primarily those with limited options for alliances, the 
incidence of alignment increases along with the desire to pacify the hegemonic 
power. In these circumstances, rational calculation of material threats and interests 
form the fundamental basis for security policies and alliance partnerships (Walt 
1987; Waltz 1979). 
As the realist school argues that conflict is the result of states securing 
their vital interests, they view such conflict as inevitable. Power tools such as 
foreign aid become an option for states to promote their interests. Foreign aid is 
described as being a policy tool that originated during the Cold War in order to 
achieve donors' foreign policy objectives (Wall 1973: 9). In the Cold War context, 
therefore, foreign aid was considered to be a foreign policy instrument used by 
both sides as a means of gaining influence with Third World regimes (McKinlay 
and Mughan 1984; Morgenthau 1962; Hook 1995). An example of this is the 
Nicaraguan conflict, between the Contras and Sandinistas, each of which were 
supported by their respective patrons, the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American support for the Mujahideen, are 
examples of Cold War powers promoting their foreign policy interests, whereby 
both powers were accused of fighting proxy wars against each other using other 
states. For most of their post colonial history, the majority of African states 
became battlegrounds for US-Soviet ideological warfare. Aid was also frequently 
linked to military assistance in these scenarios, as observed in the foreign aid 
debates that promoted US national security, and countered the communist threats 
that were used by both supporters and opponents of the bills, during the 1963 and 
1964 debates in the US House of Representatives (Vorys 1967: 3). This view is 
also supported by Huntington (1970-1: 161-89), who analyses the situation from a 
donor's perspective. He concludes that foreign aid is being used primarily as a 
foreign policy tool to achieve donors' goals. In his review of US foreign aid, he 
argues that aid is intended to serve U.S. foreign policy interests. 
Morgenthau (1962: 301-4, 309) argues that aid serves interests 'which can 
not be secured by military means'. In his six types of foreign aid (humanitarian, 
subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and economic development), he cites two 
strategies of influence: 'propaganda' and 'bribes'. 'Propaganda' involves the 
attempt to create 'psychological' relationships for international recognition and 
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prestige, whereas 'bribes' involve a more direct exchange of goods for loyalty by 
seeking a price paid for political rewards. The propaganda that Morgenthau argues 
is an instrumental component of foreign aid that was ideological in nature during 
the Cold War. In the case of the Soviet Union, an ideological propaganda 
campaign was maintained, through its leadership in the Com intern, within its 
Soviet-sphere of influence, which mirrored its commitment to world revolution. 
Through this, the Soviet Union encouraged Soviet-style socialist 
revolutions across the globe. With the European powers devastated by WWII, the 
hold on their colonial empires became weak, and as each former colony gained its 
independence the Soviet Union and the US began to occupy the vacuum produced 
by their departure. The superpower economic assistance in the de-colonized 
regions enabled the superpowers to battle for the support of these newly 
independent states. Another foreign aid tool 'bribes', places importance on 
influence in realist backed foreign policies. Few states admit involvement in 
bribery as a tool of foreign policy, yet diplomatic scandals and kickbacks abound. 
Since aid was viewed as a tool for buying favour or influence, restricted and/or 
non-transparent aid has been correspondingly viewed with suspicion, particularly 
by traditional aid donors. The Iran-Contra Affair involving some of the highest 
ranking leaders of the American Government is evidence of the influence of 
'propaganda' and 'bribes'. 
In line with this insight, Maizels and Nissanke (1984: 870-900) further 
highlight that there are different self-interest variables for different donors. Their 
study of donor-interest models provides a convincing explanation of the allocation 
of bilateral aid for the period between 1978 and 1980. In the United States, for 
example, strategic considerations were most important, whereas in France and 
Britain, the link with former colonies motivated their concerns and models. In 
Japan, markets of importance to Japanese exporters were the priority and 
therefore became the focus of their policies. These ideas are supported in 
Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor's (1998: 297-8) cross-national analysis. They 
demonstrate that although the four donor states (United States, Japan, Sweden, 
and France) share democratic values, and support recipient countries' economic 
development, their aid policies are all influenced by realist strategic interests. 
[I]nternational relations are conducted in a Hobbesian state of 
nature in which national security and self-preservation become the 
primary [aim]. As a result, foreign aid is perceived as only 
minimally related to [the] recipient['s] economic development and 
the humanitarian needs of [the] recipient countries are 
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downplayed. 
(Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998: 297-8) 
Under the realist paradigm, foreign aid policy is concerned with serving the main 
concerns of state security and the maintenance and securing of power. 
Humanitarian needs are often considered only in response to pressures from civil 
action groups concerned with fighting corruption and mistreatment of people in 
the recipient country. 
2.2.1 What does realism reveal about China's foreign relations? 
Realists, such as Yan Xuetong (1996), argue that the context of Chinese strategic 
interests shapes its foreign policy. Due to this, its economic power will eventually 
transform into military strength, once its primary factors of size, population, 
resources and military potential converge. This has been accelerated in China in 
recent years by its sustained economic growth. This led Segal (1995: 70) to 
predict that 'in 2020, the world [would face] a united, authoritarian China with the 
world's largest GDP, perhaps the world's largest defence budget'. Without 
acquiring greater power, China would 'be exploited by the hegemon' (Layne 1993: 
12), mirroring historical events in China when it was 'invaded and exploited by 
foreign powers during the nineteenth century because it failed to attain 
great-power status while Japan and the European states did' (Li 2004: 26). This 
has fuelled and motivated generations of Chinese to erase the memory of their 
'Century of Humiliation' at the hands of Europe, the US and Japan, and so restore 
their pre-eminent global position. A rise in Chinese nationalism and confidence 
has matched its building of a 'prosperous nation and powerful military' (juguo 
qiangbing) (Zhu 2004). The central strategy of the CCP is consequently focussed 
on creating 'a strong military appeal to nationalist sentiments within the current 
leadership as well as the general population', causing realists to surmise that its 
potential for aggression and conflict becomes enhanced/elevated (ibid.). With the 
United States as the only superpower, realists envisage China will seek to ensure 
its security, thereby challenging the predominance of the US in the process of 
defending its perceived vital economic and security issues. Shambaugh (1996: 
187) argues China's goal was to 'weaken American influence relatively and 
absolutely, while steadfastly protecting its own corner', while in more recent 
times, Rex Li (2004: 25) has suggested that China 'perceived the US as a major 
rival' . 
China's foreign policy has not been solely driven by the concept of power 
alone. Neo-realist scholars emphasize that the structure of the international system 
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also sheds light on the behaviour of the Chinese state. Waltz (2000: 30) views 
China as one of the candidates capable of challenging the dominance of the 
United States, since structural change at the end of the Cold War encouraged 
China to perceive its great-power status. Realists argue that 'a state's freedom to 
choose whether to seek great-power status is in reality tightly constrained by 
structural factors. [ ...... ] eligible states that fail to attain great-power status are 
predictably punished' (Layne 1993: 9). China's economic expansion since the 
1980s has made it easier to challenge America's central position in the post-Cold 
War period, since there is a natural desire for a stronger economic power to 
assume a more significant military role (Waltz 1993). Mearsheimer (2001: 402), 
in particular, sees a confrontation between the US and China as a structural 
inevitability. This view has been echoed by Huntington (1996: 147) who states 
that China is the leading challenger to the West, where 'centrally important to the 
development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of 
China's military power and its means to create military power'. Roy (1994: 
149-68) even described that China as the 'hegemon on the horizon'. In addition, 
while reminding the world of its political and military obligations to bring about 
unification with Taiwan, by force if necessary, its commitment to North Korea's 
security, and its sovereign territory disputes, China's rise as a great power would 
coincide with attempts to attain greater security for survival in the East Asian 
security environment, due to tension on the Korean Peninsula, Japan's influence 
and power, and the potential conflict across the Taiwan Straits, as demonstrated in 
the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (see Ross 2006: 13-49). China also has had territorial 
disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu islands and with several Southeast Asian 
countries over islands in the South China Sea, such as the Chinese occupation of 
Philippino-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995 (MFA 2004a; People s Daily 2003a). 
According to Chung'S (2004: 127-40) observation, China's territorial claims in the 
South China Sea in the 1990s were fuelled by its search for rich natural resources, 
which remain vital to the survival and prosperity of China. 
By adopting a social revolutionary approach in understanding China's 
place in the realist world order, Tang (2007: 28-9) is more convinced that China 
will adopt a 'defensive realistic' policy, which means that it is 'unlikely to use its 
gained power to intentionally threaten other states'. However, the proponents of 
'civilizational realpolitik' like Samuel Huntington (1993: 22-49; 1996), continue 
to see China's strong sense of cultural superiority and self-confidence as 
precipitating a challenge to the existing international structure. Johnston (l998a: 
X) further argues that 'precisely because realpolitik behavior may be 
strategic-culturally rooted, these system-wide strategic predispositions may be 
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more mutable and susceptible to purposeful change than realists may expect'. The 
Chinese are no less concerned with the use of military power than any other 
civilization. 
The realist approach, as previously stated, advocates a defined structure 
within international relations, such that the 'texture of international politics 
remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly' 
(Waltz 1979: 66), and as such, each state perceives and acts upon its interests in a 
predictable manner. Despite being criticised for attributing little importance to the 
role of ideas in shaping the world system, the use of the 'strategic culture' 
approach, as well as historical legacy or culture, all contribute to the 
determination and re-enforcement of understanding China's position within the 
realist world order (Johnston 1998a). Though the strategic culture realist approach 
is considered 'more rigorous in conceptualisation and methodology' than 
conventional realism, it is equally unable to explain the transitions in a state's 
behaviour purely through ideational changes, particularly in terms of social 
learning (Johnston 1996b: 221; Levy 1994: 297-8). In general, the rationalisation 
of Chinese international relations, from realist perspectives, focuses the primacy 
for security and importance of military power as the ultimate resolution for 
security threats. 
2.2.2 The implications of realism for the understanding of China's foreign aid 
As discussed earlier, realism makes foreign aid possible when it is related to a 
donor's pursuit of political objectives. In the case of China, realists look for an 
explanation of China's economic assistance in its foreign policy goals, as it is both 
an aid donor and recipient. Zha Daojiong (2005: 1) highlights three goals of 
Chinese foreign aid, which suggest a realist Chinese foreign policy. These 
comprise: firstly, 'an instrument for serving the country's diplomatic agendas'; 
secondly, 'serving the country's economic development needs'; and thirdly, 
'promoting national re-unification', namely, how China views foreign aid as a 
tool to persuade and prevent more countries from recognizing Taiwan as a 
sovereign state. 
In the first goal, China's foreign aid policies were viewed by realists as the 
rivalry and struggle for influence in the Third World between the PRe and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War (Eckstein 1966; Goldman 1967; Kovner 1968; 
Larkin 1971; Muller 1964). This can be observed by China's cultivation of 
partnerships in developing countries in its drive to form a sphere of its O\vn, 
independent of both the Soviet sphere of communism/socialism and of the 
emerging Non-Aligned Movement, by promoting wars of national liberation as a 
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tool for its political purpose (Van Ness 1971). Many argue that the Tan-Zam 
railway project was a political gesture to aid the restoration of diplomatic ties 
which were disrupted during the Cultural Revolution, and in making new contacts 
in the field of international relations by demonstrating how Chinese aid was more 
capable of achieving the goals that other donors had failed to achieve (Yu 1970). 
China's economic relations and technical aid programmes served as 'a tool of its 
external relations' (Copper 1976: 14) to facilitate state-to-state contacts and 
people-to-people exchanges (Vang 2008: 37). Foreign aid donations from China 
were based on the basic principles of 'proletarian internationalism' which, at that 
time, was 'the guiding principle of China's foreign policy and also her foreign aid' 
(Peking Review 1974b: 16). For most of their post colonial history up until the 
1980s, the majority of developing states, especially newly independent African 
ones, became battlegrounds for primarily US-Soviet ideological warfare, which 
occasionally involved China as a third alternative. Chinese involvement in 
sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War period paid dividends for China's 
political relations in Africa, as support from the region had provided it with access 
to the United Nations General Assembly. As evidenced by the support China 
received from developing country members of the United Nations, the Chinese 
Government saw aid donation as an effective means for achieving its political 
goals. Mao was often quoted as saying: 'it was China's African friends that 
carried China into our seat at the United Nations headquarters' (Interview 2006a; 
2006b;2006c;2007c;2007d;2007g). 
In its second goal, as China's economy expands, realists argue that China 
will tend to become more ambitious in using its new-found power to extend its 
influence and defend its economic interests, thereby disrupting the dominance of 
the world's major power (Harris 2003; Segal 1999). China's economic advance 
continues to help its wider political and strategic position, such that, following 
Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, Chinese leaders have been developing 
China's 'comprehensive national strength' to compete with other great powers 
(Chan 1999: 28-33). Laliberte (2005: 17) points out that China's 'emergence as a 
major economic power with global reach cannot but evoke the spectre of 
hegemonic transition and its political fallout'. Therefore, Chinese foreign policy, 
including aid, is directed towards states that can supply the resource materials for 
China's economic development. China itself makes it clear that economic 
development is its priority, as the stressing of mutual benefit, built upon the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, was first outlined between China and its aid 
recipient countries (Peking Review 1974a: 6-11; 1974b: 16; Xu 1996). The 
Chinese 'go out' (zou chuqu) policy, as first proposed by Jiang Zemin following 
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China's ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, was aimed at 
helping Chinese firms access a range of start up incentives, joint ventures, and 
aid-to-profit schemes, in the form of government backed soft loans and export 
credit for businesses internationally (MFA 2002e). The Chinese Governmenfs 
recent activity in foreign aid is regarded as an attempt to secure natural resources 
to meet its domestic needs. Such reasons are supported by the realist viewpoint, as 
demonstrated when Chinese troops were sent to help its major aid recipient, 
Sudan, maintain control of its vital oilfields against rebel attacks in 2000 
(Economy and Monaghan 2006). Thomas and Zhu (2004: 4) argue that the 
dispatch of troops to the Sudan was not just part of China's push for resources, but 
was also part of China's political, diplomatic, and military objectives. 
Moreover, with regard to its third goal, throughout the CCP Governmenfs 
struggle for recognition from the international community between 1949 and the 
early 1970s, the PRC used economic assistance as a means to draw international 
support and recognition away from Taiwan, and towards the PRC. China's support 
of state sovereignty, the realists would argue, is in keeping with the IR theory that 
states conduct themselves in a manner that is self-serving, and where sovereignty 
and security can only be ensured by power. While the international community 
may view trouble spots and conflicts as international crises, China has shown time 
and again that what the international community deem an international concern, it 
views as domestic, such as Tibet and Xinjiang; a view that also extends to its 
policies on Taiwan. The 'one-China' policy is an example of how China's power 
is used to draw agreement from the international community. China's active 
participation in persuading the states recognizing Taiwanese sovereignty to switch 
their recognition and support to the PRC, is an example in keeping with the realist 
theory that foreign policy is conducted in a way to further a state's objectives. The 
very real threat of force by the PRC against any declaration of independence from 
the Taiwanese, in light of the American deterrent, shows again the lengths to 
which China will go in protecting its vital interests, as demonstrated in 1995-6 
when Beijing held a series of large-scale military exercises and missiles tests in 
the Taiwan Straits. While the Chinese Government has insisted that the 
Cross-Strait crisis was an 'internal affair', realists argued that China's willingness 
to achieve its national goals militarily proved that the stability of the Asia-Pacific 
region continued to be at risk. China had sent a clear signal that 'it now feels 
strong enough to play Asia's power game by its own rules and win' (Ross 2000: 
87-123; The Economist 1996; Whiting 2001: 103-31). 
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2.3 Liberalism 
In comparison with realism, liberalism shares the View that the international 
system is anarchic, and comprises rational states pursuing their own self-interests. 
However, unlike realists who tend to stress the importance of structural 
constraints in state action, liberals deny that state capabilities, or power struggles, 
are the primary interest which determines a state's foreign behaviour. While 
acknowledging the reality of anarchy, liberals object to the view that human 
nature is fundamentally bad and conflict among states is inevitable. Liberalism 
bases its view on cooperation, rather than on power and security. There is no 
hierarchy to international issues so state preferences may change while the 
interdependencies among nations increase. Accordingly, the more dependent a 
state is upon a greater power, for trade, aid, or protection, the more responsive it is 
likely to be. The behaviour of a state is also determined by its domestic concerns, 
such as its economy, which, according to Oneal and Russett (1999: 5), as it is 
'[ fJearful of the domestic political consequences of losing the benefits of trade, 
policymakers avoid the use of force against states with which they engage in 
economically important trade'. 
Post Cold-War international relations represent a departure from the 
bi-polar Cold War period, in that changes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union have allowed states the manoeuvrability to develop their foreign relations 
while providing an opportunity for increased state-to-state cooperation. Where 
neo-realism views international cooperation as 'harder to achieve, more difficult 
to maintain, and more dependent on state power' (Baldwin 1993: 5), liberalism 
supports a different viewpoint by recognizing the value of cooperation. This 
difference leads liberals to different conclusions over states' foreign behaviour, 
namely, that while states may indeed be prone to disputes in the pursuit of 
self-interest, their governments, behind the apparent 'black box', can learn to 
settle disputes peacefully. The increasingly 'complex interdependence' of the 
modern capitalist economy makes war too costly and reduces the effectiveness of 
traditional military force (Keohane and Nye 1998: 83-7). In the liberal view, a 
state that is more interested in economic development and trade is unlikely to 
invade its trading partners, thereby alleviating the effects of anarchy and 
promoting international cooperation (Ikenberry 2000: 103-4). 
Although appearing similar to realism in viewing states as the central 
players in international affairs, international organisations can playa variety of 
roles in the liberal paradigm. As Keohane and Martin (1995: 47) state: 
Realism's insistence that institutions have only marginal effects 
renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and 
logically unsound, and leaves it without a plausible account of the 
investments that states have made in such international institutions 
as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations. 
Liberalism does not assume that states are either absolute sovereign actors or 
'closed black boxes'. Instead, liberals believe that the qualitative change in the 
relationship of states under 'complex interdependence' permits the creation of 
international regimes, organisations and laws that facilitate cooperation and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes., It is through this interdependence that states can 
seek the collective security needed to tame the struggle for power (Viotti and 
Kauppi 1993: 236-42). In a situation supporting 'complex interdependence', the 
importance of transnational actors increases. There are also many communication 
channels such as 'epistemic communities' , which are 'networks of 
knowledge-based experts', engaged in 'articulating the cause-and-effect 
relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing 
the issues of collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient 
points for negotiation' (Haas 1992: 2). This minimizes the uncertainties and 
misconceptions, and broadens the information networks between nations. These 
international organisations facilitate the creation of regimes and maintain a system 
of cooperation in the anarchic system. Therefore, wars and conflict are the 
products of bad institutions and structural arrangements such as the Cold War 
bipolar structure of two opposing powers locked in deadly conflict with one 
another. The strengthening of international institutions and the construction of an 
international society can eliminate such structural conditions (Kegley and 
Wittkoph 1997: 4). In Keohane's words, institutions are 'persistent and connected 
sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane 1989: 3). Therefore, international 
institutions or regimes can affect the behaviour of states or other international 
actors. In accordance with this view, liberals claim that, despite anarchy, there is 
cooperation on various issues such as environment, human rights and collective 
security. 
The expansion of the European Union to include former Soviet and 
communist states in Eastern Europe was made possible following the end of the 
Cold War. Further expansions of organisations, such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU), also benefited 
from changes in international politics. Cooperation between states and regional 
bodies has also increased in order to deal with the destabilizing effects resulting 
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from the end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism. Issues such as 
climate change, poverty and trade have also necessitated an increase in 
cooperation, with international summits and conferences rivalling meetings of the 
UN General Assembly and the Security Council. 
Liberals view foreign aid as a set of programmatic methods intended to 
enhance the social, economic and political development of recipient countries 
(Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian 2005; Chenery and Strout 1966; Packenham 
1973). They view foreign aid as a resource for the development of poor countries 
suffering from economic backwardness and poverty, therefore, external assistance 
to maintain political stability in the newly independent countries was deemed a 
necessity in the post-war period. In the years immediately following the Second 
World War, US President Truman expressed these ideas by stating that' [0 ]ne of 
the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of 
conditions, in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life 
that is free from coercion' (The Truman Doctorine, cited in Grillo 2003: 50). The 
Marshall Plan, which was an extension of the Truman Doctrine, provided liberals 
with an early ideal model of foreign aid, and was believed to produce success 
since it 'allowed Western European nations to achieve peace and stability' 
(Watson, Gleek, and Grillo 2003: 53). The Marshall Plan encouraged European 
nations to work together for economic recovery after the war, which is in line with 
the liberal view, that foreign aid reflects the tendency of states to cooperate in 
addressing problems of interdependence. Growing amounts of aid channelled 
through international institutions during the 1970s, such as the World Bank, was 
viewed by many proponents of liberalism as evidence of cooperation at work in 
the international system. The increasing role of multilateral aid organisations 
became more visible with the establishment of the concessional loan window at 
the World Bank, which became known as the International Development 
Association (IDA) in 1960, and supported the ongoing roles of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), following their foundation in 1959, 1964 and 1966 
respectively. In contrast to these loan-providing multilateral banks, the UN 
Development Programme, founded in 1965, consolidated existing UN grant 
programmes (Poats 1985: 65-88). 
Additionally, and in line with the concepts of multilateralism, aid actors 
such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB, are all supposed to be institutions 
that facilitate communication between aid donors and recipients. Despite the 
goodwill of these institutions, the criticism of the inefficiency of aid has been 
raised since it underwent structural change at the end of the Cold War. Major 
donors and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, 
increasingly base their aid and loans on 'conditionality' of Structural Adjustment 
Policies which ensure that reforms and good governance are undertaken.! These 
traditional donors turned to legal and political reform in aid recipient countries as 
a possible cure for poverty after their aid programmes were criticised in terms of 
'failure' (Stiglitz 2002). This is generally supported by liberals with their claim on 
humanitarian assistance, as they would tend to believe that human potential for 
good governance is natural. Political will, combined with a national commitment, 
is needed by states and civil society organisations to root out corruption and 
mismanagement. Foreign aid itself originates from good will, but it has not been 
utilized effectively in the recipient countries. For liberals, the best way to avoid 
criticism is to ensure good economic and political governance which conforms to 
generally accepted norms of political and public behaviour (Fagelson 2004: 1-46). 
The concrete ideas advocated by liberalism are often taken to be representative of 
traditional donors, such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), who 
have gradually built up approaches and norms, such as good governance, 
sustainable development, democracy, and respect for human rights, in addition to 
the 'Washington Consensus', which comprises a list of policy proposals approved 
among the Washington-based international economic organisations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
2.3.1 What does liberalism reveal about China's foreign relations? 
Whilst diversifying foreign policy concerns such as foreign aid, liberalism focuses 
upon the role of international regimes in promoting cooperation, and views 
Chinese participation in various regional and international organisations as 
examples of managing issues and disputes that enhance cooperation. Therefore, 
an analysis of China's policy related to issues such as human rights, as well as 
environmental protection and peacekeeping, highlights independent variables 
rather than solely power-dependent factors that affect China's foreign policy 
choices. By taking Choedon's (2005: 53, 55) analysis of China's peacekeeping as 
an example, decision-making on Chinese peacekeeping operations not only 
depends on security and strategic concerns, but is also dependent upon economic 
and social aspects. With respect to the impact of interdependence towards foreign 
policy mechanisms, Choedon (2005: 55) argues that: 
I Liberals have been divided over the idea of self-determination and intervention; the split 
between (Bryanite) non-interventionists and (Wilsonian) interventionists reflected the Bryanites 
predominant supposition of a cooperative and stable global environment compared to th~ vie\\ 
held by Wilsonians, who believed intervention and force were necessary to achieve reformist and 
democratic ends (Gerstle 1994: 1046; Shimko 1992: 282). 
25 
China's stand on UNPKO [UN Peacekeeping Operations] reveals 
its progressive integration in the international system and a 
transformation from a revolutionary state challenging the global 
status quo, to a more mature and active participant in international 
relations. 
The escalating force of interdependence constrains China's foreign policy choices, 
which is evident in China's concerns about human rights. Regardless of the level 
of compliance with the UN human rights mechanisms, China officially proclaims 
its active participation in human rights discussions at the UN General Assembly 
and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (MFA 2004b). 
In the liberal paradigm, China's growing economic power and its 
increasing number of links with global markets, sufficiently temper China's 
behaviour, thereby making disputes and aggressive behaviour counterproductive. 
Cable and Ferdinand (1994: 259) recognise this when they highlight that: 
[T]he nature of current Chinese development has involved building 
up strong economic linkages with its neighbours through trade and 
investment flows [ ...... ] which would make military confrontation 
all the more costly. 
Therefore, both China and its trading partners have common interests in 
maintaining stability and prosperity, and should seek to maximize their absolute 
gains through international cooperation (Li 2009: 34). In line with this view, 
Kristof (1993: 68-9) notes that China's 'territorial and military aspirations are 
reasonable'. However, the importance of a peaceful environment to Chinese 
economic modernization has resulted in China becoming unwilling to destabilize 
the existing regional and international order. As Rex Li (2009: 13) points out: 
Given its multidimensional contacts with the outside world, 
liberals believe, China is becoming gradually involved in the 
global process of 'complex interdependence' and is restrained by 
its participation in international institutions and regimes. 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has gravitated towards cooperative relations 
with its Asian neighbours. Shambaugh (2004/05: 64-99) demonstrated active 
Chinese participation in the regional institutions of Asia, such as the Association 
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of Southeast Asian Nations (A SEAN) plus one (ASEAN and China), and the 
ASEAN plus three (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea). It has also initiated 
new regional regimes, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the 
Boao Forum for Asia and China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) (ibid.: 73-4), 
the latter of which will be launched in 2010 (Zhu 2000). The Boao Forum has 
held annual meetings in China's Hainan province since 2002, where political 
elites, business leaders and experts from around the region, have gathered to 
discuss economic cooperation in Asia (BFA). The liberal approach assumes that 
this economic cooperation is caused by economic interdependence in a region. In 
line with this insight, K wan (1994) argues that intraregional interdependence 
among Asian economies is the rationale for deepening cooperation among Asian 
governments. In addition, ASEAN+ 3 is an institution that contributes to 
stabilization, because it includes Southeast Asian states and all three major 
security actors in Northeast Asia, each of which have historically engaged in 
military conflicts with the other two at some point. This view is also supported in 
Johnston's (1998b: 1-30) data analysis, where he observed that the number of 
Chinese military disputes, either territorial or border, have declined, as a direct 
result of China's greater involvement in the international system. This 
demonstrates liberalism's argument, that increasing integration into international 
trade and politics affects the cooperative behaviour of a regime. 
Having illustrated how and why Chinese integration with international 
economic organisations helps its cooperative behaviour, this discussion will focus 
on how proponents of liberalism view how China and the International security 
regime would work in a cooperative manner. Taking China's membership in the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) as an example, Kent (2007: 100) comments 
that: 
[China] has become an integral part of the CD and of the arms 
control and disarmament regime more generally. It has moved 
from narrow, instrumental policies contrary to arms control norms 
to accepting the norms, principles, and rules of the nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 
The cooperation between China and the International security regIme, as 
Robinson (1998: 193-216) argues, shows how interdependence in one sphere 
helps facilitate interdependence in others spheres. This view is shared by Kim 
(1996: 433), who observes that 'judging by the phenomenal growth of Chinese 
IGO and INGO membership, positive participatory experience, and a number of 
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policy adjustments and shifts over such global issues as arms control and 
disarmament, UN peacekeeping, North-South relations, human rights (until 
Tiananmen), and science and technology', 'complex global interdependence and 
interpenetration' has occurred in Chinese international relations. 
2.3.2 The implications of liberalism for the understanding of China's foreign 
aid 
In the case of China's foreign aid policy, proponents of liberalism would divert 
attention away from a donor's pursuit of power to the more beneficial side. The 
liberal approach allows China's foreign aid to be viewed from a moral perspective, 
such as China's involvement in disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance. 
China's foreign aid to the 2004 tsunami relief effort in Southeast Asia is such an 
example of the liberal paradigm. The Chinese media made a point of reporting 
China's contributions to the relief effort as an obligation to international society, 
and Chinese populations were encouraged to actively participate in aid donation 
to international organisations such as the Red Cross (BBC 2005; Xinhua 2004b). 
It is widely known to be China's largest non-governmental donation, surpassing 
even those donations provided following the highest-level aid-related visits (Pan, 
Han, and Liu 2005: 26-7; Xinhua 2005b). Shih (1993: 243) agrees with the moral 
aspect of China's foreign policy behaviour, stating that Chinese leaders like to 
'present themselves as the supreme moral rectifiers of the world order'. As such, 
its Third World policy is intended to be a model for emulation. 
When responding to China's foreign aid behaviour, proponents of 
liberalism highlight its aid contributions and integration into international aid 
operations, such as initiatives led by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). 
Since 2006, this programme has also taken the lead in working with the Chinese 
Government to establish the China-Africa Business Council (CABC). This 
multilateral development assistance initiative 'reflects China's current approach to 
development cooperation' (Chin and Frolic 2007: 18). The major aid donor 
countries also invited China to the G8 meeting at Heiligendamm, Germany in 
2007, since China was increasingly being viewed as part of the 'next generation 
of potentially' significant aid donor countries (BBC 2007b). Liberals believe that 
both China and other major aid donors share common interests in maintaining 
stability and prosperity in aid recipient countries, and seek to maximize their 
absolute gains through international cooperation. The international community 
needs to make a greater effort to promote dialogue and collaboration with the 
PRC, with the ultimate aim of encouraging it to act more constructively and 
responsibly (Breslin 1997: 497-508). 
28 
Given the importance of international organisations as mechanisms of 
communication and cooperation between states, liberals point out that since the 
end of the Cold War, China has developed multilateral trends in its development 
assistance (Chin and Frolic 2007: 3). Chin and Frolic highlight that Chinese 
support for multi-donor-supported South-South dialogue and international 
research for development is beneficial to the field of development assistance. 
They are confident that Chinese technologies in developing countries will benefit 
the economic development and contribute to the improvement of the 
technological levels of recipients (ibid.: 9). Liberals would argue, that Chinese 
commitments at the 2005 Millennium Review Summit in New York demonstrate 
China's contribution to international development, assistance, and cooperation. 
Manning (2006: 376) summarised the summit's concluding commitments as 
follows: 
1. The introduction of a zero tariff on key exported, China-bound, 
products from all thirty nine of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
that have current diplomatic relations with China. 
2. The expansion of aid to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 
and LDCs, along with a commitment to cancelling all outstanding, 
pre-2005 interest-free and low-interest government loans to HIPCs, which 
held current diplomatic relations with China, by the end of 2006. 
3. A three-year time span for implementing the provision of US$l 0 billion, 
in concessionalloans and preferential export buyer's credit, to developing 
countries for the purpose of improving infrastructure and promoting 
mutual cooperation between enterprises, an increase in assistance of 
anti-malarial and other medications, aimed at establishing and improving 
medical training and facilities, in addition to the training of 30,000 
personnel in various professions throughout the developing countries to 
assist with their human resource development. 
The willingness to interlink multilateral foreign aid has required China to engage 
in a balancing act in its foreign aid policy between its obligations to the donor 
community and its own agenda of interests. Although China is not entirely 
supportive of the economic reform agenda or the use of policy conditionality 
agreed by major aid donors, proponents of liberalism are more optimistic about 
China working with traditional aid donors, and advocate a pragmatic Chinese 
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response to international criticism of its aid behaviour. 
2.4 Constructivism 
Constructivism regards human nature as neither being naturally prone to conflict, 
as advocated by realism, nor to cooperation, as proposed by liberalism, but rather 
remains dependent on the socially constructed identities and interests of the 
involved actors (Alagappa 1998: 5). The nature of international anarchy is not 
stable or pre-disposed but is determined by states directly. 'Anarchy is what states 
make of it' (Wendt 1992: 408-9), and whether it takes a Hobbesian or more 
benign form of culture, such as Lockean or Kantian, it is the result of how states 
interact, and the norms they are inclined to construct. Since there is no single state 
of 'rationality' within a regime, ideational factors such as their individual national 
identities, shared expectations and norms, have been attributed to the 
non-homogeneity of states' behaviours (Hook et al. 2001: 42, 47; Smith 1997: 
183), in contrast to the external, material factors such as power or trade as 
emphasized by realism and liberalism. According to the constructivist 
interpretation, identities are not exogenous, but are constructed through 
interaction with other states in historical, cultural, political and social contexts 
(Hopf 1998: 176; Wendt 1995: 72-3). Since identities are constructed through 
social practices, so consequently are the interests upon which they are based. 
Identities directly influence the kinds of interests or preferences with respect to 
the context that states find themselves in. As Wendt states: '[i]dentities are the 
basis of interests' (Wendt 1992: 398), which led Weber (2001: 60) to show that 
'what states do depends upon what their identities and interests are, and identities 
and interests change'. The interest of states, therefore, cannot be simply deduced 
from the realist or liberal structure of anarchy, namely through the maximisation 
of power. Threat perception is a function of identity, and a sense of shared identity 
rather than the power of other states, would, therefore, decrease the perception of 
a threat from another state. Thus, contrary to maximization of wealth and power 
of interests, constructivism facilitates an understanding of interests that are in 
relation to where particular interests originate, and why particular interests are 
absent in some states. As Hopf (1998: 176) states: 
By making interests a central variable, constructivism explores not 
only how particular interests come to be, but also why many 
interests do not. The tautological, and therefore also true, most 
common, and unsatisfying explanation is that interests are absent 
where there is no reason for them, where promised gains are too 
30 
meager. 
By observing the explanations of the constructivist approach, it becomes apparent 
that constructivism does not refute realist and liberal arguments, such as 
rationalism and security, as explanations of the international behaviours of states 
(Wendt 1992: 391-2). The major dispute with rationalism from the constructivist 
perspective is that it assumes the identities and interests of states are evident that , 
states 'acquire identities-relatively stable, role-specific understandings and 
expectations about self' which shape their 'intersubjectively constituted structure 
of identities and interests' (Wendt 1992: 397, 401; 1999: 231). Apart from 
exhibiting a traditional material focus, constructivism has incorporated ideational 
factors such as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures into the 
ontological status of the international system (Krasner 1983: 2). While the 
ontological status focuses on identity, ideas, or norms, the relationship between 
structures and actors involves inter-subjective understanding and meanings. 
External environments do constrain states, but states can also transform these 
constraints by relating to them and acting upon them in new ways (Jepperson, 
Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 41). The institution also plays an important role in 
the constitution of identities from the constructivist perspective. They not only 
support rationalist and utilitarian functions such as benefit and cost calculation, 
but also identities and interests as a result of mutual interregional interactions 
(Hook and Kearns 1999: 3). 
Within this inter-subjective social context, constructivists VIew the 
behaviour of states as driven by rules of appropriate behaviour. 'Norms therefore 
constitute states/agents, providing them with understandings of their interests' 
(Checkel 1998: 326; 2005: 804). Accordingly, norms 'describe collective 
expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity' (Katzenstein 
1996: 5). It is subsequently through internal actors and external pressures, such as 
bureaucratic politics, factions and business activities, that foreign policy and ideas 
of national interest become shaped (Hook et al. 2001: 38, 72). Norms are 
deliberately chosen to reflect 'identity and culture', and although they are difficult 
concepts to define, the examination of the constituent parts of identity and culture 
through norms is more practical (Dobson 2003: 27-9). 
2.4.1 The impact of norms on foreign policy 
A norm is generally defined as 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors 
with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Norms are distinct 
from behaviour even though they are generally associated with value judgt:ments. 
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and therefore are often viewed as devices depicting standards of 'good' or 'bad' 
behaviour, although most norms studied by IR scholars tend to focus on those 
with positive associations (Kowert and Legro 1996: 485-6). In contrast, ideas and 
beliefs, which may occasionally be mistaken for norms, require neither any 
distinct association with actor behaviour, nor any requirement for collective 
acceptance, nor any attachment to value judgements. Norms promote the concept 
of 'correct behaviour' in a society as they prompt justification of states' actions. 
Once institutionalized, norms, acting on the basis of established beliefs and values, 
become a source of legitimacy and constrain the behaviour of states (Berger 1996: 
327; Katzenstein 1996: 5). States continuously create and recreate identities and 
reassess norms, and therefore reshape conceptions of their interest through the 
constant testing of these identities and norms against actual events, and through 
interaction with other states (Barnett 1996: 412; Berger 1996: 326; Wendt 1992: 
399,411). 
Norms are dynamic concepts, and consequently should not be viewed as 
static, but rather subject to forces of evolution and change. By looking at the 
origins of norms and their mechanisms for exercising influence, the conditions 
under which norms become dominant can be identified. Typically, before a norm 
comes into being, there is no self-interest in its promotion. A variety of influences 
lead to the creation of norms, which according to Finnemore and Shikkink (1998: 
887-917), who examine the norms of women's suffrage and laws of war, follow a 
standard life cycle from emergence, through a tipping point to a cascade which 
leads to internalisation, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
New Norm 
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challenged 
Tipping Point 
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almost Inevitable 
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Figure 2.1 The norm life cycle1 
I Author'S figure is according to Finnemore and Shikkink's (1998: 894-905) norm life cycle. 
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Changes to norms at each stage of the cycle, and throughout their 
subsequent evolution, are influenced and characterised by different actors, who 
subject the norms to diverse behaviours in order to obtain influence over them. 
Many norms share their origins within domestic issues, then become 
internationalised by a process of universal acceptance outside of their domestic 
setting. In the first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998: 890-900) norm life 
cycle model, norm entrepreneurs convince a critical mass of states to take up the 
new norms which co-exist in balance with existing norms, and thus create a 
tipping point after which the second stage of norm evolution begins. Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998: 892, 895-6) argue the dynamics of norm dissemination in their 
discussion of the norm life cycle. They note that at the end of the first phase of the 
cycle, once the tipping point has been passed, norm acceptance by other actors 
becomes increasingly, and rapidly, prolific. Through the process of internalisation, 
the norm becomes enforced, widely accepted and embedded into a state's 
constitution and professional working practices, thereby making it very powerful 
but hard to discern. Although the phases represent the main life cycle of a norm, 
its ability to traverse this entire process is far from certain, as norms inter-compete 
for acceptance or the achievement of cascade. Once the norm has become adopted, 
transnational influences may become more significant than domestic pressures in 
the norm's evolution and subsequent diffusion. Norm makers frequently use 
congruence between transnational norms and local beliefs and practices to 
facilitate their acceptance and implementation. The key to the successful 
acceptance of a transnational norm lies in its potential for localisation; a factor 
that plays a key role in the evolution of a norm (Acharya 2004). The process and 
outcome of localisation is often complex, but the key to its success lies in 
constructive intervention and flexible engagement. The process of localisation 
commonly results in the internalisation of a domestically embedded norm, such as 
sovereignty or developmentalism, and plays a role in the defining of domestic 
interests. As the influence of the norm expands domestically, it affects the nation's 
interactions with the wider international community, inducing a further transition 
of the norm into an international norm, such as Asianism, bilateralism, 
multilateralism or internationalism (Hook et al. 2001: 72-5). 
Two important factors play critical roles in the norm life cycle: the norm 
entrepreneur and the identity of the regime. Norm entrepreneurs actively construct 
enhanced perceptions of appropriate behaviour within their communities by 
raising the awareness of the norm. The entrepreneur commonly constructs a 
cognitive framework in order to broaden communal understanding, by contesting 
the importance of the new norm through challenging the logic of appropriateness 
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of existing and opposing norms. The aim of this process is to invoke empathic, 
altruistic or ideational commitment from the community to perceive the new norm 
favourably. The entrepreneur acts in accordance with the redefined conception of 
their interest (Finnemore and Shikkink 1998: 893, 895-9). 
Identity plays a role in facilitating norm localisation, since external norms 
often require initial adaptation to local circumstances (Acharya 2004: 241-70). 
This allows the norm to be viewed as strengthening a society without 
extinguishing its identity, as well as leading to the reinforcing of both its existing 
norms and its leadership by local agents who are viewed as more persuasive than 
external agents, without seemingly being manipulated by them. Thus, initiatives 
seeking to accommodate local sensitivities are more likely to succeed, in place of 
those that seek to supplant them. Since change depends on not only the agent but 
the local beliefs shaping it, localisation is viewed as progressive rather than 
regressive and static. 
Having addressed the concepts of norms, as well as understanding their 
life cycle, the discussion will continue by drawing upon the constructivist view of 
foreign aid. For constructivists, 'how the state's identity is likely to shape its 
willingness to provide aid' is an important question, because foreign aid policy 
practices are related to donors' ideas, such as those exemplified by Therien (2002: 
449-66). 
As constructivist insights suggest, the transformations of the aid 
regime cannot be understood outside the ideological and discursive 
environment in which they were engendered. In line with these 
insights, it is important to emphasise that the debate on 
development assistance has always been framed in terms of an 
opposition between forces of the Right and forces of the Left. 
(Therien 2002: 449) 
Therien (2002: 454) highlights that the decision about how aid is distributed is 
largely based upon the concept of the donor's aid norms, as well as on its social 
relations with aid recipient countries. He argues that the prevailing ideas from that 
period arose through a combination of factors which include contributions from 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in defining a vision of international 
cooperation in the inter-war years, as well as international initiatives taken 
between 1950 and 1970, that included the creation of the IDA in 1960, the 
establishment of the OEeD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961, 
and the creation of the UNDP in 1965. 
Other dominant discourses of the time included the development model 
promoted through foreign aid during the 1950-70s, which assured that economic 
growth would adequately compensate the social requirements of Third World 
populations. This development, which emphasised infrastructural improvement, 
used foreign aid for the construction of dams and roads, and assumed that the 
population would eventually all benefit from these projects (Therien 2002: 455). 
Conversely, Structural Adjustment Programmes, that grew out of the protectionist 
and monetarist policies throughout the developed world in the 1980s, became 
promoted by the IMF and World Bank as an alternative model, and prerequisite 
for obtaining foreign aid (ibid.: 456-7). 
These two examples show how the transformations of donors' ideas 
change the form of aid, and reiterate Hattori's argument that foreign aid identifies 
'a basic shift in the nature of anarchy in international relations after World War II' 
(Hattori 2001: 649). Based upon Hattori's analysis, aid practice transforms 
material dominance and subordination into gestures of generosity and gratitude. 
This transformation, in turn, signifies the material hierarchy underlying the 
donor-recipient relation. In this process, recipients become complicit in the 
existing order that enables donors to donate in the first place. He demonstrated his 
argument by highlighting how US and Soviet military aid in the Cold War era was 
a much inferior form of symbolic domination (Hattori 2001: 635-43), namely, the 
identity behind the manner of giving and the norms that donors believe in are the 
incentives for donors' aid decisions. Norms, therefore, 'describe collective 
expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity' (Katzenstein 
1996: 5). 
2.4.2 What does constructivism reveal about China's foreign relations? 
As the constructivist perspective focuses primarily upon issues of culture and 
identity, the idea of 'who is China' becomes an important question in clarifying 
both the norms of behaviour, and the source of the motivation behind China's 
foreign policy. Constructivists have examined China's identity, which influences 
what it considers its interests, in order to understand Chinese foreign relations 
(Berger 1996; Johnston 1996a). History, geography, and ethnicity have played 
significant roles in shaping China's relations with the world, such as its traditional 
Chinese world order (see Shih 1993; Zhang 2001: 250-71). Pye (1996: 109) views 
China as a 'civilization pretending to be a nation-state', noting that Chinese 
political behaviour references cultural precedents. 'These culturalist 
understandings often lead to essentialized views of Chinese identity and practice' 
(Callahan 2004: 3). Callahan (2004: 37-8, 149-52) argues that Chinese foreign 
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policy has been described as closely related to its sense of insecurity, which is a 
result of its 'national humiliation', namely the shame it felt over its lost territor\'. 
Idealized versions of China's past inspire Chinese scholars' and policymakers' 
plans for China's foreign behaviour (Callahan 2004). Berger (2003: 387-8) 
illustrates Chinese willingness to challenge the US, despite undermining its own 
economic and security interests by exemplifying: 
Neoliberal institutionists and Neorealists alike should be perturbed 
by the People's Republic of China's (PRC) readiness to risk a 
military confrontation with the United States over Taiwan despite 
the overwhelming preponderance of American maritime and 
strategic power in the Pacific and despite the damage that such a 
belligerent policy inflicts on China's international image and the 
possibilities for international cooperation. 
Additionally, China and Japan have nurtured close economic relations, despite 
their relatively lukewarm social and political ties (Interview 2006a; 2007i). The 
origins of the growing disparity of relations can be traced as far back to the height 
of the dynastic Chinese empire in the 16th century (Hook et al. 2001: 27-9). A 
more recent cause for this disparity in relations originated primarily from the 
invasion and division of China by foreign powers during the 'century of shame 
and humiliation', and the memories of Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanjing 
massacre in 1937, and subsequent events during World War II. The strength of the 
Chinese response to the Nanjing massacre, most notably at Taierzhuang in 1938, 
highlighted how deep the division in Sino-Japanese relations became historically. 
The Chinese are particularly sensitive to Japanese actions that may trigger painful 
memories, such as Japanese accounts of their actions during World War II 
presented in historical textbooks and the visit of senior Japanese politicians to the 
Yasukuni Shrine (Jiang 2002: 153; Li 2009: 139). China is aware of the relevance 
of how a 'correct historical view' is perceived about itself (Li 2009: 139). 
Historical aspects feature prominently in many demonstrations throughout China, 
such as the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, which was 
viewed in terms of humiliation comparable to that inflicted a century earlier at the 
hands of the West (Callahan 2004: 52-3, 183). 
The PRC was established in a bipolar international system with 'the sense 
of loss of sovereignty at the hands of the United States and other \Vestern states 
[that] echoed the humiliation experienced in its earlier relations with Western 
powers' (Kent 2007: 39). Within this system, China's interest was constructed by 
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its victim identity, through the desire to preserve autonomy. As Kornberg and 
Faust (2005: 15) highlighted, 'China would lean to one side and then to the other, 
and it would seek friends in the Third World, but its continual security imperative 
was the jealous preservation of its sovereignty.' By defining itself on the basis of 
anti-imperialism, through its social interaction with other states, China was 
forming an identity to attain recognition from the Third World, with whom they 
shared common empathy. The opening up and reform of the Chinese state. 
introduced by Deng Xiaoping, initiated the PRC's first major ideational 
transformation since its formation. Prior to Deng, China for most of the period 
from 1949 through 1976, was isolated internationally due to its opposition to 
American and Soviet hegemony. This isolated victim identity provided China with 
a role in seeking foreign relations with Third World countries. Beijing came to 
view itself as one of the leading actors of the international communist movement, 
and one who bore 'a heavier responsibility for the unity of the entire socialist 
camp and international communist movement' (Griffith 1964:259). As Chen 
Zhimin (2005: 44) notes, despite China being alienated from the international 
community in the 1960s, it was able to obtain 'a sense of greater international 
status through its "thought centre" [leading ideological] role in world 
revolutionary movements', by supporting radical anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
movements in the developing world. 
With the PRC's legitimate membership in the UN, China overcame its 
lack of 'international legitimacy' (Kent 2007: 63). In addition, through its 
'open-door' policy, China actively interacted with the international community, in 
particular through its economic relations, and consequently, China expanded its 
participation in international organisations. Pearson (1999: 229) argued that the 
ideas of the Chinese Government playa predominant role in shaping the nature of 
Chinese policy changes. 
This is particularly true of the original impetus for the "open" 
policy; in the 1970s and early 1980s, policy communities which 
favoured joining the global economic regimes formed within China 
in isolation from international forces and made the decision to 
pursue participation in the multilateral economic organizations 
(and global markets generally). The influence of outside forces 
came later in the process, and only after the basic decision to 
"open" China was made. 
(ibid.: 227) 
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Building upon this, China's identity underwent change from that of an isolated 
victim state to one of a rising great power state, despite Chinese leaders' 
assertions that they would always identify with developing countries. These 
assertions have, since then, echoed the remnants of its vestigial victim identity. 
Snow (1994: 309) highlighted that China would abandon the developing world 
once it had repaired relations between itself and Western powers following 
changes in Chinese identity. This identity of a big power state reflects Johnson 
and Evans' (1999: 265) view, that through China's participation in international 
organisations: 
[Chinese decision makers] appear to have been more sensitive to 
social incentives-fear of appearing to be pariah, the saboteur of 
processes that were highly legitimate for a large number of states 
in the system; and a desire to maximize a diffuse image as a 
responsible major player whose identity as such required 
participation in major institutions regulating interstate behavior. 
China's rapid increase in participation in global affairs since the 1970s has 
stimulated constructivists to investigate the interaction between China and the 
international community. As Economy (2001: 232) observed: 
[N]umerous scholars have attempted to shed light on the values 
and priorities that China brings to the negotiating table and the 
nature of Chinese participation once it has joined an international 
regime. 
Johnston (2003: 45-56) argues that within East Asia, China is progressing towards 
key norms of security, by manoeuvring away from revisionism in two significant 
respects: by avoiding domestic social and political upheaval, through increased 
state control, and by attempting to minimise the US/China security dilemma, 
through increased multilateral cooperation and reassurance. Frieman (2004) 
additionally argues that Chinese behaviour has adjusted, in no small part, due to 
international non-proliferation norms, and through links with Western 
organisations that promote ideas of cooperative security. The means by which this 
socialization occurs is typically argued to be through the accumulated effect on 
individual people. In the Chinese case, this would arise from 'the development of 
a Chinese community of arms control experts who have burgeoning transnational 
links with organizations in the West that support cooperative security ideas' 
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(Johnston 1996a: 57). 
2.4.3 The implications of constructivism for the understanding of China's 
foreign aid 
As outlined earlier, as a result of its increasing integration and 'legitimate 
recognition' from the international system, China's identity as a victimised and 
isolated state has been in decline, stimulating a transformation in Chinese identity. 
Following China's admission to the UN, as the primary embodiment of Chinese 
integration in the international system, a move which was further underlined by 
its open door policy during the 1970s, it became more involved in global 
economic and security institutions (Johnson and Evans 1999: 235-72; Pearson 
1999: 207-34; Zhou 2008: 144-5). Throughout its diplomatic exchanges with the 
outside world, China continued to redefine its status and identity, in order to 
re-position itself within the international community (Zhou 2008: 144). In so 
doing, 'socialism with Chinese characteristics, the status of great power of 
developing countries' became its representation of self-identity (Zhou 2008: 144; 
also see China 1997). 
The transformation of Chinese identity, as a big power state, promoted a 
China that possessed a more proactive attitude, which therefore increased its 
ambition in participating in international foreign aid programmes. Following the 
redefining of its identity, China became more comfortable with its dual role as 
both an aid recipient of the developed world, as well as aid donor to the 
developing \;Vorld. Since it was a great power in the developing world, China 
became furnished with Western capital, technology, knowledge and experience 
that it required to rebuild itself, while at the same time, as a senior member of the 
developing world, China continued to provide aid to its 'friends and partners' in 
developing nations (Zhou 2008: 144). This idea was illustrated by Deng Xiaoping 
at the third plenary session of the 11 th Chinese Central Committee, when he 
clarified that the present Plenum would adamantly promote 'relying on 
self-reliance and supplementing it with foreign aid', since its isolation from the 
Soviet Union had isolated itself from the major global powers (Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 1982: 5). From that time, China not only began to 
maximise the effectiveness of foreign aid from the UN, Japan and Germany, but it 
also continued to provide aid to developing countries (Zhou 2008: 144, 146). In 
so doing, China displayed characteristics and experience of a nation with 
significant economic leverage, while at the same time, it showed no propensity to 
'overturn established regime norms' (Pearson 1999: 207), such as its advocacy of 
the sovereignty norm, namely non-interference, which sustained its continued and 
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unchallenging support of countries such as Myanmar and Sudan, which will be 
explained in more detail in the case study chapters. By expanding its interaction 
with other aid donors, thereby becoming increasingly disciplined to the rigours of 
the global market and the desires of its own domestic actors, China continued to 
promote changes to its behaviour through its aid policy. Even though control of its 
foreign aid decision making processes remained highly centralised, the impact 
from interacting with global aid donors began being channelled through its own 
domestic perspective (Interview 2006b; 2006d, 2007d). During the 1970s, the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations held five national working meetings, 
initially annually between 1971 and 1973, then biannually thereafter, for the 
purpose of discussing foreign aid under the direction of the State Council (Zhou 
2008: 146). In subsequent discussions, Deng Xiaoping reiterated the central ideas 
of deploying less financial aid with a view to becoming highly efficient. 
Internationally and domestically embedded norms exist in a state of 
competition with regard to foreign aid, as demonstrated by China's own 
experiences as a former recipient of World Bank funds. These experiences shaped 
China's principles of self-reliance in its own foreign aid to developing nations and 
focussed its aid policy on the stressing of long-term economic development in 
place of other goals such as social or political development. Such goals are 
consistent with Chinese foreign policy, which include principles relating foreign 
aid with non-intervention in developing countries' domestic affairs, which have 
been applied somewhat subjectively and less frequently in recent years, and aid 
disbursement for military purposes. Additionally, it has immediate foreign policy 
concerns that involve challenges to its sovereignty, such as Taiwan, Tibet and 
Xinjiang. As 'China has become a born-again believer in regional multilateralism' 
(Shirk 2007: 118), it may seek a more prominent role in shaping international 
norms in future in order to demonstrate its willingness to engage in activities that 
will rationalise and allay suspicions towards Beijing's motivations. China's 
contribution to multilateral fund donations, such as its contribution to the World 
Bank's IDA Fund in December 2007, along with its joint co-financing of 
collaborative arrangements through the Chinese Export-Import (EXIM) bank, 
demonstrate the constructivist view that through socialising with international 
society, norms became more internalised through localisation. As it transformed 
from being an aid recipient state, to something more akin to a donor, it began to 
recognise its interest in increased responsibility. 
China is changing from a recipient nation to a donor nation in 
international aid. It is expected to playa bigger role in international 
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poverty alleviation. [ ...... ] Yao Shenhong, deputy director-general 
of the International Cooperation Department under the Ministry of 
Commerce, said that China is willing to share its experiences in 
poverty alleviation with other developing nations. He said that 
China began to offer help to other nations years ago and would 
make further contributions 'in its own way'. 
(People:S Daily 2007a) 
Despite the changes that have transpired in China's identity, norms, and interests 
throughout the distribution of its foreign aid, public opinion, in general, plays a 
largely insignificant role in influencing Chinese aid programmes in the 
constructivist paradigm. Sustained public discussion over the effectiveness of aid, 
or how it conforms to international norms, is extremely rare, largely due to the 
lack of information available on such matters, and also due to the role of central 
government in determining aid implementation concerns, which are addressed by 
high ranking political leaders and selected official researchers (Interview 2007e; 
2007n). Until there are distinct improvements in aid bureaucracy, a dedicated aid 
agency or financial institution, or a community of aid professionals whose 
members belong to a larger global epistemic community that is conversant and 
versed in the key principles that constitute international aid norms, a significant 
barrier to the convergence of norms within China remains (see Haas 1992; for 
Central Government Management Structure China's Foreign Aid, see Chin and 
Frolic 2007: 7; Zhou 2008: 156-8). Although efforts are being focussed upon the 
recruitment of expertise, through the organisation of conferences and the 
invitation of leading scholars to become more involved in this process, thereby 
assisting with the ongoing design of aid, the moves are still largely limited. Until 
such interaction occurs, the diffusion of international norms in China in practice, 
with regard to aid, will remain relatively elusive (Interview 2006c; 2006d; 20071; 
2007d; 2007m). Therefore, the main concern to constructivists remains the 
trajectory of Chinese aid and whether any convergence towards international aid 
norms such as DAC standards or Chinese aid behaviour, is directly guided by the , 
embedded norms. Constructivists are particularly interested in how China's 
primary motivations for aid donation have undergone change, along with how it 
has sought greater alignment with the international aid norms and modal 
practices. 
Chapter 3 continues this discussion by examining, in detail, the constituent 
components of these identities, and norms, in order to highlight how they have 
contributed to the debate on China's foreign aid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NORMS AND CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
As norms playa central role in analysing China's foreign relations in this thesis, it 
is important to examine the literature on this subject. Although the literature on 
the concept of norms in studies of China's foreign policy has continued to grow, 
few studies have focussed upon the norms themselves, within its foreign aid 
policy, or upon their impact on state behaviour, despite China's growing presence 
as an 'emerging' aid donor. The main body of literature on norms in China 
focuses primarily on China's compliance with international norms in widespread 
and influential areas, such as human rights, the environment, and arms control. 
Kent (1999) studies the human rights norm in China by examining its 
participation and limitation through United Nations humanitarian regimes; Yu 
Hongyuan (2008) argues that international regimes have contributed to the 
development of coordination in China's policy making within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and Frieman (2004) 
gives an account of China's demonstrated compliant behaviour, by documenting 
China's role in seven specific arms control regimes. In addition to the 
aforementioned focus on specific issues, Chan (2006) and Kent (2007) examine 
China's changing international behaviour through its interaction with international 
organisations, by covering and comparing issues such as trade, arms control, 
environmental protection, and human rights to investigate how China has 
complied with international norms. The majority of the remaining literature, as 
analysed by Johnston (1996a), Hu (1999), Pearson (1999), Johnston and Evans 
(1999), Wang (2000) and Lampton (2001), points out China's internalisation 
(learning) of international norms by examining both the extent of China's 
cooperation with the international community, and the quality of its subsequent 
integration, through the study of the changes in the way that Chinese foreign and 
security policy is made. An additional perspective was provided by Wang (200.+: 
38), who combined the traditional IR theories and the insights of constructivism 
to examine the diffusion of international norms in China's government reforms. 
Wang (2004: 4-40) argues that the manner by which the Chinese Government has 
accepted international norms varies along two dimensions: rhetoric and practice. 
From the discussion, Wang identifies a broad spectrum mer \\hich the 
international norms of power separation, media oversight, rule by law. Central 
Bank autonomy, and meritocracy in the civil service existed. These range from 
norms that gained minimal recognition in the official discourse, and subsequently 
received little practical implementation, at one extreme, to norms that have 
enjoyed enthusiastic endorsement from the Government, which have become 
institutionalized over the years, at the other extreme. The study also cites a variety 
of mixed cases with varying degrees of rhetorical and practical acceptance that 
were found to lie in between the two extremes. 
Medeiros and Fravel (2003: 32) highlight that Chinese foreign policies are 
informed by China's growing emphasis on great-power relations (daguo guanxi). 
The Chinese media cite that the image and identity of being' a responsible great 
state' (juzeren de daguo) playa role in China's foreign policy behaviour (People's 
Daily 2009d; Xinhua 2006d; 2007d). Swaine and Johnson (1999) further argue 
that China's self-image of being a responsible great power facilitated the 
extension to the arms control agreement which China signed in the 1990s. Chan 
(2006: 15) proposes that in accordance with the traditional Chinese Confucian 
ideal of mingzheng yanshun (when names are right, speech is consequential), the 
idea of dingwei (to define one's position) therefore becomes significant in 
determining one's behaviour. The idea of dingwei which Chan cites is closely 
linked to the constructivist idea of national identity, and affects how a state is 
going to behave, fulfil its identity, and exercise its foreign policy. Chang (2004: 
51-2, 255-60) analyses three definitions of Chinese dingwei of' great power'. The 
first defines China as 'a systematic great power' (yiji in Chinese terminology). 
Under this definition, China would construct its foreign policy through 
'partnership relations' (huoban guanxi), by placing emphasis on its 'great power' 
as a primary factor in the forging of its foreign policy priorities. The second 
defines China as a 'responsible big power', implying that it would be more likely 
to comply with international norms and order, become engaged in international 
organisations and regimes, or even propose reforms. The third defines China as an 
'anti-great power' or a 'challenge great power', whereby China regarded the 
international order as immoral and would be inclined to oppose and challenge the 
existing values and norms, which it would view as hegemonic. The observable 
behaviour of China would be to the degree of the definitions, either exclusive or 
inclusive, characterising its identity (ibid.: 264-8). Katzenstein, Keohane, and 
Krasner (1998: 679) reflect this argument of China's emphasising its great-po\\er 
identity, by stating that constructivists insist 'on the primacy of inter-subjective 
structures that give the material world meaning'. In so doing. China displays 
'different components that help in specifying the interests that motivate action: 
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norms, identity, knowledge, and culture' (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 
1998: 679). 
It should be noted that the aforementioned works concentrate on the 
manner in which international norms impact upon China rather than on how 
norms in China shape its international behaviour. Moreover, the argument of 
China's good self-image alone when used to define China's identity as a 'great 
power' (daguo) only focuses on China's outward-looking mentality and is 
restricted to a limited historical period. Norms not only enable actors, create new 
interests or categories of action, but also initialise dynamic concepts (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998: 891). Both internationally and domestically embedded norms 
exert an important influence upon China's international relations. Therefore, the 
evolution of these norms is central to an understanding of China's international 
behaviour. 
Before conducting an examination of the norms which are central to an 
understanding of China's international behaviour, the choice of the particular 
norms used in this thesis requires justification. According to Womack (2008: 5), 
'developments in [China's] foreign policy have occurred in four major areas since 
the 1990s'. These have largely affected China's policies of non-interference, good 
neighbourhood, institutional involvement, and multi-polarity and cooperation. 
These developments have arisen through not only China's own experiences, but 
also through China's exposure to elements that were beyond its control in the 
international community. These considerations make the choice of both 
internationally and domestically embedded norms important in the investigation 
of the changes that have transpired. Two internationally embedded norms which 
China has become increasingly exposed to are Asianism and internationalism. The 
impact of its exposure to these norms may be seen through its institutional 
involvement in the regions. The influence of the change in policies that have 
arisen through its unavoidable exposure and response to these norms: 
[R]eflects an obviously thought-through strategy of clearing the 
path in the rise to power - and keeping options open [displaying] a 
substantial willingness to erase the most abrasive asperities of their 
foreign policies. [ ...... ] the acceptance of those norms was aimed 
at defusing the unease of smaller Asian nations in face of its 
overbearing and bullying conduct and, as a whole, it has been 
successful in that respect. The changes reflect an understanding 
[ ...... ] of the novelty in the exercise and forms of power: setting 
the agenda. shaping the preferences of others, framing issues in 
ways consistent with one's own interests, worldviews and 
objectives is a more efficient method than intimidation, 
domineering and antagonization [domination and antagonism]. 
(Buhler 2006: 16) 
Two prominent norms that reflect China's own experiences over the past sixty 
years, and play an important role in foreign aid, are sovereignty, informed by its 
non-interference policy, and developmentalism, through the shaping of the 
Beijing Consensus. As a relatively new concept, the Beijing Consensus remains 
the subject of continued international debate, set against the backdrop of China's 
fast growing economic development. This study intends to contribute positively to 
this ongoing discussion. 
These norms will be investigated in the case studies to best evaluate how 
they were shaping foreign aid in a region which had long held traditional links 
with China, Southeast Asia, as well as in a region that had been important, and 
pivotal, in shaping China's more recent history, Africa, and thirdly, in a region that 
China had recently expanded its presence in, Latin America. In each of the 
regions, internationalism will highlight how China has expanded its role in 
institutions across the regions and how this has shaped its propensity to behave 
more responsibly in the international community. Asianism, a norm that defines 
China's role in Asia, will be focussed upon exclusively in Southeast Asia, to 
highlight how China has striven to improve cooperation, integration, and define a 
leadership role for itself in Asia since the end of the Cold War. The domestically 
embedded norms, of sovereignty and developmentalism, will highlight how 
China's foreign aid has been influenced by its non-interference policy, and its own 
developmental model in the form of the Beijing Consensus. 
3.2 Internationally embedded norms 
3.2.1 Asianism 
i) Definition 
The norm of Asianism geographically refers to East Asia and also incorporates 
Southeast Asia. This geographical dimension is often referred to by Chinese 
leaders in announcements directed towards the membership of Asian 
organisations. 
Premier Wen liabao introduced the concept of 'harmonious East 
Asia' at the' 10+ 3' - 10 members of the Association of Southeast 
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Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea. 
(China Daily 2007) 
China considers Southeast Asia to be integral to the Asianist norm and belie\es 
that the countries of the region should support and demand regional cooperation 
and integration based upon a shared identity of their cultural legacy. ; Asian 
values', consequently, justify the Asian behaviour that characterises their 
interactions with external global communities (MFA 2004d; People s Daily 2005c; 
Saaler 2007: 2; Xinhua 2007a) by shaping the 'set of ideas, feelings, or attitudes 
appropriated by Asians to promote solidarity and cooperation with "Asia", usually 
against the political, economic, and cultural influence of "the West'" (Hats use 
2007: 226). In addition to the construction of a modem Asian identity, the Asianist 
norm also induces China to promote a leadership role, especially in relation to 
Japan (Huang 2005: 5; Xinhua 2008a). 
At the Boao Forum in Hainan in 2009, 'values' were cited for their role in 
Asia's recovery from the global economic crisis. It was highlighted how 
adherence to these values had prevented Asia from copying the practices of the 
West that had induced the crisis. According to Xinhua News (2009f), China was 
particularly singled out as a paragon that would lead Asia to recovery and future 
prosperity. Chinese president Hu Jintao stressed the importance of Asian 
cooperation as a path to recovery at the forum by pointing out that: 
China will work with other Asian countries to seize opportunities, 
meet challenges and build a peaceful and open Asia of 
development and cooperation. [ ...... ] [We] should work together to 
ensure [ ... ] dynamic growth. 
(China Daily 2008) 
ii) Evolution and influence 
Since dynastic China was the prominent power across East Asia and prominently 
influenced the region of Southeast Asia, the historic manifestation of Asianism 
originated and emerged from the relationship China developed with the peoples of 
the region over the centuries (Sun 2004). This has shaped the classic historical 
Chinese perception of its civilisation and stature, which can be understood 
through an examination of its 'tribute system'. 1 The adoption of various aspects 
I For more information about China's tributary system, see Fairbank and Teng (1941) and 
Manca11 (1968). 
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of Chinese culture and civilization over the millennia, combined with the power. 
wealth and influence of the ancient dynasties, saw many of the region's former 
kingdoms and empires tum to China for security, trade and recognition. Tribute 
was often used as a way of ensuring Chinese recognition, while allaying fears of 
Chinese invasion. By showing deference to the Chinese emperor, fledgling states 
and regional empires could diplomatically achieve security and in some cases 
alliances with the Chinese, thereby reducing threats from neighbours fearing a 
Chinese reaction to any conflict in the region. The tribute system comprised a 
network of interstate relations and tributary trading systems, with China 
occupying a central position, thereby allowing it to maintain unity in East Asia for 
many centuries. This Sino-centric world order permitted China's successive rulers 
to draw homage, reverence and wealth from tributes paid by neighbouring states. 
As Western nations began to advance throughout Asia in the 18th and 19th 
century, the regional reaction opposing their presence, in response to the West's 
perceived interference, developed into Asianism. The collapse of the Sino-centric 
world order at the end of the 19th century mirrored the rise of Japanese 
colonialism. Consequently, China developed the notion of Asianism as a 
Japan-centric regional order that challenged centuries-old traditions in the region. 
Since China viewed Asianism in terms of Japan's expansionist activities 
throughout the region, which took the form of successive militaristic invasions 
and colonisations, the Asianist narrative became irrelevant outside of the 
discourse of Japanese colonial rule (Wang 2006: 7). This idea of 'solidarity 
among Asian people' derived from a diplomatic term which the Chinese 
Government had begun using in the early 1950s, in seeking to improve relations 
with the 'people' of Japan, as opposed to the 'militarists' who had led Japan on its 
path of destruction during the 1930s and 1940s (Hatsuse 2007: 230). 
Following the formation of the PRC in 1949, and the start of the Cold War, 
Asia became divided into two opposing blocs, which severely restricted both 
economic and political cooperation in the region (Hatsuse 2007: 226). Zhou 
Enlai's (1955: 62) discourse in 1955 at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung 
stressed China's solidarity with Asian countries against the West by emphasising 
how 'the days when the destiny of the Asian and African peoples was manipulated 
at will by others' was over. Zhou (ibid.: 63) also pointed out that by: 
[S]uffering from the same cause and struggling for the same aim 
[ ...... ] the Chinese delegation has come here to seek common 
ground in doing away with the sufferings and calamities under 
colonialism. 
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Despite the efforts made at Bandung to promote Asian unity, Chinese communist 
allegiances impeded relations with its neighbours for several years. Regional 
opposition to China's communist activities throughout the Western aligned 
countries of the region catalysed the formation of ASEAN in 1968. From the early 
1970s onwards following China's admission to the UN, it began to renew its 
relations across the region, primarily through bilateral relations in order to 
counterbalance ongoing Cold War superpower activities in the region. Following 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, China increasingly became involved with the 
regional institution of ASEAN, serving initially as a dialogue partner. During the 
early 1990s, the concept of' Asian values' resurfaced as economies throughout the 
region experienced an explosive period of growth. The Asian financial crisis of 
1997 marked a key transition for the Asianist norm, and China's attitude towards 
regional multilateralism and financial cooperation. 
The outbreak of a financial crisis [ ...... ] justified the significance 
of Asian value and Asian culture. [ ...... ] A well-organized and 
disciplined collective is able to accomplish a great deal. Facing 
outside invasion and colonialist domination, endeavours from a 
few individuals have proved to be fruitless. Solidarity of the whole 
people under a vigorous leadership IS indispensable to attain 
national independence and democracy. 
(MFA 2004d) 
In light of the growing disagreements with the IMF-prescribed solutions to the 
crisis, which disregarded sovereignty norms and became increasingly 'perceived 
[in terms of] Western arrogance and triumphalism', the collective learning of the 
Chinese policy makers rationalised, through a process of cognitive dissonance, 
feedback effects and transnational persuasion, that beneficial regional multilateral 
cooperation could be effected through changes in its relational identity (Sohn 
2008: 320). These ideational transitions determined the change in China's 
behaviour from its muted opposition to Asian financial co-operation in the 1990s, 
to its active support of regional financial cooperation in the early 2000s, as 
evidenced in the emergence of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CM!), the 
Chinese-Japanese-South Korean trilateral financial cooperation, and the Asian 
Bond Fund Initiative, despite such a fund preferentially benefiting Japan (Sohn 
2008: 321). Zhong Wei, a senior government consultant on Chinese foreign 
financial policy claimed, 'if China actively supports the move for an Asian bond 
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market, the Japanese yen will dominate the proposed market and assets valued in 
yen will become the biggest gainers. China cannot get big direct benefits. 
[However,] the proposal to set up such a common market is highly valuable, and 
it needs the continuous efforts and close co-ordination of all participants' (China 
Daily 2003, quoted from Sohn 2008: 324). He Fan, a research fellow at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also commented that 'even if Japan eats the 
biggest portion of the cake, China should take part as the country itself can obtain 
benefits' (China Daily 2003, quoted from Sohn 2008: 324). The learning of the 
benefits of cooperation reflects the changes that have transpired in Chinese 
foreign behaviour, which resulted in its long-term support for Asian financial 
co-operation. Therefore, China's foreign policies are informed by Asianism 
through the frame of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Boao 
Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Six-Party Nuclear Talks, and 
the Asian Community Summit (Sohn 2008: 309). Through these institutions, 
China also promotes the formation of an East Asian community as a manifestation 
of Asianism, which promotes economic development as a key driving force, by 
disregarding certain historical Asianist stigmas, attributable to its past failings 
(Bergsten 2007: 1-9). 
Following on from the concept of a 'harmonious world', Hu Jintao's 
proposal of the concept of a 'harmonious Asia' was raised in 2006. Vice-Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi further conceptualised that Asianism 'is maturing alongside 
China's participation in regional cooperation mechanisms such as the APEC [Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation] organization and Southeast Asian Regional 
Forum' (China Daily 2007). Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out at the 10th 
ASEAN+3 Summit that: 'China remains committed to East Asian cooperation and 
will work with other countries to promote peace and development and build an 
East Asia of peace, prosperity and harmony' (MFA 2007a). Through this, the 
Chinese Government, informed by the Asianist norm, continues its foreign 
policies of 'establishing good-neighborly relations and helping with our 
neighboring countries' prosperity and peace', in order to reinforce further the 
Asianist norm through multilateral cooperation (ibid.). 
The norm of Asianism, can be seen to play a strengthening role in the 
sense of China's 'periphery-ism', 'Asia-ism' and 'Asia-Pacific-ism', or 
regionalism, which promotes being 'friendly to one's neighbors and partners with 
them', through implementing policies of 'befriending, reassuring and benefiting 
one's neighbors' and strengthening regional cooperation (China Daily 2007). 
These moves reinforce the need for cooperation and prioritisation in relation to its 
aid giving, as the next empirical chapter on Southeast Asia, will illustrate (ibid.) . 
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3.2.2 Internationalism 
i) Definition 
The internationalist norm specifies that responsible states should use 
multilateralism within the mechanisms of international institutions, such as the 
UN, to resolve global human issues (Goertz and Diehl 1992: 634-64; Herrmann 
and Shannon 2001: 621-54). Although multilateralism and internationalism may 
appear identical in nature, multilateralism is merely an approach to achieving 
internationalism. The distinction lies in a state's devotion to international 
responsibility. Internationalism requires that a foreign policy goal is not only 
pursued multilaterally, but also responsibly, whereas multilateralism may be 
pursued either responsibly or irresponsibly. 
Before the PRC's admission to the UN in 1971, internationalism was 
traditionally regarded as an unlikely norm to engender China's commitment to the 
international community. Following its admission, however, a shift in China's 
attitude towards international cooperation became apparent (Kent 2007: 2). As 
China transformed itself from an isolated to an increasingly interdependent state, 
the norm of internationalism encouraged it to promote international responsibility 
and multilateral cooperation. Ni Feng (2004: 146) investigated this newly 
emerged norm, stating that 'China is repositioning itself from a revolutionary 
country that rejected the existing international regime, to a responsible power 
within the system'. These observations were further reinforced by Wu and 
Lansdowne (2008: 3) who argued that the changes arose from 'China's recent turn 
to multilateralism [ ...... ] as evidenced in both its declaratory and operational 
policies'. At the G20 London summit in April 2009, China responded to the norm 
by encouraging a more regulated global financial system that was less dependent 
upon one country or currency in order to ensure global financial stability. Its aim 
was to encourage confidence in a global recovery by strengthening the 
coordination of macroeconomic policy, and the avoidance of protectionism. 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also pointed out, by directly questioning 
international responsibility, that the G20 should 'pay close attention' to 
developing countries for a more multilateral international financial policy (BBC 
2009d). Following the G20 summit, and in response to Hu Jintao's outlining of 
the above issues, the summit leaders issued a joint statement indicating the 
consensus that had been reached for managing the financial and economic crisis, 
which included increasing funding to multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to 
assist countries, particularly those in the developing world, that were experiencing 
financial difficulties, and the strengthening of financial regulation (BBC 2009c; 
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MFA 2009d). 
ii) Evolution and influence 
The internationalist norm in China is mutually constituted by its identity as a great 
power, and by the manner of its perceived responsibility to the world.! Zhang 
Yongj in (2001: 250-71) argues that it is meaningless to debate whether China is a 
responsible power that is keen on promoting the status quo, or an irresponsible 
revisionist power, without a prior analysis of the changing identity of the Chinese 
state. In his view, the PRC has come a long way in transforming its national 
identity from a revolutionary power to a post-revolutionary developmental state 
through an ongoing process of revolution, war and reform. As such, China's 
perceived responsibilities increase as it becomes more integrated into 
international society. 'The international relations of the People's Republic of 
China is a saga of the isolation-alienation-socialisation-integration of China in 
international society since 1949' (Zhang 1998: 244). Following its ascension to 
the UN in 1971 and the start of the period of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the late 
1970s, 'China's socialisation and its integration into the society of states' (Zhang 
1998: 73) contributed to the modification of its policies in response to the 
proclamation of the three pillars of China's foreign policy, namely the centrality 
of the UN, China's alignment with the developing world, and its cooperation 
through multilateral channels. Greater economic modernisation became officially 
sanctioned following the normalisation of relations with the US, the abandonment 
of state trading monopolies, and the encouragement of foreign investment after 
the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress. 
It was at this point that its international and domestic interests 
converged [ ..... ] confidence and the loosening of ideological 
constraints in the country at large allowed it to seek entry into 
more politically sensitive and strategically important [international 
organisations], such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the 
Conference on Disarmament and UN human rights bodies. 
(Kent 2007: 51) 
In developing its internationally responsible image, China was compelled to 
consolidate its efforts in four main areas. Firstly, China had to fulfil its 
responsibility towards improving the well being of its own population through the 
I For a wider discussion on China's identity as a great power and its constitutive responsible 
behaviour, see Zhang and Austin (2001) and Kim (2003:35-75). 
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development of its regime. Secondly, in meeting its legal responsibilities, China 
had an obligation to honour its institutional commitments, as well as to take 
responsibility for any misconduct on its part. Thirdly, China had to regard those 
additional responsibilities which obligate great powers to lead the international 
community by example, and by adherence to orderly and coherent behaviour. 
Lastly, there were special responsibilities accorded to major powers with prime 
positions within the United Nations Security Council, which dictated the 
maintaining of global peace and stability (Chen 2009: 11-4). The main forces 
motivating China's behaviour arose through its need to show responsibility by 
addressing its own interests, defining its principles, acting within its capacity and 
managing the external expectations of the international community. By addressing 
its own interests, China has expanded its trade networks globally. This expansion 
has increased the requirement to maintain regional peace and stability along its 
trade routes, thereby prioritising the need for increased multilateral diplomacy and 
a need to maximise the common interests between itself and its neighbours or 
trading partners. This is reflected in the shift in multilateral alignment between 
China and the developed world, away from developing countries, through its 
ambition to enhance its responsible image. Though this appears to represent a 
marked departure from its past alignment with the developing world, this 
realignment allows it to expand market access to the developing world through its 
new privileged position, and highlights how China is nurturing the foundations for 
its long-term ambitions using multilateral channels. Wen liabao addressed this 
issue in his final statement at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in 2009 
(People:S Daily 2009a). Although the universal sharing of interests between 
diverse nations is complicated, China's promotion of the concept of a 
'harmonious world' discourse obligates China to embrace more shared interests 
with its trading partners. 
Through the defining of the principle of responsibility, China's leaders 
expressed the concept of peaceful development by stressing the importance of an 
optimum environment that was conducive to multilateral growth and development. 
There is a requirement within such an environment to balance both national 
ambitions with global visions that are acceptable to the international community. 
By addressing this requirement, China has become more proactive towards the 
norm of internationalism. This was demonstrated at the 2009 London G20 summit, 
when China encouraged global multilateralism, whilst refraining from being 
coerced into 'saving capitalism from itself'. As part of its proposed reforms for 
the IMF, its adherence to multilateralism is reflected in its express desire to 
engage in further G20 summits (Zhang 2009). At the 2009 G20 summit in London 
and Pittsburgh, China's response and contribution to the IMF recovery fund was 
linked to its GDP rather than its financial reserves, in a move that aimed to 
contribute to, and not to damage, its long-term prospects (China Daily 2009b; 
MFA 2009i; Zhang 2009). 
As China has continued to grow, there has been an increase in external 
expectations and demands upon it from the international community. As the 
European Union (EU) and the US, since 2005, have accepted that China has 
become part of the international community, and as such, will become influential 
in shaping future global mutual ambitions, they have increasingly demanded that 
China conform to, and support, the existing policies of the major nations. 
However, China is positioned, through its multilateral links with the developing 
world, to promote an enhanced balance between the two worlds, by shaping a new 
diplomacy that is more favourable and mutually beneficial than current 
Western-driven standards. Furthermore, China remains aware of the West's 
propensity to frame global responsibility from its own unilateral perspective 
(People:S Daily 200ge), and, as such, comes under regular criticism in cases of 
ongoing unresolved international tension, such as in Myanmar (The Washington 
Post 2008b). 
China's involvement in international organisations accentuated its 
legitimisation. By acceding to a large number of international treaties and 
participating in the activities of an increasing number of international 
organisations, especially in the areas of trade, arms control, environmental 
protection, and human rights, China has deepened its integration with the rest of 
the world. As it becomes less isolated, China faces structural problems in aligning 
with the international community, since the core values, institutional designs, 
behaviour norms, and decision-making processes, as well as the international 
regimes, are products of Western experiences (Liu 2004: 6). Consequently, China 
attempts to balance its obligation to the developed world in accordance with the 
policies of good governance and anti-terrorist activities alongside its obligations 
to the developing world through supporting issues of sovereignty and 
independence. 
Internationalism as a norm in China's foreign aid behaviour expressed its 
great-power identity in the 1990s and prompted China to build an image of being 
a responsible great power. This international image, as a result, became its state 
interest, alongside state security and economic development. As China's stake in 
maintaining relationships with developed countries matured, its identification and 
symbolic status as the leading country of the Third World in the global political 
arena decreased. China's international image became moderated through the 
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gradual relinquishing of its identity and position as the leading country of the 
Third World, and the stressing of its role as a 'responsible big power'. As a result, 
aid donation became beneficial in its self-identification. Although the specific 
details of aid remained concealed, China would publicly announce the scale and 
nature of its aid plan to demonstrate its willingness to address issues, such as 
humanitarian aid and Debt reduction (Interview 2006h; 2006i). China has also 
increased its recognition of international contribution through its participation in 
the Millennium Review Summit, UNDP, ADB, a new multi-donor-supported 
South-South dialogue, and the International Poverty Reduction Center in China 
(IPRCC), which will be examined in detail in each of the case study chapters. 
3.3 Domestically embedded norms 
After reviewing two internationally embedded norms, the investigation will 
examine two domestically embedded norms to identify how China's own 
experiences are shaping its policies. 
3.3.1 Sovereignty 
i) Definition 
According to the classic Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm, states 
should not interfere in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Where conflict 
arises, the sovereign state should exercise the right to repel such interference in its 
affairs (Axtmann, 1996; 2004: 260). This exemplifies the overlap between a norm 
and a traditional realist national interest. From the realist viewpoint, sovereignty 
defines statehood and forms the postulated foundation of international anarchy, 
whereas constructivists view sovereignty as a norm or social construction. The 
extent to which these factors define this term varies; however, recent efforts, from 
within institutions such as the UN, to redefine sovereignty in line with human 
rights, stress the importance of international responsibility and moral legitimacy, 
thereby placing a higher priority on a state's duty to protect its population than on 
its right to independence. Such transformations would supersede non-intervention 
on the grounds of defined criteria from within these institutions (Zhang 2008: 
113-4). 
Having become established in Europe in the 17th century, sovereignty 
became the basis upon which diplomatic relations were conducted. Territorial 
integrity, non-intervention, and political self-determination were the foundations 
upon which sovereignty was based. When the Western powers arrived in China at 
the time of the Qing dynasty, seeking to establish diplomatic re lations between 
their respective governments and the Qing leadership, in the form of embassies 
and trade consuls, they did so in keeping with the protocols and rules of 
international relations established and accepted by modern Western states since 
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. With the Qing refusal to participate in this system 
and allow the establishing of modern state-to-state relations, Qing China was 
unable to form alliances and treaties with states which could have aided it in 
safeguarding its sovereignty. As a result, Western states were not hindered 
diplomatically from disrespecting Qing sovereignty, leading to China's 'Century 
of Humiliation' and the awakening of Chinese concerns over its sovereignty. 
Sovereignty concerns continued following the collapse of the Qing 
dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese Republic. As China descended into 
anarchy and warlordism, challenges to its sovereignty continued, with foreign 
powers backing competing warlords, while the Nationalist Kuomingtang (KMT) 
with its Western backers and the CCP backed by the Soviet Union, fought to 
liberate China from each other, and later on from Japanese occupation. The 
ensuing civil war, between the KMT and CCP, expanded concerns over 
sovereignty, with the CCP adopting the doctrine of anti-imperialism, arguing 
against the KMT's close relations with the United States and the West. The 
domestic sovereignty norm embedded in the PRC became rooted in the 
experience leading up to the CCP's successful defeat of the KMT. In keeping with 
its adherence to the sovereignty norm, China should not support, either direct or 
indirect, interference in the affairs of other sovereign states, and should resist such 
external interference. 
ii) Evolution and influence 
Sovereignty as a norm was manifested through the discourse of the Eight 
Principles of China's Foreign Aid as outlined by Zhou Enlai in 1964, which 
themselves originated from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,: 
In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government 
strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries and 
never attaches any conditions. 
(Renmin Ribao 1964) 
Since Mao Zedong (1991: 659) was inspired by the revolutionary doctrines of 
Marxism and Leninism, the norm of sovereignty was limited by such ideals 
distinctly, because Mao distributed aid to other countries, largely in Southeast 
Asia and Africa, in support of world revolution, and therefore, interfered \\ith 
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countries' domestic sovereignty. Zhang Yongjin (2008: 102) supported this idea 
by arguing that: 'China's understanding and practices of sovereignty statehood 
have been either incomplete, selective, instrumental or even contradictory'. The 
sovereignty norm affecting China's behaviour during the 1950s and 1960s was a 
result of its experience of colonialism and foreign interference. Along with the 
Soviet Union, it regarded its support of liberation movements and their struggle 
for independence, during the period of de co Ionization, as legitimate, since China 
was not interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as these states were 
ruled by illegitimate imperial foreign powers. Once these states had achieved 
independence and established sovereign rule, China no longer felt it was 
legitimate to continue its involvement, and by the 1970s, it began to complain 
about the interference of the superpowers in the affairs of these newly 
independent states. This can be seen during the period between the 1950s and 
1970s when China remained absent from revolutions taking place in Latin 
America, where countries had become independent much earlier. 
By the time of the reform period in the late 1970s, China's view of 
sovereignty, reiterated Zhou Enlai's original principles, as highlighted by Deng 
Xiaoping's clarification: 
We should respect other parties and peoples in their search for 
solutions to their own issues. We object to others imposing their 
own orders, and we should refrain from giving orders to others. 
This is an important principle. 
(People s Daily 1980) 
Shortly afterwards, in 1980, the sovereignty norm was further addressed at the 
twelfth Party Congress: 
In [China's] exchanges and communications with foreign political 
parties, the CPC [Communist Party of China] observes the four 
basic principles of independence, complete equality, mutual 
respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, of 
which the principle of independence is the basis for establishing a 
new type of party-to-party relations. 
(IDCPC 2003) 
In the practice of China's foreign aid, adherence to these principles has remained 
largely subjective. The process of aid negotiation in China commonly transpires 
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during the state visit to Beijing of high officials from the prospective recipient 
country, or during reciprocal visits by Chinese officials (Interview 2006h; 2006i). 
China emphasises that its foreign aid donation differs significantly from that of 
other major donors, in that it does not attach any political agenda upon its receipt, 
with the exception of the recipient's choice of recognising Taiwan as a sovereign 
state. While it may be argued that this interferes with the foreign policy of the 
recipient country, China justifies this stance in terms of conforming to its own 
domestic sovereignty. Before China entered the UN, it viewed international 
recognition as key to it becoming a legitimate state. After replacing Taiwan at the 
UN, as the officially recognised international state of Chinese culture, its 
implementation of the 'one-China' policy was constructed to strengthen this 
legitimacy, by further undermining Taiwan's international status. In order to 
legitimise its seat at the United Nations, the PRC offered aid in return for 
diplomatic support from member states. Africa has been at the forefront of a 
long-standing conflict between PRC and ROC over diplomatic recognition. Most 
of the countries that Taiwan and China competed for were poor, less developed, 
and heavily in debt. This competition for recognition prompted enhanced aid and 
financial offerings by one side, in order to compensate for the influence of the 
other. Hertz (2004: 35) commented upon the competition between China and 
Taiwan by stating that: 
The Chinese and Taiwanese, for example, continue to mirror the 
bipolar world of the cold war by competing for diplomatic 
recognition in Africa and the Pacific on the basis of which can give 
the most aid, with their 'clients' playing them off against each 
other as effectively as ever. 
China stresses its 'one-China' policy under which trade and investment 
agreements will be ratified, so long as the recipients agree to support this view. 
China has not only used the promise of trade, aid, investment, and other benefits 
to persuade states to renounce their recognition of Taiwan, but also exercised its 
veto against the sending of UN peacekeeping troops to countries which had 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, such as Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 
1999 (Xinhua 2005c). The only exception to this behaviour to date has been seen 
through China's involvement in UNPKO in Haiti; a nation that continues to 
maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
China, through a combination of its own territorial disputes. the effect of 
Western sanctions following the Tiananmen incident, and differing pressures from 
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external sources to censure its own domestic affairs, has reiterated the issue of 
non-interference in domestic affairs. This demonstrates its concern that other 
nations should not use foreign aid issues as a pretext for influence and 
interference. China criticised Western countries and international organisations for 
applying their values to developing countries, including itself, on issues such as 
human rights. Lantos et al. (2007: 5) address China's concern with sovereignty by 
stating: 
It is common to attribute Beijing's actions in Sudan to China's [ ... ] 
economic self-interests [ .... ]. This view, in our opinion, is 
overstated, lacks precision about Chinese motivations, and fails to 
explain why there was a shift in late 2006 to positions more closely 
aligned with the United States and other concerned Western 
powers. Sudan's contributions to China's total energy needs are 
very small [ ... J. While the relationship with Sudan is important on 
a microeconomic level [ .... ,] it does not represent a critical strategic 
relationship on a macroeconomic scale [ ... J. An important, but 
often overlooked motivation is Beijing's concern with protecting 
the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference [which] 
have been cast as bedrock to China's strategy for becoming a 
global power backed by robust alliances. 
The sovereignty norm also provides China with the rationale to defend its 
developmental agenda choices and that of aid recipient countries, by condemning 
Western countries' tied aid policies, which will be discussed in the following 
section. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang liechi pointed out at a United Nations 
Conference that during the current world financial and economic crisis: 
Developed countries should implement the Monterrey Consensus, 
fulfil the commitment of using 0.7% of their gross national income 
(ONI) as official development assistance and act further to reduce 
and cancel the debt of developing countries. [ ...... ] provide on a 
priority basis financing support to developing countries with no 
harsh conditions attached, and use its new resources mainly to 
assist developing countries. 
(MFA 200ge) 
China's opening up to the international community has increasingly ex.posed it to 
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the effects of globalisation. This has progressively transformed it as it sought to 
capitalise on the opportunities that were presented in its accommodation of a 
global market economy. Due to this transformation, China has had to rethink its 
stance on sovereignty at a time when the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty 
norm is also undergoing a shift towards greater adherence to human rights (Zhang 
2008: 101-10). Over the past decade, questions have arisen regarding the 
dynamism of the sovereignty norm, as China's 'position on sovereignty is not 
what it used to be' (Carlson 2005: 2). As the global sovereignty norm has evolved, 
in response to 'external pressures (both material and normative)', China is 
therefore ' changing [the] relationship between relatively persistent and 
historically conditioned sovereign centric values' (Carlson 2005: 3), Zhang 
Yongjin (2008: 102) points out that: 
These variations in China's understanding and practices of 
sovereignty have been heavily informed by China's historical 
transformation from a universal empire to a civilisational state, and 
its contemporary metamorphosis from a revolutionary power to a 
globalised state. Contemporary Chinese discourse of sovereignty 
demonstrates [ ...... ] that China has become increasingly 
ambivalent towards the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty. 
Carlson (2005: 11-20) classifies sovereignty into four distinct categories: 
territorial, jurisdictional, sovereign authority and economic. Zhang (2008: 110-5) 
illustrated that the changes within these main categories highlighted the manner 
by which the sovereignty norm was being transformed, and is reflected in China's 
embracing of globalisation, its contesting of sovereign practices, and its 
problematizing of sovereignty. 
China's economic sovereignty and status has become eroded gradually by 
its pursuit of globalisation, as its traditional values and state identity confront 
major intellectual and political challenges. The traditional concepts of sovereignty 
are becoming contested, and the norms reconstituted, as a result of two pillars of 
China's economic success; global capital investment in China and trade growth. 
The transformation of the norm, along with its economic success, both renews, 
and encourages, the redefining of the moral purpose of China's governing elite, 
despite exposing China's development to economic vulnerabilities (Zhang 2008: 
110-2). 
As the effects of globalisation have become more pronounced, state 
sovereignty has continued to be undermined as global economic institutions and 
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multinational companies have redefined the boundaries of the traditional concepts 
of domestic and international. China has negotiated this transformation 
surprisingly well, largely by abandoning its strict adherence to the ideals of 
economic sovereignty, thereby allowing it to converge with international practices 
without apparently weakening its stance on sovereignty. The concessions that 
China made to gain admission to the WTO showed the extent to which the 
Chinese policy makers were prepared to bend their traditional economic 
sovereignty in order to do so (Zhang 2008: 113-5). A further reason for China's 
embracing of the WTO in favour of protecting its revisionist developing world 
agenda is China's realisation of how it can use the coalition channels of the WTO 
to gain access to developing world markets, as seen by its alignment with the 
agricultural policies of the US. However, on issues related to textiles, it has 
remained somewhat reticent in light of US protectionism, despite its strong links 
with the developing world (Pearson 2006: 242-75). Despite these economic 
changes, the normative changes remain shallow, as seen by its unrelenting current 
adherence to territorial sovereignty. 
With regard to sovereign authority and jurisdictional sovereignty, the 
overall increased global exposure to non-traditional security threats, which 
include a wide range of issues such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), climate issues, terrorism, epidemics, transnational crime and multilateral 
policing through peacekeeping operations (PKO), has shaped international society 
and humanity in general, and in doing so, has induced shifts in China's policies 
towards more humanitarian interaction, thereby softening its stance on 
non-interference (see Chen 2009: 157-73). China's contribution to international 
peacekeeping was a 'responsibility that China should shoulder as a major power' 
(Interview 2007f; 2007k), and as such, implies China's great-power identity (Asia 
Times 2007). This is further revealed through China's uptake of multilateral ism in 
global policies due to the shift in its understanding of the sovereignty norm 
(Zhang 2008: 113). China's shift towards increased multilateralism, and protective 
intervention of human rights, comes at a time when the US is increasingly 
stressing the limits of sovereignty. Kim (2006: 277-9) argues that the weakening 
of these international boundaries has had the effect of sensitising the Chinese 
governing political body to domestically driven concerns that are in the national 
and international interest. 
State sovereignty has shifted in recent years, as globalisation has 
transformed the sovereignty norm, such that the state serves its people. This has 
arisen through an increasing need and obligation for international intervention, 
based upon legitimate and universal principles in cases where states fail ill their 
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responsibility to protect their populations. 
China has become increasingly aligned with human rights, as this issue 
has become significantly more politically and economically desirable and 
legitimate. Two distinct features of the Chinese human rights policy have become 
more apparent since the 1990s; a distinct emphasis on development and 
subsistence, and an emphasis on non-interference and sovereignty. Jiang Zemin 
addressed these points in his speech at Harvard University: 
Today, in finding a road to development suited to us, we will 
proceed from our own national conditions to address the issue of 
how to conduct economic construction and political and cultural 
advancement without blindly copying other countries' models. In 
handling international affairs, we decide our positions and policies 
from an independent approach. The Chinese people cherish [their] 
friendship and cooperation with other countries, as well as their 
right to independence they have won through protracted struggles. 
(China Informed 1997) 
This evolution of the sovereignty norm raises pertinent dilemmas over whether 
there should be institutions to encourage states to engage in intervention during 
times of international crisis or to restrain them. Although both solutions set 
dangerous precedents, charters should at least address sub-clauses pertaining to 
'common interest' (The Economist 1999). The determination of such 'common 
interests' should address; firstly, the use of intervention by internationally 
accepted means, other than force, such as PKO; secondly, the redefining of 
national interests into collective interests; thirdly, that decisive action must be 
taken when needed in defence of common humanity; and finally, that the 
commitment to the ensuing peace must be as firm and consistent as the 
commitment to wage war. These changes arise as global communities are 
becoming increasingly determined and willing to confront and challenge issues of 
contention rather than tolerate them, thereby further evolving sovereignty (The 
Economist 1999). 
As argued above, China's approach to the evolving sovereignty norm 
demonstrates that: 
China, by utilizing the rhetoric of nonintervention and protecting 
sovereignty, appeared to simply be saying "no" to humanitarian 
intervention and multilateral peacekeeping. Nonetheless, this 
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conclusion has not been supported by a comprehensive empirical 
investigation into the main characteristics of the Chinese approach 
to sovereignty and intervention during the 1990s. 
(Carlson 2006: 217) 
Moreover, as China has become focussed on its developmentalist policies since 
the 1990s, it has seen that development and human rights were sequentially linked 
(Sullivan 1998: 132). The shift towards human rights demonstrates that social 
learning has shifted sovereignty to the conditionality of responsibility to its 
population on humanitarian grounds. This is inducing a rise in individualism, as 
international society is reconstituting China's moral purpose (Zhang 2008: 114-5). 
The influence of the traditional sovereignty norm on China has weakened 
with its return to the international community, by affecting its attitude towards 
non-interference in its aid policy. As the sovereignty norm evolved, China 
modified its policy of non-interference. In doing so, it negotiated with the 
opposition parties in Zimbabwe and Sudan, pushed for the acceptance of UN 
forces in the Sudan, provided a forum for discussing the nuclear issues in North 
Korea, and addressed similar issues in Iran. Most notably, it applied subtle and 
implicit pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Myanmar. 
While its recent notable involvement in United Nations peacekeeping activities in 
global conflict zones contributes to international intervention in other states, 
China still places importance on its sovereignty in its own domestic affairs, by 
repeatedly stressing the relative importance of economic, cultural, and solidarity 
rights over civil and political rights, as well as the Taiwan issue and human rights. 
3.3.2 Developmentalism 
i) Definition 
The developmentalist norm specifies the manner by which the pursuit of an 
optimum path that a nation should take in its development is controlled in 
political, economic and social terms. The Beijing Consensus frames the current 
developmentalist norm in terms of China's own developmental success and 
experience (see Ramo 2004, Interview 2006d; 2006g; 2007m). The Consensus is 
not presented in terms of unrestrained development as much as a firmly controlled 
guided path to growth, which allows access to the international community via 
paths that protect the life and political choices of the developing world (People ~' 
Daily 2005a). 
With regard to the emergence of a country into the international 
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community, developmentalism balances the paths between national development 
and globalisation in the modem world. National development maintains a 
commitment to autonomy and sovereignty, whereas globalisation gradually erodes 
this in favour of universalism (Dirlik 2003: 241-2). The key to achieving balance 
between these two opposing paths lies in stressing the central importance of local 
mechanisms for development within the global framework. Western approaches to 
development established a precedent for success which it has sought to prescribe 
to the rest of the world, however, this precedent was shaped largely by 
colonialism and imperialism; ideologies that China has displayed an historic 
aversion towards (Perdue 2003: 8). The Western approaches advocate growth 
through economic, political, and social openness. As such, its economies are 
founded upon trade in competitive global markets. This approach ensures that the 
economies remain sustainable and continue to grow. Such markets are dominated 
by the highly developed, and mostly Western countries, who pursued this path to 
development in the post World War II years. Conversely, for developing countries, 
entry into such development paths and markets, in more recent times, is 
considered difficult because of the significant barriers to entry. These approaches 
to development were viewed as stifling to both political and economic 
development in the Third World, and the Western view of globalisation is viewed 
largely in terms of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism (Dirlik 2003: 243-4). 
China, by contrast, has followed a development path that has achieved a level of 
economic success that is appealing to developing nations seeking successful 
models to emulate (Ramo 2004; Beeson 2009:5-39). This pathway entails 
development along a path which remains localised to the developing country, and 
relatively free from the competitive forces of Western dominated markets, until 
such time as the localised economy has grown in strength. 
Table 3.l demonstrates three different development paths, in political, 
economic and social terms, and shows how the examples of Marxist, liberal and 
authoritarian development relate to the global economy. The table shows a 
traditional Western development path, as well as China's development paths from 
the early days of the PRC under Marxist communism, and its modem path, 
manifested by the Beij ing Consensus. 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of developmental paths 
Development under Development under the i Development under the 
Marxism Washington Consensus i Beijing Consensus -
--
-------
Political Totalitarian control Democratic control Authoritarian control 
. SocialfHuman rights Heavily restricted Reformed at same rate as Relegated to late stage 
economy development 
Economic State planned and Market regulated I Government controlled 
controlled (Promotes attainment of key I (Economic development is 
prescriptions of good pursued in preference to political 
governance and privatisation, or social development.) 
to facilitate equal access to free 
markets.) 
Relationship with free Closed Open Pragmatically 
market subjective/ideologically 
polarised 
(Ideologically polarised towards 
South-South cooperation, whilst 
more pragmatic in reality, as 
seen in the apolitical nature of 
economic relations with Western 
oriented countries, such as US, 
EU, Japan, Korea, Taiwan.) 
Examples and explanation Success: Cuba! Success: Botswana] Successful: China 
of success/failure of Failure: North Korea2 Failure: Rwanda4 Failure: Not yet' 
respective pathways 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc Cited reasons for failure Authoritarian control potentially 
at the end of Cold War rendered indicate too great an adherence restricts possibility for onset of 
this pathway largely to privatisation, at the expense political reform as ruling body 
unsustainable, as success was of public sector. This became extends its hold on power, 
only achievable through united undermined by a lack of thereby preventing efficient 
efforts, failure demonstrated by resources, due to inefficient growth. 
individual nations' pursuance good governance. The 
I 
of policy. subsequent blame was 
I apportioned to inherent 
I corruption, though it was l equally due to inefficiencies in effective deployment channels. , 
I Cuba's Marxist developmental path and its concentration on meeting the basic needs of its 
population has enabled it to become a regional leader in medicine and health care, despite the US 
trade embargo, and has seen its participation in medical aid programmes and exchanges across 
Latin America (see Kirk and Erisman 2009). 
2 The DPRKs ideologically driven developmental model based on self-sufficiency and closed 
markets, led to the collapse of the state's economy, and is an obstacle to economic reform. (For 
more about the DPRK's developmental path, see Ahrens 2003: 53-73.) 
3 Botswana's adherence to the democratic model has allowed the state to maintain a stable 
democracy with an open market and a standard of living equal to that of Mexico, and is arguably 
the best example of successful economic development in Africa (see The Economist 2009). 
4 Economic troubles resulting from debt and Structural Adjustment Policies are often noted as a 
contributing factor behind the Rwandan genocide (see Chossudovsky 2003: 103-24). 
5 The Beijing Consensus remains only a possible alternative to the Washington Consensus at 
present, as China continues to be the testing ground of an alternative development model which 
has yet to be adopted by another developing country. 
6 As what constitutes the Beijing Consensus is still under debate, and due to the vagueness of its 
precise definition, along with its promotion of self-reliance, the precise attributing of this pathway 
to a country in terms of either success or failure is difficult. By its very nature, the countries are 
encouraged to follow the example of self-reliance set by China, whilst retaining their local identity. 
Consequently, the following examples only demonstrate the success or failure of countries which 
have followed self-reliant development paths, whilst retaining their identity through (semi-) 
authoritarian control. 
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ii) Evolution and influence 
As China began to develop relatively recently, its leaders have continued, since 
the reform period began in 1978, to perceive significant threats to its growth. 
These threats have arisen due to three distinct factors (Beeson 2009:5-39). Firstly, 
as China is a large developing country, the management of its development has 
remained problematic. Major issues have arisen over local and national interests, 
the wide scale supply of resources, and the balancing of local and central relations. 
Secondly, by developing late, China has entered an increasingly competitive 
global market alongside more dominant players, such as Japan and the United 
States. This led it to make use of its large and cheap work force, along with its 
growing domestic market, to initiate a political economy that is attractive to 
foreign investment. Thirdly, as the PRC remained a command economy until 1978, 
the legacies of CCP authoritarian rule needed to be managed effectively 
throughout the creation of China's increasingly competitive and industrialised 
base. This required the exercising of increased levels of 'flexible authoritarianism' 
in managing its transition towards a market economy (Cabestan 2004). 
The developmentalist norm evolved through two distinct phases. The 
initial phase transpired during its early reform years, at a time when China's 
image was informed by its newly established neutral identity. During this period, 
as the PRC had minimal experience of development in modem economic terms, 
its reform interests were shaped by its potential rather than actual experience. 
Deng Xiaoping epitomized the developmentalist norm entrepreneur, as a 
pathfinder and paragon of China's future prosperity, by adopting the Reform and 
Open policy, promoting China's economic development while preserving its 
political stability. This explains why it needed to exercise prudence and control 
over reforms, by initiating them in areas such as agriculture, as it had substantial 
experience and knowledge of this field. By achieving success in such areas, it 
could demonstrate the self-reliance and competence that it needed to further its 
reforms. As success in agricultural reforms became apparent, further reforms 
increasingly expanded into foreign trade and investment, and then into industry. 
These began to feedback positively into China's identity and image of a great 
power as the developmentalist norm raised China's self-esteem. As reform within 
the new regime was built upon the legacies of the older system, state regulation 
remained paramount amid concerns over sustaining successful development, and 
as such social indicators of health, education and poverty were designated of 
higher significance than liberalisation. In addition, since China had no significant 
debt issues impeding its progression toward economic development, the IMF and 
World Bank held little sway over the restrictions of state control over 
65 
development, allowing the success of the reforms to be displayed and controlled 
in terms favourable to the CCP (Singh 2002). By 1979, the CCP continued their 
experimental reform by establishing regional special economic zones (SEZs) 
within China so model economic reforms could be further tested and managed in 
a controlled environment, before implementing policies further afield (People s 
Daily 2002). Another critical factor that proved pivotal in developing economic 
wealth and transfer of control in these zones was the origin of its FDI. As more 
SEZs were created, during the 1980s and early 1990s, approximately three 
quarters of China's FDI was derived from sources local to China, such as Hong 
Kong or Taiwan, rather than from overseas conglomerates, and these investments 
were subsequently rewarded with additional beneficial economic conditions to 
enhance their productivity. Such practices, though, resulted in claims of 
round-tripping of investments to channel funds into the SEZs to enhance their 
profitability. The success of these zones has contributed to the establishment of 
regions of immense wealth in Eastern and Southern China which have impacted 
positively on China's self-esteem and encouraged it to pursue its great-power 
status. This has also created significant wealth imbalances, leaving central and 
western regions more marginalized, which is problematic for China's social 
security services (Singh 2002). 
The subsequent and most recent phase of the developmentalist norm 
evolution began in the early to mid-1990s, as it actively sought to manage its 
transition into globalisation (The Economist 1999). This second phase occurred at 
a time when its self-esteem had benefited from the success of its initial reforms, 
and although its self-confidence had grown, China still remained cautious about 
controlling its future success. The domestically embedded developmentalist norm 
therefore is responsible for transforming a revolutionary China into a 
developmentalist state with its attendant focus on order and security. The fall out 
from the Tiananmen incident, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, raised its 
awareness of the fragility of its position and catalysed a major transition in China. 
This resulted in the CCP addressing key policies which they considered essential 
in the maintaining of control during its economic reform. One key policy change 
was to distance the party from the growing entrepreneurial element in society, 
whom, they believed, were pushing for more capitalist reforms (Dickson 2008: 2, 
10-9). Though this practice was increasingly exercised in the early 1990s, it 
became diminished by the start of the 21 st century. 
Another timely reminder of the challenge confronting China arose at the 
end of the Cold War, through the successive emergence of new East European 
countries onto the world scene. China followed their development exposure to the 
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Western prescriptions of the Washington Consensus with interest. This 
development, in numerous cases, resulted in the complete, and somewhat 
catastrophic, removal, and replacement, of long-term infrastructures (People s 
Daily 2005a). Fearful of following a similar path at a time when US unilateralism 
was increasing, and upon the advice of former leader Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese 
Government implemented a series of further controlled reforms, implemented 
initially within strict testing grounds, which paved the way towards a market 
economy. By implementing a series of changes that took the form of liberal 
economic moves, state enterprises, which had been the cornerstones of communist 
development, were gradually dismantled and the housing sector underwent 
privatisation (The Economist 1999). 
While economic reform had brought many new challenges for China, it 
had responded to these changes by exercising prudence and control over its 
national interests. By the late 1990s, China was beginning to heed the critical 
lessons of expanding globalisation that were becoming apparent, notably in 
Indonesia, where ineffective management of reform had led to catastrophic 
political damage being inflicted (Lanteigne 2008: 170). China also witnessed 
significant failings throughout the developing world, largely in nations that had 
been subjected to the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus (see Doner et al. 
2005; Gore 2000: 789-804). Several key international events, the bombing in 
Belgrade of the Chinese embassy and the Hainan spy plane incident, contributed 
to growing nationalism in China and made the CCP increasingly wary of the 
relative compatibilities of globalisation and its national interests (Lanteigne 2008: 
170). China's adherence to the developmentalist norm, which was being 
influenced by its concerns of achieving visible developmental success, 
demonstrated to varying degrees the ongoing anxieties that had existed during the 
1990s regarding perceived threats to its economic development, its increasing 
need for foreign exchange, and its need for retaining constraints on its budgets 
(Lanteigne 2008: 170, 173). This induced the CCP's pursuit of 'pragmatic 
nationalism', which resulted in the formulation of two key policies, the 'three 
represents' and the 'go out' policy, the latter of which was formulated from Jiang 
Zemin's 'three closeness' theory (MFA 2002e). As success in these policies 
required extensive entrepreneurial expertise, the formulation of these policies was 
closely followed by the CCP sanctioning greater entrepreneurial involvement in 
its development programmes in a notable reversal of its policy from the late 1980s 
(Lanteigne 2008: 168; Zhao 2005: l31-44). Though increased entrepreneurial 
involvement may have resulted in the acceleration of capitalist reforms, China's 
development shared several key aspects with Asian development, which \\as 
67 
modelled largely on Japan's 'flying geese' model of development, through its 
top-down control which prioritised economic growth and its detachment from the 
embracing of liberal markets. This allowed the CCP greater protection of its 
policies and emergence into globalisation, which could further the image of the 
CCP as a successful leading body. 
The expression the Beijing Consensus was proposed by Joshua Cooper 
Ramo in 2004, when he stated that China, which 'most pointedly' ignored the 
World Bank- and IMF-championed Washington Consensus, 'now [has] records 
that speak for [itselfJ'. The Beijing Consensus expressed the scepticism felt in the 
developing world, regarding the benefits of privatization and free trade. Ramo 
(2004) argued that other nations could, and should, be able to fit into the global 
system 'in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of 
life', although he was unclear about the precise nature of this platitude. It remains 
to be seen if Beijing's top-down model will work outside of a semi-authoritarian 
China, or if the Chinese economy can continue to remain exclusively prosperous. 
The consensus best exemplified China's controlled emergence into the 
glocalisation and grobalisation that was transpiring between China and the 
international community. Glocalisation indicates the control of globalisation at a 
local level, while grobalisation highlights how other developing countries are 
turning to China's model of apparent success to shape their own models of 
development after years of Western policies shaped by the Washington Consensus 
(Lanteigne 2008: 176). 
Having outlined the Beijing Consensus, the discussion will continue by 
reviewing how the consensus is presented by China, in addition to how it is 
viewed by the international community. The discussion will conclude by outlining 
those features of the consensus which may be studied to evaluate its 
implementation in developing regions. 
iii) How China presents the Beijing Consensus 
Having been a developing country itself, China holds a view of development that 
differs significantly from more traditional aid donors, which traditionally 
followed development agendas akin to the prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus. As such, China promotes the Beijing Consensus as an alternative 
development model. The Chinese view of development stresses that there are no 
universal paths or defined prescriptions to development (Ramo 2004: 7-10). In 
order to develop as a country, and emerge into the international system, 
development has to be closely controlled and tested in a model environment, 
where it can be nurtured and refined in gradual stages such that its environment 
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remams stable and free from competitive forces until it is sufficiently mature 
enough to enter the system, both effectively and competently. Shih (1993: 44-5) 
reflects this by highlighting that China's Third World policy is intended as a 
model for emulation. 
By presenting an alternative path to development through the Beijing 
Consensus, China has been able to style itself as leader of the global South and 
champion of a progressive international order, further underlining the identity of 
China as a great power. China's belief in this developmentalist policy encourages 
its aid donation to nurture developing world markets, upon which future trade 
relations can be founded. In order to accelerate the beneficial aspects of 
development, China promotes the use of innovation, and indirect cost-effective 
solutions, in achieving developmental goals. This allows traditional targets of 
development to be achieved not only through non-traditional, and less costly 
approaches, but also without having to adhere to the traditional donor's specific 
development criteria. China also holds a firm belief in the overall positive benefit 
of development. It believes that development is comprised of both positive and 
negative aspects, termed 'green or clean GDP growth' and 'black GDP growth' 
respectively, by traditional aid donors. In China's view, if the 'clean GDP growth' 
exceeds the 'black GDP growth', then the long-term prospects for development 
are beneficial, and the 'black GDP growth' can be regarded as transient (Ramo 
2004: 12,22-23). Coupled with this is its belief that short-term policy failures in 
reaching goals constitute an acceptable part of overall long-term developmental 
success. The 'go out' policy has its origins in Hu Jintao's 'Three Closeness' (san 
ge tiejin) theory, which was formulated from a refinement of Jiang Zemin's 
'Three Represents' (san ge daibiao). This theory postulated that the development 
path should be close to the people, reality, and life, in order to address the 
fundamental issues of the specific case of development (SAIS 2006). The 'three 
closeness' theory also reflects China's strong belief in the importance of culture 
and localisation in development (Ramo 2004: 31), where developmental schemes 
are moulded by the local cultures so they adapt to their environment beneficially. 
The Beij ing Consensus has become reinforced by the identities that were 
inherent in China during its own development. In the initial process of 
development, China was displaying an image of competent self-reliance. However, 
as the success of its reforms grew, this increasingly reflected through the 
exercising of the developmentalist norm, an image of competent economic 
professionalism which echoed Deng's early epitomisation of the developmentalist 
norm entrepreneur, by demonstrating reproducible success according to a strictly 
formulated path. Such success on its own terms fuelled its self-esteem and fed 
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back into its great-power identity. Wang Bo and Liz Padmore highlighted these 
ambitions in the preface to a book by Zhang Yongjin (2005: VI) when they 
pointed out that: 
China's recent transformation from 'isolated' to 'globalised' has 
been a reflection of the Chinese government's desire to maintain 
sustainable long-term economic prosperity, which it believes can 
only be achieved through full integration into the global economy. 
While this further transition into the international fold has begun to 
reshape the internal priorities and commitments of the Chinese 
government, China in turn has begun to redefine the world 
economic order of which it seeks to become a part. 
The' go out' policy is producing a new generation of entrepreneurs who aspire to 
match and extend this success in the name of national, and self-interests, therefore, 
the promotion of this image to the developing world is fuelling mutual aspirations 
and ambitions. As the Beijing Consensus is still evolving, China is exercising 
prudence through its non-interference policy, by offsetting potential resentment 
and discontent that might arise through similar policy failings in the developing 
world, which fuelled the rejection of the Washington Consensus in the late 
twentieth century. The success or failure of policies is framed in terms of the 
self-reliance of the individual nations. 
iv) How the world perceives the Beijing Consensus 
Ramo (2004) defined the Beijing Consensus as essentially the use of constant 
innovation and experimentation, through the refining of effective policies, the use 
of different means of measuring success including sustainability and equality, as 
well as self-determination. The development path advocated by the Beij ing 
Consensus has met with a wide range of perceptions worldwide (Dirlik 2006). 
The vagueness of what, in essence, is not a consensus as such, as no firm 
definition exists on what it precisely constituted, is more of an attitude that China 
has been able to apply to itself through harsh control and wide exploitation of its 
readily abundant mass population; as such, it will be hard to replicate elsewhere. 
Criticism has also been levelled at the sustainability and equality aspects of the 
Consensus, as the apparent wealth gap that has arisen in China attests to gross 
inequality. 
Conversely, strong government promotion of economic growth. along with 
firm government control, makes this model appealing to developing countries 
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who have grown tired of the destructive prescriptions of Western-imposed models. 
Though this initially raised fears that some governments embracing this 
development path would fail to relinquish power over their own subsequent 
successful nations (China 2008), many have commonly not displayed such 
behaviour, and more importantly, countries that have displayed such behaviour, 
such as Myanmar and Zimbabwe, have exhibited little or no interest in actively 
developing their countries. 
As the Beijing Consensus is more of an attitude and consequently more 
diffuse, its speculative application to the developing world seems enticing to 
maintaining the status quo and redressing the damage inflicted by the Washington 
Consensus.! By focussing upon developing countries' key industries, such as 
agriculture, China is increasing the strongly-shared sense of South-South 
cooperation and non-Western union, which in turn, has enhanced mutual 
understanding. This is consequently being viewed, notably in Africa, as an 
historic opportunity to break from the neo-colonial ties to the West (Lammers 
2007: 16-8). The possibility of following China's example of raising a substantial 
proportion of its population out of poverty within two decades, without 
externally-enforced Structural Adjustment Programmes, has bolstered African 
countries' optimism that they too can devise their own development path, and that 
the Western model was inherently flawed. According to Lammers (2007: 16-8), 
early signs of the success of the Beijing Consensus became apparent in Africa in 
2004. The provision of Chinese developmental aid had, by that time, created in 
excess of 15,000 new African graduates from Chinese universities alone. The 
return of these graduates to their homelands has fuelled a serendipitous 'brain 
gain' , thereby reinforcing China's image and the developmentalist norm 
(Lammers 2007: 16-8). A further consideration that often impedes localisation 
arises from extensive external influences which direct development according to 
the subjective self-interests of traditional aid donors. In order to minimise this 
I The Washington Consensus was a 10 point prescriptive plan fonnulated by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank in the late 1980s, which used a neo-liberal shock solution to 
stimulate development in developing countries. The consensus prescribed the implementation of 
key economic infrastructural components deemed necessary to support a growing economy. The 
main reasons for its 'failure', though, arose from its one size fits all approach to development and 
failure to appreciate the differential local settings existent in the developing world due to poor 
infrastructure and high unemployment. Such failings were attributed more to local inherent 
corruption and squandering of resources than to any part played by Washington in framing the 
plan in local contexts (Perdue 2003). The main reasons behind the policies of these key paths to 
development have been outlined in Perdue's paper o.n ~estern deve!op~ent. Th~ \~'est's p.olicies 
are shaped in tenns of orientalism, scientism, evolutIOnISm and temtonal essentlahsm which ~ed 
many western countries to a messianic belief in countries aspiring to be more Western, and \\ l1lCh 
failed to recognise that successful cultures existed outside of these frame\\orks. For more 
information about the Washington Consensus, see Williamson (1993), and Kuczynski and 
Williamson (2003). 
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factor, and maximise both the self-reliance and determination of a developing 
nation emerging into the competitive international community on its own terms, 
China is also promoting the development of asymmetric defensive mechanisms 
(Ramo 2004: 37) to offset the challenges presented by more developed countries. 
This factor is especially appealing to the developing world. 
v) The features of developmentalism in China's foreign aid 
The success of providing direct and indirect innovative aid throughout the region, 
fuels a self-sustaining form of self-confidence in the recipient country, which 
induces what Ramo (2004: 16) described as Total Factor Productivity, whereby the 
success of assistance becomes more than the sum of the components provided. 
The developmentalist norm, as manifested in the Beijing Consensus, may 
be viewed in its foreign aid policies through investigating and addressing the 
following six key issues: firstly, by identifying where China has used aid to 
promote and encourage innovation, or creative environments for growth and 
development; secondly, by highlighting where such innovation has induced and 
fuelled regional self-confidence, through China's targeting of localised processes 
of development aimed at inducing chain reactions which fuel further development; 
thirdly, by demonstrating where China has become closer to the people through 
implementing schemes, and learning through various single step approaches; 
fourthly, by indicating how China has pursued policies with long-term benefits, 
despite encountering potentially problematic issues; fifthly, by detailing how 
China is creating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as long-term regional support 
infrastructures to encourage economic development and equality in trade, outside 
of external influence; and lastly, by showing how China has deployed its aid to 
enhance strategic leverage, either intentionally or unintentionally throughout the 
region, as a means of developing asymmetric defence mechanisms. In each case 
study, the investigation of the developmentalist norm will address and provide 
insights into these six issues. 
3.4 The trajectory of identities and norms in China's foreign relations since 
1949 
Over the past sixty years, China has successively demonstrated three distinct and 
significant identities. Each of these successive identities has existed, to date, 
throughout an approximate twenty-year period, beginning with China's identity as 
a victim of Western colonialism, which lasted for the first twenty years of the 
PRC from 1949 onwards. The victim identity underwent transformation, when 
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China gained admission to the UN in the early 1970s, into that of a neutral actor 
and supporter of the developing world. The neutrality of China's new identity also 
counterbalanced the superpowers of the US and USSR. It maintained this identity 
until the end of the Cold War, when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and in light of growing US unilateralism, its identity transitioned further, as a 
result of the induced shift in its compensatory neutral role towards that of a great 
power. 
The similarities that were apparent in China's behaviour, before and 
following its identity transformations, were reflected in the norms that were 
present, and exerting an influence at those times. A pivotal norm influencing 
China's international relations in the 1940s and early 1950s was sovereignty, 
whereas the emergence of internationalism in the early 1970s, and uptake of 
developmentalism in the late 1980s, transformed its respective identities during 
those times. The shaping of its behaviour in this manner, along with the 
subsequent policies and activities that this behaviour induced, reflected its 
determination to establish a renewed identity for itself through its experimentation 
with new norms. After being influenced by these norms and following the 
stabilisation of its behaviour, China's identity underwent a transition. Following 
this transition, its efforts then became focussed upon translating the influence of 
these norms into its policies and activities. The scale of China's identity 
transformation is also reflected in the magnitude of its behavioural change. Hence 
in the early 1970s, the identity shift that followed the balance of norm influences 
of both internationalism and sovereignty induced a much larger shift in identity 
than that observed in the late 1990s, when China having additionally adopted 
developmental ism in the late 1980s, further engaged Asianism. 
From the early days of the PRC, China's identity as a victim was shaped 
extensively by the extraordinary events of the last two centuries of its history. 
China's 'Century of Humiliation' which began in 1840, arose from an extended 
period of pressure from the West, notably the United States and Europe, and later 
from Japan, leading to numerous defeats and loss of territory. This culminated in 
the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the formation of the Republic of China in 
1912. China then entered a period, which lasted for approximately three and a half 
decades, where the country became divided between numerous factions, under the 
influence of the Nationalists, the Communists, and regional warlords. The 
ongoing anarchy, by the late 1920s, pushed China into a state of Civil War. By the 
early 1930s, the Japanese took advantage of the chaotic situation in China and 
launched an invasion from its Korean colony into Manchuria, an event that further 
inflamed the ongoing Sino-Japanese wars. These events devastated China on all 
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levels. Internationally and regionally, it meant the loss of its great-power status, 
with many states no longer regarding China as the pre-eminent power in Asia, but 
rather a large, impoverished, and technologically backward state. Chinese factions 
continued to struggle against the Japanese occupation, during the 1930s and early 
1940s, while fighting their own battle for leadership and control of China's vast 
territory. Foreign powers, most notably the Americans and the Soviets, backed the 
opposing factions of the CCP and KMT, and in the case of the Soviets, passed on 
the ideological doctrines of anti-imperialism and socialist revolution. Both played 
important roles in the formation of China's identification with victimization, and 
its support for world revolution. The loss of its great-power status has fuelled 
China's significant pursuit of, and efforts towards, its re-establishment over the 
following six decades. 
By 1949, following their victory over the Nationalists, the CCP 
proclaimed the PRC. The PRC began extricating the major sources of contention 
of the previous century in an attempt to repair their damaged country. However, 
the legacy of this 'Century of Humiliation' was manifest in a loss of 
self-confidence and self-esteem, as China's national identity and projection began 
to reconcile the loss of its former status and prestige as the 'Middle Kingdom'. By 
reflecting upon the behaviour of the Qing dynasty, and its penchant for 
maintaining traditional socio-political and economic structures, Zhou Enlai 
highlighted how 'Qing ideals, sense of identity [ ...... ] and the conflicting systems 
of these two quite different civilizations' had resulted from 'the shift in the 
balance of power from East to West' (Zhou 2007: 447; also see Dittmer and Kim 
1993). China's failure to adapt to a changing world, reinforced the idea of 'the 
unchanging East' , and contributed to China's fall in wealth, power and standing. 
The blame for China's weakness, eventual occupation and collapse, was 
collectively apportioned to the Qing dynasty, the Nationalists, and foreign powers. 
Under Soviet, tutelage the Chinese leadership adopted Marxist axioms on 
imperialism and capitalist exploitation, and came to side with the Soviet's view of 
American led Western imperialism. In 1950, renewed threats to regional stability 
compelled China to respond to North Korean aid pleas during the DPRK's war of 
unification with South Korea. Again, China was drawn into conflict with Western 
powers in the form of the US led fifteen member UN alliance, as it assisted North 
Korean attempts to prevent the establishment of a pro-American Korean peninsula. 
Following the armistice in 1953, China further strengthened its identification with 
revolution as a mechanism for self-improvement. This influenced its perspective 
on cooperation, towards achieving decolonisation through revolutionary means. 
After allying itself closer to the Soviet Union, it began to rebuild its war-ravaged, 
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undeveloped and backward economy. International representation of Chinese 
interests at the UN, however, remained in the hands of the Nationalists, who the 
CCP had forced into exile in Taiwan in 1949. This further fuelled the PRC's 
self-identification as a victim of 'Western' aggression, exploitation, and 
colonisation. 
During its victim identity period, the PRC continued to view its 
sovereignty and leadership as being under threat from the Western powers, and 
their domination of international institutions (Kornberg and Faust 2005: 14-9). As 
Harding (1984: 214) points out that: 
China's leaders [Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai] have regularly 
viewed international politics as a struggle for hegemony among 
superpowers, have maintained an abiding concern with their 
security and sovereignty against threats from abroad, have sought 
to preserve a high degree of independence and initiative in their 
international conduct, and have tended to identify their country 
with the developing nations of the Third World, rather than with 
either of the two superpowers. 
The legacy of its enforced period of 'humiliation' and subjugated potential, still 
resonates deeply in modem Chinese foreign policy, strategic culture, and overall 
worldview. 
China's identification with the developing world led it to playa prominent 
role at the Bandung conference in 1955, where it nurtured stronger connections 
with many colonised, or former colonised, countries in the developing world, who 
at that time were seeking, or strengthening, their independence, and were either 
communist or non-aligned (see Shao 1979). From the mid-1950s onwards, the 
PRC focussed upon providing aid to countries of the developing world which had 
formed relations with China, following the Bandung conference. The aid, 
however, was accompanied by assistance from China in translating its own 
success into de co Ionisation by revolution. China's behaviour highlights a major 
contradiction towards the norm of sovereignty, which stressed non-interference in 
a nation's internal affairs. China's communist allegiances, and Mao's 
determination to undermine Western influences in the developing world, 
constrained the norm of sovereignty at this time (see Zhong 1994: 255-313). 
Interfering in a state's internal affairs, was acceptable in the name of 
de-colonization and anti-imperialism, and could no longer be rationalized once 
the era of decolonization came to an end. This was notable through China's 
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considerably more enhanced adherence to non-intervention in independent nations 
of the developing world, throughout Latin America. 
Within the PRC, China's development aid was initially managed by the 
newly established Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, 
which was later renamed as the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries within 
the Ministry of Commerce. During this period, China worked alongside the 
Soviets, and its IDA was influenced by their communist aligned policies. China 
strived to display marked prudence m making its resources as effective as 
possible. 
However, by the late 1950s, as its communist alliances fragmented 
following the Sino-Soviet rift, much of the success that fuelled its own domestic 
revolutionary activities appeared increasingly elusive. As its alliances reduced in 
number, it sought to strengthen its remaining relations, through a need to survive 
and recuperate its international position. The increasing loss of these alliances 
fuelled its victim image further, and as it sought to offset the influence of the 
superpowers, notably in Africa and Southeast Asia, its identification with its 
remaining allies in these regions strengthened. Much of China's activities in Latin 
America, outside its support of Cuba, remained marginal due to its reduced 
capacities, and the enhanced anti-communist sentiment in the region's politics. 
Although these reasons were also extant throughout much of Southeast Asia, the 
region's relative proximity to China, increased incidence of colonised nations and 
urgency of offsetting the regional superpower influence, prioritised China's 
activities. In 1964, in Mali, Zhou Enlai proposed eight principles for formulating 
foreign aid. These were proposed as guidelines and shaped China's goals on three 
distinct levels: firstly, the 'poor helping the poor' in post colonial countries to 
improve self-reliance, agriculture, technical assistance and projects with low turn 
around times; secondly, working on communist world revolution; and thirdly, 
countering the KMT influence by mitigating the position of the ROC globally 
(Chin and Frolic 2007: 5). As the 1960s progressed, and its international isolation 
increased, China's aid, and the rhetoric that accompanied it, began to reflect the 
extreme desperation of its position, as its aid and determination to show its 
capacities, self-reliance, and separation from the Soviet camp became more 
apparent. China's increasingly isolated international position was seen in 
Indonesia in 1965, through the extreme anti-Chinese backlash, and became even 
more significant after its Cultural Revolution commenced in 1966 (Xinhua 2006a). 
In the face of ongoing competition from the US and USSR, China engaged in 
higher-risk and larger-scale projects, such as the Tan-Zam railway, in addition to 
its lower-risk standard sports stadium projects (Yu 1980: 117-44). Though the 
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Tan-Zam project was only realised in the 1970s, its formulation was completed 
during the 1960s during a visit of a CCP delegation to Africa. 
The determination to demonstrate its capacities reflects how it \\as 
reacting to its desire to assist the developing world through the framework of 
South-South cooperation, and gain further international recognition in order to 
legitimise its position in the international community. China provided economic 
assistance to developing countries through its emphatic desire to form its own 
sphere of influence, remammg independent from both Soviet 
communism/socialism and of the emerging Non-Aligned Movement (Zha 2005). 
The tangible success of this foreign policy provided China with support from 
developing country members of the UN, and gave it sufficient incentive to induce 
a transformation of its identity and image. As Mao Zedong is often quoted, it was 
China's African friends who carried China into its seat in the UN headquarters 
(Interview 2006a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007g). This reaffirmed not only that its 
revolutionary activities were limited and counter productive to its future growth, 
but also, its goals for the developing world could now be focussed through 
mechanisms within the UN, which had previously been unattainable during the 
early years of the PRC. 
The switch of recognition from the ROC to the PRC, was viewed by the 
CCP as an international acknowledgement of its authority and leadership, and 
enhanced international status. While the issue of sovereignty in Taiwan remained 
unresolved, China continued to deal with security issues and began to involve 
itself in international affairs more actively, as the norm of internationalism 
increasingly emerged. This brought China out of its international isolation, 
stimulating the reallocation of resources, which had been diverted towards 
China's 'recognition effort', towards other foreign policy objectives. Aid during 
the 1970s and 1980s reflected the changes in China's behaviour as it began to 
identify with its new neutral identity, and became a stronger supporter of the 
developing world. Its foreign policies shifted from being reckless and extravagant, 
to being more multilateral and cost effective. Its neutral identity also led to it 
adapting its policies from the pursuit of Maoist communism towards increased 
alignment with the international community and a commitment to regime survival. 
As China moderated its ideological doctrines of anti-imperialism and socialist 
revolution that had limited the sovereignty norm, it became aware of the 
consequences of this self-inflicted national damage upon its pursuit of 
re-establishing its great-power status. In light of this, China remained opposed to 
both superpowers. and so, by remaining on the sidelines, while the Soviets and 
Americans sponsored regimes in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, the 
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Chinese continued to promote an image of neutrality and independence. After 
denouncing the superpowers for involving themselves in the affairs of sovereign 
states, China took on an observer role, participating marginally in conflicts backed 
by the Soviet Union and the United States. By opposing the interference of both 
the Soviets and the West, and limiting its involvement in other state's affairs, 
China was free from the criticism levied against the superpowers for their proxy 
wars and conflicts in the developing world. This allowed China to form friendly 
relationships with developing countries who had become disillusioned with the 
West. By 1973, the Chinese Government reinforced its nascent international role 
through aid giving, by increasing the scale of its aid financially, as well as in 
terms of overall government expenditure and as a percentage of GDP for the 
decade of the 1970s (Zha 2005). After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng 
Xiaoping gradually returned to a position of power, through being reappointed to 
the position of Party Vice-Chairman in July 1977, and was tipped to take over and 
is generally regarded as having taken over the role of de facto leader at the Third 
Plenum in December 1978. After these changes, Deng increasingly took over 
management of China's national and foreign economic policy making. As China 
identified itself less as a victim, there was little need for it to justify the aid it 
allocated to fellow victims, as China could cite its international obligation when 
supporting the developing world; consequently, China's quantity of foreign aid 
began to decrease. In fact, this move, in 1978, marked a distinct change in its 
behaviour as it began to seek development aid from Japan, in order to assist its 
own economic and societal development. This was followed by an increase in its 
campaigning for membership of such international development institutions as the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB. By prioritising the utilisation of external 
resources for its own development above that of assisting other developing 
countries, China became one of the few nations that remained both a significant 
aid recipient and donor. China has frequently been cited as the World Bank's 
largest borrower as well as the recipient of the largest proportion of aid from 
Japan between 1979 and 2000 (Takamine 2006: 1,5, 161-4). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China's relations with Southeast Asia 
and Latin America significantly improved, through the shared promotion of 
South-South cooperation. China's aid policies shifted towards promoting the 
increase in aid recipient self-reliance, as it became focussed upon its own 
domestic growth. The 1980s also marked a gradual but persistent decline in the 
role of communist/socialist ideology as a basis for China's pursuit of its 
diplomatic ties with developing countries. In the same period, there was a marked 
increase in China's need to maintain relationships with the developed world that 
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mirrored its decrease in identification with the Third World. This moderation of its 
neutral identity explains why China's foreign aid showed no increase, despite 
substantial increases in its own economy and national budgets. The continued 
opening up of China's economy, at this time, led to its economic growth and 
development, raising its international status and reputation, and increased 
confidence in the CCP's leadership. 
By the late 1980s, in light of China's own domestic developmental success 
during the decade, the domestically embedded norm of developmental ism began 
to become reinforced. Although the conforming to this norm at this time focussed 
a renewal of China's activities towards enhanced development in the aid recipient 
regions, the global events of the period also contributed to the uptake of the 
developmentalist norm, and its impending identity transition into that of a great 
power. At the end of the Cold War, when Soviet influence in the world collapsed, 
leaving an increasingly unilateral United States, Chinese identity as a significant 
neutral supporter of the developing world became unbalanced, inducing a shift in 
its identity. Having freed itself from its revolutionary past, and in light of its 
successful domestic development, as well as its increasing involvement in 
regional institutions, it began to identify with becoming a great power in order to 
continue to counterbalance the United States. These events, which contributed to 
the uptake of developmental ism, along with the aftershock of Tiananmen Square, 
had the effect of shifting the focus of the internationalist norm away from 
South-South cooperation, and increasingly towards international responsibility. Its 
aid from the 1990s onwards reflects this transition, as its foreign policies and 
activities have become more significantly enhanced through the re-enforcement of 
this identity. 
As China's behaviour, following its identity transformation stabilised, 
Deng Xiaoping formulated his idea to 'focus on developing the economy but keep 
a low profile in international affairs' as a means for dealing with the diplomatic 
difficulties of the G7/G20 and other industrialized countries (Huang 2009). This 
allowed China to continue prioritising the stabilisation of its aid commitments 
rather than increasing them. Consequently, China increasingly and actively sought 
partnerships abroad, both with international organisations and on an interstate 
level. In the mid-1990s, China's policies in Southeast Asia, which were informed 
by its increasing international responsibility, desire for development and 
adherence to regional stability by maintaining and enforcing of sovereignty, led it 
to draw further on the norm of Asianism. Though this did not induce a further 
change in identity, it did reinforce its existing identity as a great power, as it 
strengthened China's ongoing pursuit of re-establishing this lost legacy. In 
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Southeast Asia, this was reflected by its increased involvement with ASEAN, in 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and greater cooperation 
throughout the region in its reform and infra structural projects. In Africa and 
Latin America, its policies have become reflected through its supportive, but 
non-interventionist, role in the institutions of the region. Since the start of the 21 st 
century, China has continued to reinforce these norms through its foreign aid 
policies to aid recipient countries. Though China's identity has remained constant 
through this period, the ongoing changes to the norms themselves, as seen in 
global sovereignty, have induced further changes in China's behaviour and 
foreign policies as it continued to strengthen its great-power identity. 
The reach of Chinese finance in developing countries has raised concerns 
about issues such as debt sustainability, environmental standards, human rights, 
and the undermining of the international norms that have built expectations about 
what constitutes aid, and how aid effectiveness is assessed (BBe 2007a; The 
Guardian 2007a; 2007b; The Washington Post 2007). Chinese officials and 
scholars disclose that the volume of their aid is a state secret (Interview 2007d; 
2007f; 2007i). Their justification for this lack of transparency is due to the fact 
that if they published how much aid they were providing, including to which 
specific governments, they would soon find themselves under pressure from many 
of those governments to increase their aid in order to keep up with the largest 
recipients, and also from their own people to meet their own domestic needs. This 
fact reinforces the CCP assertion of strong state control, which shapes China's 
identity and makes a concrete picture of China's aid difficult to ascertain. This 
raises questions over the proportion, timing, and nature of how Chinese aid is 
determined. Therefore, it appears that China does not yet have a clear aid policy. 
More commonly, decisions are announced by senior leaders often to smooth 
official overseas visits. Accordingly, the pattern of Chinese external orientation 
and behaviour becomes more important. While China's impact on regional and 
global outcomes is significant, Chinese behaviour and its formulation of foreign 
policy is key to the continuity and change of China's foreign relations. 
The study of the norms that influence China's policies and interests raises 
several questions: firstly, how has the role of identity influenced China's 
definition of its interests? The concept of identity relates to the self-perception 
that China has of itself in the global community. This has played a major role in 
influencing China's behaviour, and consequently, its definition of interests. 
During the early years of the Cold War, China assumed the identity of a victim, in 
light of the detrimental events which it had suffered prior to and during its 
twenty-two-year long civil war. This identity led China to act in an aggressive. 
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defensive and hostile manner towards the outside world. As relations with the 
West improved, and China gained increased recognition and inclusion into the UN 
and other institutions, over the following two decades, its identity became more 
subdued and impartial. It repositioned itself equidistant to the political stances of 
the superpowers, who it viewed as being equal, and diametrically opposed in their 
hegemonic perspectives. The success of Deng's economic reforms, of the late 
1970s, in transforming the Chinese economy, raised China's confidence 
significantly. By the late 1980s, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the 
growing unilateralism of the United States, China began to pursue a global 
leadership role. As it nurtured this role, it became increasingly more self-centred 
and opportunistic in achieving its goals. However, when this conduct negatively 
impacts upon its interests, its determination to behave responsibly counters and 
redresses its behaviour. 
81 
I 
The second question concerns the timing of when the norms have 
appeared, evolved and undergone internalisation. These stages are highlighted III 
the following table: 
Table 3.2 The life cycle of norms in China's foreign relations 
Norm appearance Norm evolution Norm internalisation 
Asianism Early 1990s Late 1990s Mid-2000s 
Identity: Great power Identity: Great power Identity: Great power 
Appeared in the early 1990s Evolved, in late 1990s, Norm evolving towards 
in its current form, as China prevalent during 1997 Asian cascaded in mid-2000s, as 
was becoming focussed upon financial crisis, triggered by multilateral efforts in region 
greater international China's enhanced role in crisis. expanded, though 
responsibility. internalisation is running 
parallel with its growth as a 
, igreat power. 
-~.-
Internationalism Early 1970s IEarly 1990s In progress 
Identity: Neutral actor Identity: Great power Identity: Great power 
Appeared in 1970s as it Evolution began in early 1990s Norm not internalised yet, as 
emerged from its isolation when China's identity changed still evolving parallel with its 
into, and increasingly from neutral actor to great growth as a great power. 
cooperated with, the power, still ongoing. 
international community. 
Sovereignty 1949 1950-60s Early to mid-1970s 
Identity: Pre-Victim Identity: Victim Identity: Neutral actor 
This norm highlights how an Present following civil war, Following admission to UN, 
existing internalised norm though heavily constrained by and transition from victim 
from the 1940s was being Maoist and communist identity to neutral actor, 
reshaped by the PRC's victim philosophies. internationalism began to 
identity. influence sovereignty, and 
reduce influence from Maoist 
and communist philosophies. 
1990s In progress In progress 
Identity: Great power Identity: Great power Identity: Great power 
Norm re-emerged, underlined Re-emerged Norm still evolving Re-emerged norm has yet to 
by developmentalism and parallel with its growth as a cascade, again, though appears 
internationalism. great power. more mature as the renewed 
norm is in balance with its old 
Re-emerged norm in balance internalised variation. 
with existing internalised 
norm i.e. 
non-interference/attitude to 
Taiwan, but renewed norm 
evolving towards cascade is 
being influenced by growing 
iinternationalism and global 
sovereignty as well. 
---
Late 1970s Late 1990s Mid-2000s jDevelopmentalism 
Identity: Neutral actor IIdentity: Great power Identity: Great power 
Emerged in current form in Norm evolved as Cold War As internalisation depends on 
1970-80s with own domestic ended, and enhanced China's clear definition of the Beijing 
reforms. need to become a great power. Consensus, then difficult to 
Norm further evolved due to interpret how internalised this 
perceived failings of the norm has become. 
Washington Consensus, and as 
China's intense promotion of internationalism increased 
i confidence in its re-establishing the Beijing Consensus 
of its great-power status. indicates developmentalist 
norn1 internalisation from 
mid-2000~ ___________ 
-----
----~ 
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The relationship between identity, image and norms is cyclical; identity 
which reflects self-perception promotes a nation's image, which impacts upon the 
behaviour shaped by the norms through a desire to maintain its image. This 
behaviour then feeds back, thereby reinforcing or undermining identity (Figure 
3.1 ). 
Image L 7 
\. Norms 
Figure 3.1 Relationship between norms, identity, and image 
During the 1960s, China was increasingly isolated from the global 
community and projected its image of a victim, becoming deadlocked in its 
actions globally. Its increasingly hostile image, resulting from the perceived 
hostility from the superpowers, fed back and re-enforced this victim image. The 
thawing of relations with the West, beginning in the 1970s, gave China an 
opportunity to moderate its identity, which led to a change in its behaviour, and 
was seen as a pivotal step in maintaining this more open state. 
Having discussed China's identities, norms and their relationships, the 
discussion will continue by examining a case study of Southeast Asia, which 
represents a region in which China has long held both cultural and historical ties. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CHINA'S FOREIGN AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 
This chapter will investigate China's foreign aid activities in Southeast Asia, I by 
exploring the norms identified in the previous chapter: Asianism, internationalism, 
sovereignty and developmental ism. By examining all four norms both 
independently and interactively, this investigation will establish the broad 
contextual basis for China's foreign aid behaviour in the region. 
4.1 The significance of the Southeast Asian case 
The importance of Southeast Asia in relation to Chinese foreign aid can be 
understood by examining two areas which have had an impact on 
Chinese-Southeast Asian relations. The first area concerns their mutual historical 
and cultural ties; this area is important in understanding the traditional 'tribute 
system' and the impact of an Asian identity for the making of China's foreign aid 
policy. The second area concerns economic development and trade; this area is 
important because China's economic and multilateral activities in Southeast Asia 
have increased prolifically. China's economic assistance is matching its expansion 
of activities in the region, in infrastructure and market driven projects, which are 
related closely to the region's prosperity (Perlez 2006). 
An examination of Chinese-Southeast Asian relations provides a historical 
overview, which will seek to explain the PRC's current foreign relations in the 
region and its connection to foreign aid. As will be explained, geographical 
factors have played an important role in Chinese-Southeast Asian relations, and 
events stemming from the presence of Western colonial powers have had the 
greatest impact on Chinese foreign relations. By examining China's historical 
relations with mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, it can be shown that the 
changes that occurred to the PRC's identity and international image transpired in 
response to influences from events in the region. The end of the Cold War and the 
Asian financial crisis had a profound influence on both China and states in the 
region; such influences became visible through regional trade and economics. 
Although members of ASEAN are not identical and the aid relationships between 
I The term 'Southeast Asia' as used in this chapter refers to East Timor and the 10 members of 
the ASEAN: Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. 
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China and Southeast Asian countries vary widely, the observation of China's 
involvement in multilateral institutions is helpful in analysing the development of 
norms and Chinese identity in the formation of Chinese foreign aid policy. 
In addition, international attention has been focussed upon China's aid in 
Southeast Asia, as highlighted in a 2008 US Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report (Lum, Thomas et al. 2008: 84) which noted that: 'China has become 
one of the largest providers of economic assistance in the region'. Although this 
report stated that China was not a major provider of ODA, it demonstrates an 
awareness of China's rising influence in its aid behaviour. It also contended that 
this 'largely stems from its role as a major source of foreign aid, trade, and 
investment' (Lum, Morrison and Vaughn 2008: 1). In August 2009, Zhang Qiyue, 
the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, commented upon how China and Southeast 
Asia's mutual interests had become 'intertwined in an unprecedented way' 
(Xinhua 2009i). China will 'continue to promote ties with Southeast Asian 
countries as they were indispensable development partners' and 'were an 
important part of China's geopolitical strategy' (ibid.). Zhang further commented 
that 'her experience in Indonesia had influenced her ideas on deepening practical 
cooperation', which stressed cooperation in trade, economic, and infrastructural 
development, as a prelude to the launching of the world's largest FTA in 2010 
across the region (ibid.). This reflects how 'China firmly practices trade 
liberalisation and opposes trade protection' (Xinhua 2009k). In addition, China 
has increased its involvement in multilateral regional institutions, in order to 
promote its regional cooperative business networks with its Southeast Asian 
counterparts. These activities will be funded by the establishment of a US$15 
million Asia Cooperation Fund by 2010 (MFA 2004e). 
This raises the question of why, and in what direction, this activity is 
proceeding (Asia Times 2009b; Economy 2005; FP]F 2006). Therefore, a study of 
norms allows the significant differences that have arisen in modern China's 
international relations to be understood (Li 2009: 1-46, 171-208). As was 
previously discussed in Chapter 3, Asianism has, since the mid-1990s, reflected 
China's regional identity through its foreign policies and its position relative to 
the largest aid donor in the region, which constitutes a Japanese-led Asianism. 
Asianism also highlights the ongoing challenges between regional powers, Japan 
and China, in assuming an Asian leadership role. The Asianist norm has played a 
significant role in Chinese aid to mainland Southeast Asia, most notably in 
Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia, all of which have been long-term recipients of 
Chinese aid in the region. The aid provided has been aimed at infrastructure 
projects for building roads, railways, airfields, and ports, in addition to providing 
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extensive military provIsIOns used by some of the governments to remam m 
power. While Chinese projects build dams and roads, strengthen regional 
infrastructures, consolidate control over the South China Sea, and provide 
enhanced trade and investment cooperation, some argue that this may lead to the 
'China threat', namely through China's domination of the entire region. For 
example, Leifer (1999: 87-90) argues that China's continuing economic growth, 
along with the modernization of its armed forces and increase in military spending, 
have raised many concerns in the region about Chinese interests. This is 
particularly the case with respect to Chinese territorial claims in the South China 
Sea and the perceived prospects of military conflict with other states laying claim 
to territory in the same region (also see Acharya 1999: 129-51). 
This argument is more evident, for example, from China's continued aid to 
the repressive regime in Myanmar. By providing military and economic assistance, 
along with its role as an economic patron of the authoritarian regimes in Laos and 
Cambodia, the PRC has been given a predominant voice in the region, as will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the chapter with respect to the Mekong River 
Project. However, though China has strong ties with mainland Southeast Asia, it 
has not initiated sufficient change in the maritime countries of the region to 
exercise unlimited regional influence. Economy's (2005: 413) discussions with 
Southeast Asian officials suggest that with regard to maritime Southeast Asia: 
China has yet to assume a real leadership role outside the realm of 
trade. With regard to transnational issues - health, crime, and 
environment, among others - China is often a major contributor, if 
not the primary source of the challenge. 
In line with Economy's view, the fact that Asianism is a more cultural concept can 
not be disregarded. The hierarchy of China's ancient 'tribute system' is difficult to 
reconcile with the identification of Asian countries according to the Westphalian 
concept of sovereign equality, as the system implies a dominant China and 
subservient neighbours. This is not an image China feels comfortable with 
promoting explicitly, therefore, China avoids references to Sino-centrism or the 
ancient tribute system; although this does not mean that the Chinese leadership 
does not have internalised expectations of deference. From a perspective 
supported by Chinese scholars, there is a positive relationship, linked to the 
historic tribute system, between the PRC's aid donation and recipient countries 
(IntervieH' 2006a; 2006b; 2006d; 2006e; 2007h: 20071; 2007n). 
With regard to China's approach to Southeast Asian regionalism, the 
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regional organization, ASEAN, established in 1968, provides a case to examine to 
what extent and under the influence of which norms its economic assistance was 
given priority. China became more proactive after the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, which highlighted China's increased cooperative role in the region. 
With the creation of ASEAN+3, China's participation promoted further economic 
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. 
Since there are significant differences between China's identification with 
maritime and mainland Southeast Asia, it is necessary to highlight the various 
influences that have made the maritime sub-region of Southeast Asia distinct from 
the mainland. As maritime Southeast Asia was geographically more dispersed, it 
was subject to significantly less influence from Chinese culture. The region was 
influenced much more by Islamic and Hindu civilisations from the subcontinent, 
which worked as a barrier to the spread of Chinese influence beyond the mainland. 
This resulted in the Muslim population of the region becoming incorporated into 
the global Islamic community, thereby segregating the dispersed collections of 
Chinese communities there. Consequently, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Brunei became predominantly Muslim, with minority Buddhist, Hindu and 
Christian populations. Indonesia, in particular, with the world's fourth largest 
population, often assumes a leadership role among the Muslim nations of the 
region. China's aid to Indonesia was established in the early years of the PRC; 
despite this, as Indonesia is the recipient of aid from several donors, the precise 
influence of China's aid was difficult to establish. 
The arrival in the Philippines of the Europeans in the sixteenth century and 
the Americans in the nineteenth century enhanced the influence of Western 
civilisations in Southeast Asia. This Western influence is visible on the minor 
island nation of East Timor, where predominantly Christian East Timorese live 
along side minority Muslim and Buddhist populations. Like in the case of the 
Philippines, in the past, the East Timorese have sought, and continue to support 
allegiances with countries from outside of Southeast Asia. The onset of the Cold 
War also created regional divisions as the region fragmented further into nations 
that were either aligned or non-aligned with the respective Cold War superpowers. 
This influence explains why Chinese aid was not forthcoming in the early stages 
of its aid activities, as this added to China's security concerns. By recognising the 
geographical component of Chinese-Southeast Asian relations, a more concise 
analysis of the case is possible. 
Explanations for the transitions in China's identity towards its current 
proactive state, which induced these changes in its foreign policy, may be traced 
back to the end of the Cold War. In the absence of the Soviet Union, which 
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counter-balanced US power, China could no longer remain neutral, especially in 
the face of growing US unilateralism. Rather than regressing to its former 
socialist revolutionary mindset, it moved away from its neutral identity, which 
was built upon its bilateral regional relations, through economic multilateralism, 
thereby fostering an identity of a great power. As highlighted in China's foreign 
relations overview in Chapter 3, after the end of the Cold War, China prioritised 
its foreign relations policy with Southeast Asia to 'be a companion with a 
neighbouring country, and be friendly to a neighbouring country' (China 2009a). 
This contrasted with Chinese relations across the region during the Cold War 
which was often mired in animosity, distrust, and conflict. As relations with the 
. countries across the region have adjusted in more recent times, China has been 
keen to transform these changes into enhanced and mutually beneficial political 
and economic ties. 
China's growing regional influence is derived through a diverse range of 
factors, ranging from its role as a market for the region's natural resources, the 
economic benefits bestowed through its aid and investment, primarily through 
loans for infrastructure projects, gestures of friendship expressed through 
diplomatic and foreign assistance, the PRC's status as an economic development 
model, as well as economic and cultural integration originating from proximity 
and migration. As Chinese President Hu Jintao pointed out during his April 2002 
visit to Malaysia: 'China's development would be impossible without Asia, and 
Asia's prosperity without China' (Asia Times 2002). Bilateral relations have 
become more aligned as China and its neighbours increased cooperation in 
non-traditional security areas, regional economic development, and maritime 
security, notably in the South China Sea. China's ongoing relations with ASEAN, 
which strengthen its great-power identity, seek to counterbalance the region's 
relations with the US and Japan. These relations are being energized by China's 
use of 'soft power'. Percival (2007: 111-2) illustrates China's growing 'soft 
power' in Southeast Asia by noting that' soft power' can include: 
economic benefits, shared norms and values, cooperation on 
non-traditional issues, infatuation with the new China, the mutual 
benefits of tourism and education, diplomacy and style, and 
networking and reciprocal obligations within ethnic Chinese 
communities. 
Although this Chinese 'soft power' in the region is only perceived in certain 
quarters, there are three principal reasons why China's promotion of a positive 
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and beneficial image would be helpful to enhance its regional position: firstly, 
maritime countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, have strong links with 
the United States and Japan, so substantial gains may be achieved by China's 
projection of itself as a benevolent body, in order to supplant or at least 
counterbalance these powers. Secondly, as populations in this region are 
decidedly nationalist in their political views, there is much ground to be gained in 
terms of promoting cooperation and trust. Thirdly, as Southeast Asian countries 
have a history of being hostile to former revolutionary states, such as in the case 
of Indonesia in the 1960s, the repairing of regional bonds is of importance for 
ensuring continued regional unity. The impact of 'soft power' stimulated 
Kurlantzick (2006a: 272-4; 2006b) to mark 1997 as the turning point in the 
emergence of China's 'charm offensive' in Southeast Asia. China's embrace of 
free trade in the region along with its promotion of the idea that it will become a 
major source of foreign direct investment also re-enforces its image. In addition to 
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, Beijing is also negotiating closer 
bilateral trade ties and economic partnerships with individual Southeast Asian 
states, though when asked for clarification, Chinese officials were unwilling to 
provide details, regarding disbursement channels for Chinese aid in the region. 
Comments from the Chinese Academy of Social Science, however, indicate that 
the majority of China's aid disbursements are made bilaterally (Interview 2007a; 
2007b; 2007n). 
4.2 Historical relations with Southeast Asia 
Chinese relations with Southeast Asia extend back into its dynastic past, where 
mainland Southeast Asian states participated in the 'tribute system', and became 
recipients of Chinese civilisation and culture. As such, China was viewed as a 
major actor in the region, as it offered protection to many neighbouring countries 
through this hierarchy. Despite this, and due to competing influences from the 
Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, the states never became fully integrated 
into the Chinese view of Asia. Although this left many nations relatively free of 
Chinese culture and influence, this also left them vulnerable to attack as they were 
smaller and weaker. Consequently, they became more susceptible to the 
aggression of the Western powers much earlier than countries in East Asia. 
Mainland Southeast Asia's subjugation by Western imperialist powers in the 
nineteenth century led to serious Chinese security concerns which continue to vex 
China's current leaders through a sense of inability to defend the extremities of 
the region. 
Even when nations gained their independence from Western colonisers, 
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the onset of the Cold War meant that regional identities became shaped by further 
sovereignty and independence issues, which made integration of all of the 
region's countries both complex and difficult. In line with its communist identity, 
China developed its foreign relations policy in conjunction with its views on 
class-based world revolution during the 1950s and early 1960s. In the aftermath 
of the Korean War of 1950-53, North Korea (DPRK) was supported by the PRC. 
who had assisted them for the majority of the war, in fighting against UN forces. 
China also contributed significant amounts of aid to other communist allies, as 
seen by the donation to North Vietnam of a gift of US$20 million, and loans of 
US$61 million and US$157.5 million in 1959 and 1961 respectively (Renmin 
Ribao 1959; 1961a). 
In the 1950s, all of the PRC's aid recipients in Asia had had a tribute 
relationship with China historically. As a result of historical and Cold War politics, 
countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Vietnam (North 
Vietnam) were the sole recipients of Chinese aid during the early years of the 
PRC, as a mixture of obligation and capacity shaped China's regional behaviour. 
The foundation of this relationship therefore implied the presence of a single 
legitimate China at its centre (Copper 1976: 4-7; Law 1984: 171-7). Levine 
highlights that the nature of Chinese bilateral aid relationships with Southeast 
Asian countries and their suspicions of multilateral organizations were reflected 
by their inclinations towards the tribute system (Levine 1984: 107-45). Although 
in these early years, the re-establishment of the ancient model governing regional 
relations was not seriously considered by the CCP, many of the countries in 
Southeast Asia still viewed the PRC as a predominant actor in the region (Barnett 
1961: 291). A similar shift to a more radical foreign policy occurred in Sukarno's 
Indonesia, when China saw great potential for a militant Asian coalition opposed 
to the imperialism of the United States. This prompted the extension of a US$30 
million aid loan to the nation (Far Eastern Economic Review 1961). However, 
this aid proved short-lived and was subsequently discontinued following an 
anti-Chinese backlash, as an army-led counterrevolution occurred in 1965 and 
rejected China's interference in its domestic affairs, which had arisen through 
China's identification with Indonesia's communist party, the Parti Kommunis 
Indonesia (PKI) (Copper 1976: 53). 
The leadership of the PRC has, since its foundation, been sensitive to the 
determination of the United States to limit the power and influence of China 
across Asia (Stoessinger 1974: 23). This resulted in the exclusion from China's 
list of aid recipients, of those countries allied with the United States, such as 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Following the Sino-Soviet rift, aid 
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competition in Indo-China between China and the Soviet's pursuit of policies 
aimed at peaceful coexistence and people's war, was also marked by a series of 
notable effects (Camilleri 1980: 74). Firstly, both China and the Soviets found the 
region difficult to influence; secondly, the local communist parties were strongly 
independent, as seen through the increase in intra-regional altercations bet\veen 
neighbouring communist ruling bodies, and as such, they constituted a weak 
opposition within their national governments; and thirdly, as most Asian countries 
had allied with the United States, this excluded them from the Sino-Soviet rivalry 
(Robinson 1982: 175). North Vietnam, in particular, continued to pose the most 
difficult challenge to China's leadership during the early 1970s, as China 
continued to offer aid commitments to North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Even 
before reunification, it was North Vietnam, rather than the PRC, which had the 
decisive influence over communist military operations in South Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos. In order to pursue the war effort in South Vietnam, much of 
the Laotian and Cambodian territory was occupied by North Vietnamese troops 
(Camilleri 1980: 225-6). As a result, the PRC was determined to offer aid to 
Cambodia and Laos to help them against the North Vietnamese by constructing 
road systems across the north of Laos for military use. The PRC's misgivings 
about North Vietnamese intentions were reinforced when Hanoi attempted to 
move closer to Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute (Levine 1984: 117). The PRC's 
new aid commitment to North Vietnam was substantially reduced after 1976, 
despite its neutral international image, and was terminated following China's 
invasion of North Vietnam in 1979, after Vietnamese troops invaded and occupied 
Cambodia. The continued support of the Soviets made possible the Vietnamese 
leadership of Laos and Cambodia during the 1980s. China's influence proved 
pivotal as a stabilising force when the non-Vietnamese dominated states united 
and encouraged the PRC to become involved in the region, along with the United 
States in response to the Soviet-Vietnamese conquests (Robinson 1982: 179). 
China's transformed neutral identity in the international community grew 
in prominence following its increased interactions with ASEAN, and prompted it 
to take ASEAN interests and concerns into account in its decision-making, 
leading to an adjustment of its aid policy. With relations between its maritime 
Southeast Asian neighbours continuing to be primarily based upon trade, both the 
Philippines and Thailand became the newest PRC aid recipients in the 1980s 
(Copper 1986: 508; ZDJMN 1988: 634; 1989: 55). In addition to this, China also 
joined the multilateral foreign aid programmes of the UN (ZDJMN 1989: 6-+0-1). 
As China normalised its relations with all of the region's countries, its image of 
neutrality and independence was further promoted following Li Peng's proposal 
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of the 'four principles' and initiatives from ASEAN for China-ASEAN relations 
during a visit to Bangkok in 1988 (Xinhua). China proclaimed it would not seek 
to become a hegemonic power nor would it interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
ASEAN countries, the further development of economic relations, and the 
continued support for regional cooperation and initiatives from ASEAN (Hao and 
Huan 1989: 221). This would allow China to diminish the anxiety of a 
'communist threat' or the 'China threat' (Leifer 1999: 89). 
The end of the Cold War triggered a new period of integration and 
cooperation between Southeast Asia and China. 
China has become a main force promoting economic cooperation 
in Asia and economic recovery in East Asia. Since the 1990s, with 
the bursting of its bubble economy, Japan has undergone economic 
stagnation, which weakened its ability to support the economic 
growth in East Asia. The Asian financial crisis that broke out in 
1997 hit East Asia's economy severely. China, as a responsible 
large country, tightened up its cooperation with the countries and 
regions in East Asia to help them get rid of their difficulties. 
China's swift economic growth provided them with a huge export 
market and promoted the recovery of East Asia's economy. 
According to statistics, the growth in exports from the main 
Southeast Asian countries to China increased by more than 100 
percent between 1990-2000. [ ...... ] China was not only the main 
source of surplus trade for East Asian countries and regions, but 
also a main destination of their overseas investment. In 2002, 
China replaced the United States as the largest investment 
destination of the Republic of Korea and Japan. 
(MFA 2004c) 
The Asianist norm was taken up during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when 
Asia's two most powerful economies, China and Japan, played pivotal roles in 
stabilising the deteriorating events. While Japan played a leadership role in the 
crisis, China refrained from devaluing its own currency and offered loans to 
ASEAN states. This move also contributed to the uptake of the internationalist 
norm, which increased China's multilateral cooperation. Since 1997, ASEAN has 
expanded its directive by hosting the ASEAN-China, Japan and Korea 
(ASEAN+3) informal leadership summit, as well as the ASEAN-China 
(AS EAN+ 1) informal leaders summit. This promoted the strengthening of 
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relationships between the countries in Asia as a mechanism to develop internal 
regional solutions to East Asian problems. In 1999, Cambodia gained entry into 
ASEAN, thereby increasing its membership to ten. China-ASEAN cooperation 
was developed further in the early 2000s with the development of notable regional 
financial agreements, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative. 
China's regional Asian identity was subsequently challenged in 2003-4 by 
the onset of the SARS epidemic, and humanitarian crises such as the Southeast 
Asian tsunami. Although regional identities had been shaped by increased 
cooperation, these events prompted increased assurances and reassurances 
between neighbours, especially from China, of firm commitments towards 
positive state-led development across the entire region. Following the crises of the 
early 2000s, Chinese and ASEAN relations began to intensify towards the 
formation of a mutual FTA. China's aid activities in the region continue to reflect 
its desire for regional cooperation. After President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
withdrew Filipino troops from Iraq in 2004 as part of a deal to win the freedom of 
a Filipino hostage, the United States cut their assistance to Manila. Shortly 
afterwards, China invited President Macapagal-Arroyo for a state visit, and 
offered greater cooperation and aid. Later on, in May 2005, at the first annual 
PRC-Philippines defence talks, China agreed to donate US$1.2 million in heavy 
engineering equipment to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), allocated 
five positions for Filipino officers to attend training courses in the PRC, and 
proposed joint naval exercises (Guoji Shichang 2005: 50). The interregional aid 
rivalry also focuses on Japan, despite the substantial aid provided by that country 
to China. Rival developments include those seen in 2006, in Laos, where China 
provided aid for a 100-bed hospital in response to Japan's grant ofUS$12 million 
(China Development Brief 2006). The recent aid competition with Japan also 
focuses on the Mekong river, where efforts to build dams and dredge the river to 
create potential shipping lanes have proved significant in China's consolidation of 
its image, despite the potential for environmental damage. 
4.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Southeast Asia 
4.3.1 Asianism 
Asianism, as defined in Chapter 3, informs a shared Asian identity. It also informs 
China's regional leadership role, especially in relation to Japan. It is possible to 
trace how this Asian identity has become reinforced through China and Southeast 
Asian relations by investigating how Asianism has become embedded in China's 
aid practice. The strengthening of China's great-power identity and the reinforcing 
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of China-ASEAN relations can be observed through three significant recent 
events in the region: firstly, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, secondly, the crises 
induced by both the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami; 
and lastly, the 2007 global financial crisis. 
i) The 1997 Asian financial crisis 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered a major transition in the Asianist norm, 
regional unity, and China's great-power identity, through a series of events that 
became viewed as 'the virgin voyage' of Asianism (China Daily 2007). At the end 
of the Cold War, East Asian identity was less identifiable, and the only regional 
institution of note was ASEAN, which at that time comprised only six member 
states and had no links with Northeast Asia. In the early 1990s, Asia's most 
dynamic economies, through the course of adhering to the Japanese 'flying geese' 
model,lcreated manufacturing sectors geared towards global export, notably for 
the US and EU markets. This drive towards greater Asian cooperation was in part 
also stimulated by an emerging regional developmental ism, which motivated the 
region's desire to catch up with economies of the West in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. 'Asian values', therefore, embodied the traditions that had furnished 
their economic success (Li 2007; Li and Zhang 2009; MFA 2004d; Zhang 2002). 
Although Asian identity still remained undefined, discussions of it at regional 
forums highlighted that it was at least being considered. Though economic growth 
progressed at a prolific rate, the lack of institutional regulation was to have both 
serious and serendipitous consequences throughout the region. Li Xing (2007: 4) 
argues that: 
[T]he rapid emergence of China and the Asian economic crisis in 
1997 not only interrupted the [flying-geese model] but also started 
the global debates about the 'Asian crony capitalism' and the 
'Asian values'. 
As the CrISIS spread across the region, bringing with it high regional 
unemployment on a scale that had not been seen since the 1930s, China took the 
step of not devaluing its currency, thereby containing the crisis. Its subsequent 
stimulus to the economy helped to sustain economic recovery through a 
substantial infrastructure spending programme (Hale 2008: 63-4). Being the only 
I This term refers to Japanese economic leadership, with the newly developing Asian 'tiger 
economies' positioned behind Japan in a flying geese pattern, following the developmental model 
established in Japan (see Li 2007; Li and Zhang 2009). 
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other major financial source of recovery open to Asia, Japan also implemented 
changes to help resolve the crisis (ibid.: 64). In the aftermath of the crisis, Asian 
leaders vowed to implement their own mechanisms for managing future regional 
instability. As ASEAN membership increased to 10 nations, further negotiations 
led to the formation of the ASEAN+3, which triggered the greater involvement of 
Northeast Asian nations in the regional institution. This reflected the significant 
increase in regional cooperation and evolution of the Asianist norm. Bowles (2002: 
244,263) points out that: 
The Asian financial crisis has significantly changed the way in 
which regionalism in East Asia is taking place. [ ...... ] Asia's 
post-crisis regionalism is qualitatively different from that which 
preceded the crisis, and is premised on an Asia-only vision of 
economic cooperation forged to counter the power of the US and 
Europe, then there [are] a number of important implications. 
This evolution was also to have implications for China's internationalist 
responsibility, as will be discussed in the next section. Although Asia's 
developmental foundation had suffered a major blow, it had not sustained serious 
damage. A key factor that had strengthened the Asian economies, during the 
mid-1990s, arose through their implementation of 'bamboo capitalism', I which 
had structurally reinforced the top- down managed Japanese 'flying geese' model 
of development. While the foundations of 'bamboo capitalism' had not been 
fundamentally flawed, the crisis had arisen through the lack of institutional 
regulation throughout the region's economic development. Many of the traditions 
that Asian people had long embraced, such as self-improvement and self-respect, 
in addition to hard work and simple living, diligence, studiousness, modesty, and 
devotion to their communities, were cited as not only reflective of Asian 
self-perception, and therefore identity, but were the key factors responsible for 
ensuring Asian recovery. Continued adherence to these practices played an 
essential role in restoring regional prosperity (ASEAN 1998). In the aftermath of 
the crisis reforms, a stronger Asian identity became evident in Chinese leaders' 
discourse, especially in terms of economic integrity (MFA 1999; 2002a). 
In 2000, China initiated the idea of a China-ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA). At the 2002 ASEAN+ 3 Summit in Phnom Penh, Premier 
Zhu Rongji announced that: 
1 'Bamboo capitalism' refers to China centred development with a shift in labour and production 
to China with trade and capital flowing horizontally (see Li 2007: 23). 
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China would reduce or write-off the matured debts for Vietnam , 
Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar [ ... J as a member and the region's 
largest developing country in Asia, China has always actively 
participated in and supported regional cooperation. China's 
development has been closely linked with the East Asian countries. 
Chinese cooperation in the region has not sought special status, 
and we continue to support any development that is conducive to 
regional cooperation, in line with the common interests of East 
Asian countries initiative. 
(MFA 2002d) 
China further endorsed its regional cooperative stance in 2003 by signing the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). New networks of currency swaps were 
formulated under the newly emerged Chiang Mai Initiative, which led shortly 
after to the announcement of the CAFTA, to be formalised and developed by 2010. 
By 2006, ASEAN ministers agreed to accelerate the trade zone formation in the 
region, which catalysed the announcement that the East Asian FTA could be 
developed within ten years (ASEAN2003; CPGPRC 2006; People s Daily 2009g). 
Since the crisis, Asian integration had matured, and by 2005 this increase 
in activity resulted in the East Asian summit (ASEAN 2005). At this forum, Japan 
welcomed the inclusion of three additional states, India, New Zealand and 
Australia, thereby expanding the membership of ASEAN+ 3 to a new 
ASEAN+3+3 level. However, as Chu Shulong (2007) pointed out '[tJhe Chinese 
government has taken ASEAN Plus Three as "the major channel" of its efforts 
toward Asian regionalism and community building'. Following China's 
protestation at the move, which it felt would allow external nations equal and 
unlimited access to the region, the attendance of these states was only permitted 
after they had agreed to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (People s Daily 
2005d). By doing this, China strengthened Asianism by setting a clear precedent 
that foreign nations, by implication the United States, could only join in the 
regional forums on multilateral terms which were conducive to reinforcing 
Asianism. 
ii) 2003 SARS epidemic and 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami crises 
Infectious diseases and natural disasters in the region, in the form of SARS and 
the Avian influenza epidemic of 2003-4, along with the Southeast Asian tsunami 
of late 2004, focussed the long-term regional integration goal of the East Asian 
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community. As Asian integration had become reinforced in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis and the formation of ASEAN+3, these events built upon these 
foundations by further focussing China's efforts on greater Asian integration and 
cooperation (Teo 2005: 49-67; also see Chinwanno 2005: 153-8). There was an 
increased need for redistributing wealth, development, and social and health 
benefits in the region, arising from the realisation that epidemics could spread 
with equal ferocity throughout urban as well as rural populations. The wide-scale 
spread of an epidemic throughout an area could prove devastating to the 
development of the entire region. Although, at the outset of SARS, China sought 
to contain and downplay the extent of the epidemic, in its aftermath there was an 
increased need for confidence, closer economic coordination, and cooperation 
across the region. This was noted in the rise of East Asian regionalism, through 
increased trade growth across the region, a maturing of regional economies and 
current account surpluses, and the extensive growth of East Asian currency 
reserves (Teo 2005: 54-61). China's attention during the crisis was focussed 
primarily on the prevention and containment of SARS, rather than on aid for its 
treatment throughout the region. There was also a shift towards maintaining the 
welfare of its own patients, notably the poorer populations affected during this 
period, by relaxing more traditional employment regulations (So and Pun 2004: 
5-17). 
In the aftermath of the Southeast Asian tsunami, the first three months of 
2005 were quiet for China. Its initial aid to the disaster zone appeared sparse. In 
response to criticism, Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, argued that 
'China is a developing country. [ ... J We have a population of l.3 billion. China's 
per capita GDP is still very low' (Tkacik and Dillon 2005). Liu further 
commented that the aid delivered by China, which initially amounted to US$2.7 
million, was 'equivalent to the annual income of 20,000 farmers' (ibid.). Chinese 
contributions were dwarfed by other international efforts to the region. This 
response highlighted distinct limitations in China's capacities for wide-scale 
regional disaster response. Despite appearing as a rapidly emerging economic 
superpower, these events still indicated how far China had to go to match the aid 
provided by Japan, Britain or the United States. Although China was still unable 
to compete with the major aid donors, China further stressed, in response to 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's remarks about Japan's best efforts, that Asian 
nations, as a whole, had a responsibility to provide assistance under these 
circumstances (BBe 2005). Following an increased public response across China, 
the amount of aid subsequently increased to nearly US$80 million, thereby 
demonstrating how Asianism had become increasingly taken up domestically in 
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China. 
Afterwards, China renewed its focus upon the essential areas of growth for 
the region. Economically, it focussed on fairer competition in trade and 
development and allowed regional players to keep up, rather than fall behind in 
competitive stakes. Politically, concerns became more subtle as more countries 
began conceding China's eventual rise, despite hoping for the maintenance of a 
regional US presence. In the meantime, Beijing felt it had more to gain by being a 
responsible neighbour and more sensitive to the negative implications of its 
policies, so it continued to assert greater openness and transparency in its policy 
making in the region's institutions. There was a continued focus upon economic 
development along with peace and stability to the point of avoiding conflict, as 
well as promoting cooperation and integration through its ongoing aid to the 
region, demonstrating Beijing's keenness to promote this Asian identity. 
Malaysia's hosting of a summit to establish the 'East Asian Community' in 2005 
also demonstrated the growing unity and regionalism in Asia. With enhanced 
Chinese involvement in regional institutions becoming more apparent, China is 
displaying considerable interest in promoting common regional welfare and 
development, and as such, has provided economic aid, which, in tum, provides 
benefits for its own domestic economic development (Wong 2006: 3-14) 
iii) 2007 Global financial crisis 
In the years following SARS and the Southeast Asian tsunami disaster, ASEAN+ 3 
worked towards achieving set targets and establishing new goals. In May 2006, 
President Hu Jintao proposed the concept of a 'Harmonious Asia' (China Daily 
2006). Shortly after this, Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined the conceptual 
origins, evolutionary history, practicalities, basic structure, and time line for 
implementing the new generation of 'Asia-ism' which was focussed on 
cooperation, openness and harmony. By participating more in regional 
cooperation mechanisms such as APEC and Southeast Asian regional forums, 
China was promoting the maturation of 'Asia-Pacific-ism', which Hu had first 
introduced at the APEC forum in Hanoi earlier that year. With each successive 
discussion of regionalism, which began with East Asianism, Asian identity has 
become stronger and reinforced, and with each success, China's commitment to 
furthering Asianism continues to grow (China Daily 2007). 
At the ASEAN+3 Summit in the Philippines in 2007, Premier Wen liabao 
addressed the targets that had been achieved since 2002, and outlined China's 
future goals with ASEAN (MFA 2007a). The ASEAN+ 3 countries had become 
more focussed on their goals through cooperative efforts that reinforced Asian 
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identity. Through the completion of feasibility studies for the East Asian FTA, the 
ASEAN+ 3 countries realised bilateral currency swaps in accordance with the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, accelerated the formation of the Asian bond market, and 
highlighted new areas of expansion, including rural development, poverty 
alleviation, women's affairs, disaster reduction and relief, mineral resource 
development and further cultural exchanges. China has contributed widely to the 
goals of ASEAN, by hosting the ASEAN culture week, poverty reduction 
workshops, shooting games for the region's armed forces, and establishing an 
Asian regional disaster research centre. The extensive growth highlighted the 
efforts China was continuing to make towards its vision of a 'Harmonious Asia'. 
Through this, 'China's future is inextricably linked to that of East Asian countries' 
and this goal can only be realised through continued cooperation to develop peace, 
prosperity, and harmony in the region (MFA 2007a). 
With the onset of the 2007 global financial crisis, efforts to provide 
solutions to the crisis became imperative and were the main focus of the 2009 
London G20 and Boao Forum. ASEAN affirmed that its long-term goals aimed to 
create solutions to the crisis, and prevent future crises by adhering to the values 
which had brought success to the region, and reinforced an Asian identity (Xinhua 
2009f). Following the G20 summit in London in April 2009, many targets 
outlined for resolving the crisis had been agreed in principle, but many 
fundamental and systematic challenges remained to be addressed. As the global 
market was shrinking, there was a strong need to take a stand against regional 
protectionism in trade and investment, along with a need for new innovative 
approaches for growth, whereby reserve currency countries needed to take control 
of their maintenance mechanisms. Although Asian countries needed to protect 
themselves against future risk, there were clear indications that 'Chinese 
economic growth will make important contributions to the world economic 
recovery and Asian economic stability' (Xinhua 2009g). Although many Asian 
countries found an initial international platform for discussing their resolutions at 
the G20, many also criticised the G20 for failing to address critical issues for 
long-term financial security. Many of these countries were pushing for the 
creation of new Asian institutions to balance the unilateralism of American 
institutions, by helping to maintain future security through the downplaying of 
unilateralism. 
The Boao Forum gave many of these Asian countries the opportunity for a 
more sympathetic platform, by allowing them to discuss regional concerns that 
went unheard at the G20, especially in the aftermath of the disrupted ASEAN 
summit in Bangkok. Many felt that Boao provided a wider audience for 
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discussing issues in terms of 'Asian values', and so looked here for solutions to 
the global financial crisis in a setting detached from the US, which many blamed 
for the ongoing crisis. Despite Asia's economic growth, it has suffered substantial 
damage economically during the crisis, increasing the calls for innovative and 
new solutions for the crisis. The proposals outlined at Boao aimed to reshape 
global finance and provide improved balance between regulation and innovation, 
along with solutions for expanding trade and investment to protect volatile 
commodity prices. While many attending the forum looked to China to produce a 
similar miracle to the one it had delivered in the 1997 crisis, China reaffirmed the 
need to adhere to 'Asian values' of cooperation to resolve the situation (Xinhua 
2009f). While much of the Forum focused on the financial crisis and the emerging 
economies, there was also discussion of new areas of growth that included green 
development, internet innovation and the contemporary art and creative industry, 
as Asia explored new innovative avenues of expansion. The key to achieving the 
success of instigating new innovation will be through exploiting the key traits of 
Asian character, namely: 
The unique culture in East Asia has been a main factor that turns 
the region into a global production and manufacturing base, [ .... ] 
Mass production could be well organized through "iron discipline". 
East Asian and Southeast Asian societies, which are significantly 
influenced by the obedient culture of Confucian, might have 
accepted the concept of regarding people as screws in production 
organizations. 
(Xinhua 2009f) 
As China continues to weather the crisis, it further asserts itself as a new global 
financial leader in the face of increasing Western protectionism. This is adding to 
China's image, giving it a platform to criticise the West for the crisis, notably for 
the keeping of single currency reserves, while at the same time China continues to 
build up yuan reserves in developing countries. Despite suffering damage from 
the crisis, Asia continues to view that its future recovery and prosperity will be 
achievable by re-enforcing the Asian identity through '[ s ]trengthening the flying 
geese model with China as the hub' (China 2009b). Moreover, some also view 
China's efforts as defending Asia against what it views as external US regulatory 
financial measures for the region, and in so doing, China is reinforcing both the 
region wide Asian identity, and its leadership role within it (The Washington Post 
2009b). 
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4.3.2 Internationalism 
Since the early 1970s, the norm of internationalism has increasingly been taken 
up through China's increased multilateral institutional activities. In the early days 
of the PRC, China displayed a distinct lack of internationalist responsibility. This 
was demonstrated through its formulation of foreign aid in two respects. Firstly, it 
distributed aid for the purpose of strengthening diplomatic relations; and secondly, 
its aid reinforced its world revolution. This can be seen between 1950 and 1960 , 
through the correlation between Chinese aid distribution and diplomatic relations 
throughout Southeast Asia. This reflects the fact that the internationalist norm had 
not yet emerged in China at this time. As such, the distribution of aid for the 
purpose of strengthening diplomatic relations mirrored both China's revolutionary 
ideals, and also its historic legacy of the dynastic tribute system. For example, 
after the PRC established relations with Myanmar and Vietnam in 1950, and 
subsequently formed relations with Cambodia and Laos on 19 July 1958 and 25 
April 1961 respectively, China granted initial official aid to the respective 
countries (Copper 1976: 46-9, 58-60; MFA 2009g; Renmin Ribao 1959; 1961a). In 
Cambodia, this aid promise amounted to US$5.6 million, while aid to Laos took 
the form of an official grant. In the case of the growing communist movement in 
Indonesia, Sukarno was viewed as an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial leader, and 
therefore was supported by China through the disbursement of an aid loan 
(Copper 1976: 51). However, when the Sukarno leadership was defeated in 1965, 
there was an extensive military crack-down on the communist oriented PKI. 
Many ethnic Chinese, from local Chinese communities, were targeted as 
communist agents working with China in support of world revolution and were 
considered to have aided the attempted coup d'etat. Due to this, the PKI was 
designated as a threat to power in the region for serving the interests of the PRC. 
The Chinese aid loan of US$50 million from the CCP to the Indonesian 
Government was therefore discontinued (ibid.: 53). The collapse of these relations 
heralded the end of China's diplomatic ties with maritime Southeast Asia. It 
would be another two decades before Sino-Indonesian relations warmed 
sufficiently enough to enable links to become re-established. Since the remaining 
nations of the region, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia were exclusively 
aligned with non-communist powers, they received no support from the PRC. 
Along with its newly emerging neutral image, China developed 
institutional links within the UN over the following two decades, increasing its 
activities in the region during the latter years of the Cold War. Shambaugh 
(2004/05: 74) pointed out that, by this time, China's involvement in the region 
had rivaled that of ASEAN's. In 1991, following China's increased uptake of 
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internationalism, the Chinese Foreign Minister represented China as a 
Consultative Partner of ASEAN and attended the 24th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM). This resulted in China's participation in a series of consultative 
meetings with ASEAN, which included the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARP). By 
1994, it had become a member of the ARP, an ASEAN-initiated regional security 
dialogue mechanism, the only one involving all the major powers of the 
Asia-Pacific region. In the following year, China and ASEAN established a 
separate political consultative forum at the vice-foreign minister's level, to discuss 
political-security issues affecting the region and their relations. This annual 
meeting progressed quickly in terms of the depth and candidness of discussions, 
placing on its agenda such sensitive issues as the South China Sea disputes. By 
the mid-1990s, China's attitude towards wider regional institutional cooperation 
and internationalism became even more positive and proactive once it came to 
realise that participation in the regional institutions enhanced the potential gains 
to its national interests, especially when their cooperative security approaches 
proved increasingly compatible with China's New Security Concept (MFA 2002c). 
China became a full ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996, replacing its status as a 
consultative dialogue partner of ASEAN. In order to participate in the multilateral 
mechanisms of ASEAN for its aid giving, China and leaders from ASEAN 
countries held the first informal summit in 1997 to recognise officially the 
ASEAN-China process (ASEAN+ 1). This process was quickly followed by 
China's participation in the first' ASEAN+ 3' summit. The increase in institutional 
activities on a multilateral basis showed that China was 'joining the international 
organisations and international system [ ...... to] build regional community 
participation' as the basic mechanism to comply with the internationalist norm 
(Qin and Zhu 2005: 21-7). This helped not only extinguish the ideas of a 
revolutionary China, but also promoted its image as a responsible power. 
In addition to underlining the Asianist norm, as discussed earlier, China 
displayed its internationalist responsibility during the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
by working towards a solution to the crisis (Xinhua 2007d). From a Chinese 
perspective, when faced with the collapse of many of its neighbouring economies, 
China could have chosen to devalue its currency, which would have made its own 
exports more competitive. However, this would have resulted in the further 
deflation of the Asian economies (MFA 2000e). Such action though would also 
have potentially sabotaged its efforts to gain admission to the WTO and would 
have threatened the economy of the newly returned Hong Kong in the process. 
'China's refusal to devalue its currency was its way of giving a guarantee to the 
international community and of maintaining stability in the region' (Kirton 1999). 
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Following the crisis, China and ASEAN engaged region wide reforms to the 
banking systems whose previously unregulated behaviour had induced the crash. 
In so doing, the Chinese have 'come to see themselves as a large country and 
economy, a linchpin of Asia economically along with Japan, and as a responsible 
international citizen' (Kirton 1999). 
In a multilateral organisational mechanism, China and ASEAN announced 
the Asia Debt Reduction Plan in 2002, which aimed to reduce or cancel part or all 
of the debts for Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Later at the second 
session of the ASEAN 10+3 high-level regional workshops for poverty reduction 
held in Beijing, Hui Liangyu noted: 
The Chinese Government is not only committed to solving the 
problem of poverty in our country, but is also actively involved in 
the development of supporting poverty reduction in Asia and the 
globe. China will further strengthen cooperation with developing 
countries in poverty reduction exchanges and cooperation, and will 
do its best to provide development assistance to the 
poverty-stricken country. The Chinese Government supports the 
China International Poverty Reduction Centre as an important 
platform in poverty reduction for the international community, 
especially the Asian region. 
(CPGPRC 2006) 
China's expanded engagement with ASEAN reflects the conflict and convergence 
of views among states in these organisations over the importance of cooperative 
security and conflict management. It also reflects the increased interplay between 
China's promoted international image and the norms it adheres to as l;l responsible 
state. Although China has not yet assumed a strong leadership role in terms of 
participation in Southeast Asian multilateral organisations, it may influence the 
institutionalised norms in the body as it matures. By quoting an article in Xinhua, 
'chengdan daguo zeren' (undertaking a big power's responsibility), the Chinese 
media made a point of reporting China's shouldering of a big power's 
responsibility, by citing both the official and unofficial contributions to the 
Southeast Asian tsunami disaster (Xinhua 2004b). In so doing, China attributed its 
response to the disaster, which has become known as China's largest 
non-governmental donation, in terms of its internationalist responsibility. (Pan, 
Han, and Liu 2005: 26-7; Xinhua 2005b). Following the tsunami disaster, China 
also pledged government aid and promised to help rebuild the Thai tourist 
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industry by encouraging Chinese tourists to visit as soon as resorts were 
reconstructed (Percival 2007: 48). 
In addition to its disaster relief aid, China has expressed its great-power 
identity through the internationalist norm, and through its ongoing interactions 
with ASEAN. ASEAN in turn has looked to China to play an enhanced role in 
addressing and resolving the most serious issues arising from the 2007 financial 
crisis by expanding opportunities for stronger cooperation and promoting 
long-term peace and stability in the region. In return, China proposed significant 
measures aimed at improving the China-ASEAN cooperation fund for developing 
infrastructural links between itself and ASEAN nations, by injecting US$15 
billion into ASEAN countries in the form of loans to Cambodia Laos and , 
Myanmar, and further expansion of the China-ASEAN and ASEAN+3 
Cooperation Fund, by supplying 300,000 tons of rice for the East Asia emergency 
rice reserve, providing a whole range of scholarships for agricultural training, 
public administration and Masters studies, in addition to providing further 
negotiations on expanding the multilateralism of the Chiang Mai Initiative, 
constructing Asian bond markets, expanding foreign currency reserve pools, 
expanding agreements for bilateral currency swaps and promoting future 
ASEAN+3 FTAs (Xinhua 200ge). 
Although China has promoted its internationalist responsibility, some 
areas of its aid activities have negatively impacted upon this image. China's 
infrastructural projects along the Mekong River since the late 1990s, aimed at 
making the river more navigable and efficient through channel dredging and the 
building of hydro electric dams, have led many in the region to cite China as the 
cause of extensive flooding downstream in the neighbouring countries of Laos 
and Thailand. Following flooding in Thailand in 2000, China provided some 
assistance and information about its monitoring stations positioned downstream of 
the dams. In 2005, China held technical discussions with the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) on flood management and alleviation. By 2007, China began 
providing the MRC with 24 hour water level and 12 hour rainfall data for their 
regional flood forecasts, in return for monthly flow data from the MRC's 
monitoring stations downstream of China. However, the MRC countered the view 
that the dams, which are hydroelectric in nature, rather than irrigational, played a 
part in the floods, and attributed the flooding to excessive rainfall in the region. 
Despite this, China remains reluctant to join the MRC, as its developmental 
objectives of its projects would be increasingly subject to the multilateral 
organisation's regulatory mechanisms (see Dosch and Hensengerth 2005: 263-86; 
MFA 2008a; Zhu 2009). 
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4.3.3 Sovereignty 
China's isolation from the international community retarded the internalization of 
the evolving sovereignty norm, and through the 1950s and 1960s, under the heavy 
influence of communist and Maoist doctrines, even resulted in China's subjective 
deviation from adhering to the norm. 
By empathizing with its Southeast Asian neighbours in their struggle for 
independence from colonization in the early days of the PRC, and subsequently 
from the influence of the super powers, Mao displayed sensitivity towards the 
states' concerns over their own affairs. His aversion to colonialism, along with his 
aid experience with the Soviet Union, resulted in his formulation of two of 
China's Eight Principles of Foreign Aid: the second principle, concerning the idea 
of aid with no-strings-attached, and the fourth principle, concerning the recipient 
countries' self-reliance. This adherence to the sovereignty norm, by Mao, however, 
was questioned by Copper (1976: 139), when he stated that 'Peking, however, 
cannot simply hand out aid without conditions'. This highlights how China's 
adherence to the sovereignty norm was heavily influenced by its communist 
leanings and Maoist teachings. Copper further reasoned that political motivations 
had contributed to the significant quantities of China's aid promises; as China 
lacked sufficient capital to match or surpass either Western or Soviet aid, it 
needed to exercise stricter control over its aid donations compared with its rivals. 
Since China first proposed the five principles of peaceful coexistence in 
1955 at the Bandung conference, its policies have emphasised mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 
The policy of 'non-interference' in the 1950s and early 1960s, however, was more 
applicable to China's own affairs than those of the recipient countries. This can be 
seen in a series of discriminatory events, such as when China provided the 
Indonesian Government with a loan to help combat threats from both local and 
Taiwanese backed opposition rebel forces in 1958 (Copper1976: 51). A further 
example of China's subjective adherence to the sovereignty norm can be seen in 
Cambodia, through China's offer of aid to King Sihanouk in 1956, which 
amounted to US$22.4 million. Subsequently, when rival factions led by 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen pleaded in 1997 for China's continued 
assistance in their struggle against Sihanouk, they were met with less favourable 
responses, as China reiterated its aversion to intervention in the domestic affairs 
of sovereign nations. However, this had no bearing on the subsequent awarding of 
US$18.3 million non-repayable foreign assistance guarantee, and a US$200 
million interest-free loan to Hun Sen, when he paid an official visit to Beijing in 
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1999 (ZDJMN2000: 765). 
The sovereignty norm can be seen through China's alignment with 
ASEAN on specific mutually shared values, which include human rights, 
environmental protection and democratisation, and opposition to what is viewed 
as 'interference' from the West. By adhering to the sovereignty norm in terms of 
'non-interference' and 'non-intervention', ASEAN and China aim to maintain 
peace and neutrality throughout Southeast Asia, as well as keep it free of any 
regional or external dominant powers (Nischalke 2000: 89-112). I Although 
members of ASEAN are disparate and their aid relationships with China vary 
significantly, China's involvement in the multilateral institution plays a significant 
role in the development of Chinese interests and identities, through the 
formulation of Chinese foreign aid policies. Consequently, both Chinese and 
Southeast Asian leaders appear to express a common dubiety towards the Western 
emphasis on conditional aid, despite the increase in internationalism. Unlike 
traditional aid donors whose aid programmes often reflected the ideals of the 
Western developed countries, China has sought not to directly impose its values 
on aid recipients but rather promote a mutually beneficial 'win-win' policy as a 
consequence of improved relations, though support for an existing government is 
still regarded as taking sides to some extent. According to Percival (2007: 116), 
Chinese-ASEAN relations demonstrate that: 
[T]he Chinese verSIOn of a world in which one country rarely 
intervenes in another's domestic affairs appeals to many elites that 
resent U.S. criticism and demands. China does not lecture them on 
democracy or human rights. 
This was seen in 2009, following the re-sentencing of Aung San Suu Kyi to 
further house detention. China defended the judicial sovereignty of Myanmar, and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, by stating that 'Beijing 
would not back any UN action against [Myanmar]' (China Daily 2009d). In order 
to work with Southeast Asian neighbours and create a favourable peripheral 
environment for economic modernization, Chinese leaders have made a deliberate 
effort to formulate an integrated 'good neighbour policy' since the 1980's, aimed 
at increasing China's economic interactions with Southeast Asian countries and 
fostering its own positive image. This demonstrates the complex nature by which 
1 Acharya argued that norms and identity were crucial to the ~aking ?~ AS~AN regionalis~. !he 
norms are 'non-use of force and pacific settlement and disputes,. regIonal autonomy, . th~ 
doctrine of non-interference,' 'non-military pacts and preference for bIlateral defence cooperatIOn, 
and 'ASEAN's social-cultural norms: the "ASEAN way"'(Acharya 2001: 47-72). 
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sovereignty interacts with other norms such as Asianism and internationalism, and 
has led China in its attempts to reassure the region to associate policies with 
'becoming friends and partners with neighbours' (yulinweishan, yilinweiban), 
building 'an amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighbourhood' (mulin, an lin, 
Julin), and has even characterised itself as 'a friendly elephant' (youhao de 
daxiang) in a China-A SEAN meeting. This good neighbour policy was informed 
by the sovereignty norm (People:S Daily 2006b). Kurlantzick (2006a: 272) 
comments on this Chinese policy by stating that: 
China will not interfere or meddle: foreign nations benefit because 
China will not make demands on other nation's sovereignty, 
economic models, governance, or political culture. 
By adhering to the sovereignty norm, in the face of increased internationalism, 
Chinese aid has also contributed to the maintenance of a peaceful environment 
through the development of asymmetric defensive mechanisms. Such devices 
attempt to ensure that the region's countries can maintain varying degrees of 
self-reliance, by offsetting all but direct international pressure. Though China has 
actively pursued developing such mechanisms, it has found, especially in the case 
of Myanmar, that it has been increasingly subjected to these mechanisms (see 
Ramo 2004), as will be highlighted in the following section. 
i) The sovereignty norm in the case of Myanmar 
China's aid relations with Myanmar highlight how its adherence to the 
sovereignty norm is undergoing gradual evolution. In 1990, the military junta of 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which has ruled 
Myanmar since 1962, refused to relinquish power following democratic elections. 
This act resulted in the international community imposing harsh sanctions on the 
country in an attempt to persuade it to recognise the newly elected democratic 
government of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Having suffered 
similar international isolation during the Cold War, and with memories of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre and its ensuing sanctions still fresh, China became 
an empathetic ally of Myanmar, as well as the junta's primary source of support 
through the provision of aid in the form of grants and investment in military 
hardware, and government run resource extraction industries. Beijing has 
continually disputed the effectiveness of sanctions as a means of expressing 
condemnation or exerting pressure internationally and politically, preferring 
instead to seek more diplomatic approaches to resolving crises, as sanctions. in its 
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VIew, inhibit rather than promote international dialogue. This led it to defend 
'non-interference', by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions intent on 
imposing further sanctions and political leverage in order to induce change in 
Myanmar's leadership behaviour (BBe 2003). This move reassured the junta in 
Myanmar of China's previous affirmation in 2000 by liang Zemin that they 
opposed the action of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the 
name of 'democracy' and 'human rights' (Xinhua 2001b). 
By 2007, however, the evolving sovereignty norm had influenced China's 
international relations, as demonstrated when a new crisis arose over 
democratisation in Myanmar. This resulted in Beijing expressing a more moderate 
view, when Premier Wen liabao stated publicly that 'China supports UN's efforts 
on Myanmar to achieve stability and development' (BBe 2007c). 
In the aftermath of typhoon Nargis, which struck Myanmar in May 2008, 
the junta denied foreign aid organisations, such as the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, access to the disaster struck regions, thereby transforming the crisis 
into a catastrophe. When Western aid donors asked China to exert renewed 
pressure on the junta on humanitarian grounds, the implications of their appeals 
for China to 'be responsible' as 'an emerging aid donor' appeared critical towards 
China. Although much international criticism had been levelled at China, for not 
being more instrumental in either influencing political reform in Myanmar to 
move towards democracy, or in expediting disaster relief in the aftermath of 
typhoon Nargis, the overall response of China and ASEAN has displayed 
significant degrees of unity, which some have viewed as the 'ASEAN way', 
thereby emphasizing the principle of 'non-interference' (BBe 2009b). Southeast 
Asian countries have all adhered to the sovereignty norm, which informed their 
'non-interference' policy in the political system of the nation and in opposing 
sanctions, as their interest in maintaining the regional status quo aims to ensure 
panoptic regional stability. This marks a sharp contrast with the shared 
sovereignty norm between the Western donors, from the US and EU, and Asian 
countries, comprised of China and ASEAN, and reflects the differences in their 
policy-making towards Myanmar. In attempting to placate the international 
community, China has insisted that the situation in Myanmar poses no threat to 
international or regional peace and security, and in deflecting international 
interference, China has reaffirmed that 'the future of Myanmar lies in the hands of 
its own people and the government through dialogue and consultation' (People s 
Daily 2007d). This reaffirms its belief that 'the opinions of the country in question 
and the regional organisations concerned should be respected, and that it is 
eventually the responsibility of the Security Council to make the decision to ease 
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and defuse the crisis within the framework of the UN', rather than through the 
more unilateral approaches advocated by the international powers (Lee, Chan, and 
Chan 2009: Ill). Conversely, Myanmar's ruling regime has 'skilfully used the 
twin threats of instability in minority border regions and increasing reliance on 
China to dissuade its neighbours from intervening in its internal affairs and 
pushing it too hard' (ibid.: 110). 
In the early 2000s, China supported a less confrontational path to deal 
with international concerns over Myanmar, which was in keeping with its 
adherence to sovereignty and non-interference. This led many Western states to 
argue that China's position was as an endorsement of the ruling junta. However, 
as the rhetoric of China and ASEAN has moderated, Myanmar has been more 
conciliatory towards the collective efforts of China and ASEAN in line with 
China and ASEAN's enhanced uptake of internationalism. In 2009, China 
encouraged the international community to pursue dialogue with Myanmar rather 
than intervention, and as such refused to support UN sanctions. Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu stated that: 
This not only accords with Myanmar's interests, it IS also 
beneficial to regional stability [and as such] International society 
should fully respect Myanmar's judicial sovereignty. 
(China Daily 2009d) 
While this revision to its policy of non-interference does not necessarily imply 
that China was endorsing good governance, it does demonstrate how China has 
adjusted its behaviour in line with its great-power identity and image as a 
responsible power. 
China's foreign aid approach reflects partly its strict adherence to the 
principles of the institutions of which it has become a member, in its quest for 
greater global recognition, in order to 'strengthen the moral legitimacy of an 
international society based on the state-centric principles of national sovereignty 
and non-intervention', rather than purely serving its own short-term interests, and 
partly to its objection of Western powers disregarding the institutions of global 
governance in favour of their own unilateral approaches, often in the guise of 
moralistic issues (Lee, Chan, and Chan 2009: 113). 
4.3.4 Developmentalism 
Developmentalism demonstrates how China's foreign aid policies provide a broad 
range of sustainable innovative aid, of a direct and indirect nature, to the 
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Southeast Asian region in accordance with the Beijing Consensus. The aim of this 
aid is to encourage primarily economic growth in the recipient countries' key 
industries, and the redressing of regional inequality and self-reliance, and in doing 
so, strengthening China's identity as a great power. 
By focu~sing on economic development, China has expanded its relations 
throughout Southeast Asia through a wide range of mutually beneficial projects, 
based not only on infrastructure (see People:S Daily 2005b), but also on education, 
culture and health care. It thereby clarified its aid projects in Southeast Asia in 
terms of Jiang Zemin's 'go out' policy, which was first proposed in the region 
following China's ascension to the WTO in 2002. This policy, which embodies 
China's 'three closeness' theory, has provided China with incentives to facilitate 
not only its own prosperity, but also the prosperity of the region by emphasizing 
effective cooperative implementation, and the provision of foreign investment and 
aid to Chinese firms. These incentives are provided in the form of 
government-backed soft loans and export credit for businesses in the Southeast 
Asian region (MFA 2002e). Many of the regional projects have been, since 2004, 
further supported by the ASEAN-China cooperation fund, and in future, will also 
be funded by the proposed Asia regional cooperation fund. Additionally, China's 
multilateral commercial initiatives are focussed upon projects run and supported 
by the UN, the ADB and the ASEAN. The enhancement of developmentalism 
highlights how the norm underwent cascade and internalisation in the early 2000s 
following China's emergence in the late 1970s, and has contributed to its ongoing 
re-establishment of its great-power identity. 
i) Forms of developmental assistance 
Since China's definition of foreign aid is broad, the target of its assistance 
programmes is consequently wide ranging. As the economies of Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam are predominantly agriculturally based, China has 
used regional aid to promote and encourage innovation, as well as create 
environments for growth and development, by focussing primarily upon providing 
agricultural and technical aid. This aid conforms to both its 'South-South 
cooperation' policy (MFA 2006c) and the practice of the developmentalism, in 
line with its promotion of sustainable development, by providing training in 
multi-agricultural and ripening techniques, training for a variety of territorial roles 
ranging from officers in ASEAN, tourism, and electronic business, to regional 
Mekong customs and excise agents. In the Philippines, Chinese agricultural 
cooperatives have contributed to the establishment of important bilateral ties: in 
1999, China and the Philippines signed the Agreement on Enforcing Agriculture 
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and Related Areas cooperation; in 2000, China provided US$1 million in credit 
loans to the Philippines for agricultural development, and in March 2003, the 
centre for China-Philippine Agriculture Technique was established in the 
Philippines, with the support of China (MFA 2009g). In addition, Cambodia has 
been the recipient of a relatively large proportion of foreign aid from a variety of 
sources, with over half of the Government's budget comprising external funding 
accounts amounting to nearly 23 per cent from China alone. These have been used 
for a variety of purposes, from supporting local elections (People s Daily 2007b) 
to the preservation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site of Angkor Wat (BBe 2006a). 
Collaborative efforts from the World Bank, comprising a consortium of 
international financial organisations and donor countries, known as the 
Consultative Group for Cambodia, have set out guidelines for economic and 
political reform for the Government of Cambodia since 1996. China first utilised 
the pledging mechanisms of this institution to offer aid to Cambodia in 2007 (Asia 
Times 2006b). 
China believes that the process of development is, by its very nature, 
chaotic (Ramo 2004: 11-2), and the result of the events shaping it. As the 
traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty shifted towards human rights in 
the region, the ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund was established to support 
human resource development, finance training, and seminars, predominantly for 
ASEAN countries. In the 2004 Eighth China-ASEAN Summit, Premier Wen 
declared that China would increase the fund by US$5 million, along with the 
announcement that an additional US$15 million would be provided to establish 
the Asia Regional Cooperation Fund, to encourage the related government 
agencies and firms of China to become involved in the cooperative efforts within 
ASEAN countries. With the establishment of this fund, the Ministry of Commerce 
will maintain its portfolio of international aid, while the Asia Regional 
Cooperation Fund will be available to provide loans to Chinese firms to invest in 
recipient countries. The utilization of loans from the fund by Chinese firms is on 
the condition of a matching investment from the firm itself. This form of mixed 
investment, from the Ministry of Commerce, fund loan, and firms' capital, 
benefits not only the recipient countries who can absorb more capital, but also. the 
Chinese companies who expand their own opportunities, demonstrating that as 
China provides aid to Southeast Asia, it simultaneously opens the aid recipients' 
market. This indicates how China's policy makers determine how 
developmental ism provides economic benefit when formulating aid. 
In addressing the regional imbalance in economic development, arising 
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from relatively more affluent nations such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand 
being juxtaposed to the region's poorest nations, China has concentrated its 
economic assistance efforts on the poorer nations of the region with whom it 
shares relatively amicable relations through the supply of economic and military 
assistance along with associated implicit security guarantees. By sharing mutual 
land borders with China, in the case of Myanmar and Laos, or, in the case of 
Cambodia, relatively close borders, these nations have benefited from China's 
continued financing of a range of projects related to infrastructure, construction, 
energy, the prevention of human trafficking, and counter narcotics, in return for 
which the nations rely upon Chinese equipment, technical expertise, and labour 
(ZDJMN 1984-2003). Its use of bilateral aid in Thailand has promoted the kind of 
lobbying displayed in Washington; namely, to encourage important elected Thai 
politicians to attend study trips and conferences in China. Funds have also been 
distributed throughout Thailand to purchase Thai agricultural surpluses and 
agriculture, thereby mollifying the concerns of Thai farmers about the impact of 
China's Free Trade Agreement (Kurlantzick 2006a: 274). 
The success in providing direct and indirect innovative aid throughout the 
region promotes a self-sustaining form of self-confidence in the recipient 
countries. It should be noted though that the closeness of the region's cultural and 
historical ties, and the widespread adherence to Confucianism, makes this model 
adaptable, as people in Southeast Asia share similar work ethics to those in 
Northeast Asia (Ramo 2004: 67). 
ii) A regional focus 
The Mekong River Basin has become a new focus for China's Southeast Asia 
policy. As ASEAN and China have continued to collaborate, by implementing 
numerous development programmes and projects in the Mekong River Basin, 
within various frames such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), the 
ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) and the MRC, the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region cooperation programme has expanded to include 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. According to China's State 
Report on Participation in the Mekong Sub-Regional Cooperation (MFA 2008a), 
China has so far joined the Agreement on Facility Passenger and Goods Transport 
in the Mekong Sub-Region, and has provided funds for channel improvement for 
the Mekong river that include US$5 million for help in regulating sections within 
Laos and Myanmar and the preparatory work for the Pan-Asia Railway. 
China's increased investment in infrastructure projects. within its own 
borders and Southeast Asian nations, has provided mutual benefits. While the 
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region's nations profit from China's aid, the migration of the Chinese labour 
workforce to the regions, which pursue these lucrative opportunities, alleviates its 
domestic regional employment pressures. This is reflected in the popular saying in 
China: 'If you want to get rich, build roads' (Interview 2007c; 2007d). 
Trans-regional collaborations have attracted extensive investment, as seen by 
China's interest-free loans and grants which amount to RMB 249 million (US$30 
million), to Thailand and the ADB, for the construction of the Kunming-Bangkok 
highway, as well as similar sized packages to the Laotian section of this important 
interstate channel (National Development and Reform Commission 2003: 117). 
As part of this effort to create a better long-term environment for 
development, China's efforts towards creating and sustaining region-wide FTAs 
are already coming to fruition with the completion of the first CAFTA, which will 
launch on January 1, 2010 (Wong, Zou, and Zeng 2006: l3), allowing all the 
region's countries increased access to each others markets. This is promoting 
China's great-power status, as it will become the first major regional power to 
create a region wide FTA, ahead of Korea and Japan, whose own FTAs are still in 
various stages of development. China's Asianist leader status is being 
strengthened by longer term goals of merging these three FTAs into a trans-East 
Asian FTA. With the completion of this, along with the pan-Asian transportation 
routes and enhanced trade networks linking Shanghai with Singapore, China's aid 
in cooperative regional efforts is sustaining a major regional zone within Asia that 
can support the countries. By creating internal markets, China is also helping to 
create sustained growth of markets, whose existence depends less on external 
market factors beyond their control, which as seen in the recent financial crisis 
have proved pivotal in affecting global markets. While these markets will be 
linked to the FTAs, the combined unity within Asia will provide security and 
protection during times of crisis, thereby not only enhancing developmental ism, 
but also Asianism and internationalism in China. 
Despite promoting free trade in the region, China is also negotiating closer 
bilateral trade ties and economic partnerships with individual Southeast Asian 
nations. Though China may appear to be the largest resultant competitor, it is 
displaying symbolic gestures, as seen by the Early Harvest Program (EHP), to 
reassure the region of its determination to promote growth. This policy helped 
neighbours like Thailand to negotiate mutual reductions in trading barriers in 
some agricultural goods ahead of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), 
as did the extension of aid to the least developed Indochinese countries for 
infrastructural projects. This thereby suggested that the Chinese emphasis on 
infrastructural development, such as bridges and dams, reduces suspicions of 
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symbolic domination, and creates a posItIve image of a benign donor. by 
downplaying the 'black GDP growth' through the presentation of 'clean 
GDP'(Ramo 2004: 23). 
China's interpretation of 'clean GDP growth' plays an important role in 
the regional developmentalist norm (Ramo 2004). Although China still attracts 
substantial criticism for its resource extraction projects in the region, China is 
reconciling this in terms of its great-power status, whereby a bigger, more 
powerful and cooperative China can provide better assistance across the entire 
region. By investing in major projects in the region, China has had to create a 
wide range of supporting industries to sustain these projects abroad, and in doing 
so, has provided much needed services for the local communities where the 
projects are being under taken. This is seen in the GMS project, where many of 
the projects have had their associated problems, notably the environmental 
damage being inflicted through the dredging and damming of the Mekong River. 
However, the long-term goals of such projects and the impact they will have on 
the entire region are still being promoted as the primary incentives for the 
completion of such projects. A further example of China promoting what it views 
as the long-term good in the face of conflictingly bad evidence can be seen in the 
case of Myanmar, whose military junta refused to recognise the democratically 
elected government of the NLD, as explained earlier. Even in the face of 
extensive international condemnation, China has continued with its adherence to 
the sovereignty norm (People:S Daily 2007d; also see Guo 2008). 
By providing aid with no-strings-attached, China is also providing implicit 
and asymmetric strategic leverage on more traditional aid donors, many of whom 
have become concerned with the efficacy of their attached aid policies, forcing 
them to consider rethinking their strategies for aid disbursal. Though China may 
implicitly encourage the development of asymmetric strategic leverage, its aid 
activities have resulted in it too becoming subjected to such leverage, as in the 
case of Myanmar, where the military junta utilise asymmetric methods to offset 
international intervention, by playing China against the wider international 
community (Guo 2008). Despite this, China's adherence to developmental ism 
continues to view the long-term benefits of development in the region above what 
it views as transient issues, as it develops its great-power identity further. 
4.4. Summary 
China's adherence to the norms in this region can be interpreted through a range 
of factors. Figures 4.1-4.5 show how each of the respective factors reflecting each 
norm has changed over time. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 highlights how ASEAN activity 
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has developed since the organisation's inception, and continues by highlighting 
how this activity is linked to the expansion of China's involvement with the 
institution. Internationalism is reflected, in Figure 4.3, by the increase in number 
of international organisations in which China has gained membership. The 
Sovereignty norm is highlighted, in Figure 4.4, by relating the number of bilateral 
relations to the number of multilateral relations, in order to calculate an estimate 
of the probability of China adhering to its non-interference policy. 
Developmentalism is interpreted, in Figure 4.5, by estimating changes in norm 
intended practical and norm unintended rhetorical perspectives, by measuring the 
actual aid donated to Southeast Asia, between 2002 and 2008, and comparing it to 
the rhetorical accouchement that accompanied the increase in number of regional 
summits. 
Asianism 
The Asianist norm, and its concentration on Asian identity, has become 
significantly stronger since the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Before the crisis, 
Asian identity was very defuse and hard to rationalise. Following the end of the 
Cold War, a new period of hope and developmental ism swept through the region, 
as countries embraced the Japanese 'flying geese' top-down model of 
development, which led in many cases to the formation of optimistic and 
non-regulated systems that induced 'bubble economies'. The apparent and prolific 
success of these economies was attributed to work ethics defined by 'Asian 
values', which adhered to traditional East Asian Confucian teachings (MFA 
2004d). 
During much of the early 1990s, China's interactions with Southeast Asia 
were still mired in the legacies of its Cold War relations, despite some initial 
promising interactions with ASEAN. China frequently became engaged in conflict 
with ASEAN countries, notably over territorial maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea. These conflicts highlight how China's new identity as a great power 
was emerging, but had yet to internalise defined norms of behaviour, such as 
Asianism and internationalism. Such disputes usually escalated when they drew 
wider attention from the US armed forces. As it discovered its interests in the 
region were becoming threatened by its own actions, China formulated its New 
Security Concept, which aimed to moderate its hostilities in the region. In 1997, 
following the collapse of the Thai currency, the 'bubble economies' successively 
began to burst, inducing region wide financial chaos. As the crisis became more 
widespread, China did not devalue its currency; this move is widely heralded as a 
key factor in reducing the damage from the crisis. This move strengthened its 
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reputation throughout Asia and also brought it wider international recognition, 
promoting its Asianist leadership role and the internationalist norm further. 
Following the crisis, as the region began to recover, China expanded its 
interaction with ASEAN which resulted in the instigation of the ASEAN+ 1 and 
subsequently ASEAN+3 meetings, providing wider collaborative efforts between 
South East and North East Asia. This led to the strengthening of region wide 
collaboration through a series of bilateral currency swaps under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, and helped seed the foundations for a region wide FTA. As China's 
cooperative interactions with the regional institution expanded, it ratified the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, heralding a new era whereby it 
worked towards more peaceful collaborative efforts. There was also a marked 
shift towards modifying the 'flying geese' model into a more Chinese centred 
development path, by adhering to the characteristics of 'bamboo capitalism', as 
the original model was felt to have induced the environment that perpetuated the 
financial crisis. Although Japan's influence in the region remained strong, as seen 
by its insistence on expanding ASEAN+3 meetings to include India, New Zealand 
and Australia, China only sanctioned their inclusion after these countries agreed to 
sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which bound the countries to 
serving the region's interests primarily. The SARS epidemic and Southeast Asian 
tsunami crisis highlighted new areas of regional cooperation for China and 
ASEAN. In response to SARS, China broadened its region wide collaborative 
efforts by providing disease containment aid, as well as assistance to its 
neighbours whose tourist economies had been damaged by the epidemic. The 
non-traditional nature of these threats also reinforced both internationalism and 
developmental ism in parallel with Asianism, though through necessity it 
negatively affected China's traditional view of sovereignty, on humanitarian 
grounds. The shift towards humanitarian grounds reflects the evolution of the 
sovereignty norm towards an increased concern with moral legitimacy. 
Though China's relief efforts for the tsunami victims were significantly 
overshadowed by the more traditional donor countries, it highlighted additional 
key areas of importance for China. By seeking greater collaborative efforts with 
the region, it demonstrated its international responsibility and determination to 
ensure region wide development, in a move that promoted its leadership role 
further. 
Despite China's ongomg leadership challenge with Japan, China has 
occasionally conceded financial ground for the sake of wider regional cooperation. 
By supporting financial regional plans which were developed by Japan, using its 
extensive Yen reserves, China has ensured the continuation of regional institutions, 
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despite allowing Japan to prosper competitively from such moves. China's 
expansive cooperation with ASEAN has significantly widened over the past few 
years, as it has pushed for greater regional cooperation. During the 2007 financial 
crisis and its aftermath, much of East Asia looked to China for solutions to the 
crisis, though China continued to stress the importance of collaboration, by 
stressing how adherence to region wide 'Asian values' will still create the basis 
for future regional prosperity, thereby strengthening its leadership role further. All 
of these factors stimulate China's desire to promote a 'harmonious Asia', which 
features China in a prominent leadership role. 
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Figure 4.1 The number of ASEAN and ASEAN related summits per five 
year period 
The initial plot Figure 4.1 shows the number of summits held by ASEAN 
since its inception. Figure 4.2 highlights that before the countries of East Asia 
became involved in proceedings of ASEAN, the number of summits remained 
minimal. Once cooperation began between the countries, pro-activity and 
cooperation increased between the states. Figure 4.2 also demonstrates the 
competition between the three East Asian nations, highlighting that China's 
involvement has contributed not only to the rise in number of summits, but also 
resulted in almost half of all agreements and declarations ratified during those 
summits. This shows the increase in practice of Asianism since the early 1990s, 
and highlights how the norm has increasingly emerged in the region. This 
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demonstrates how norm uptake is most likely to have occurred between the late 
1990s and the early to mid-2000s. Its continued growth is propelling it towards 
cascade and internaIisation as its great-power identity strengthens, this point is 
most likely to have been passed by the mid-2000s 
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(Source data: see Appendix 3) 
Internationalism 
With regard to internationalism, during the 1950s and 1960s, China displayed a 
distinct lack of international responsibility through its support of world revolution 
and disbursal of aid for diplomatic reasons, despite rhetorically claiming 
otherwise. Multilateralism throughout the region remained next to impossible due 
to Cold War alliances. Upon joining the UN, China redefined its role and 
re-framed its activities in the region. By becoming more involved in the 
multilateral channels of the UN, it was better able to provide neutral support to 
the developing countries of the region during the 1970s. This can be seen in 
Figure 4.3, which shows the internationalist norm emerging in 1970 as the PRC 
began joining international institutions. While China had joined a number of 
institutions throughout the early years of the 20th century, these institutions had 
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almost exclusively recognized the ROC as the global representative of China. 
following the revolution in 1949; a principal exception being the non aligned 
movement which featured prominently in the Bandung conference of 1955. The 
gradual increase of the uptake of internationalism since 1970 highlights not only 
the intent of China's promotion of internationalism but also the scale of the efforts 
that were needed to convince other countries of their intent in the region through 
their enhanced embrace of the norm. Although its aid activities decreased in the 
1980s, as it became introspective, this activism reappeared in the 1990s, when, 
enhanced by the newly emerging norm of developmentalism, China's 
involvement with ASEAN expanded, and led to an increase in multilateral 
cooperation with its regional neighbours. The continued growth in number of 
international institutions highlights the increase in number of areas that China had 
to develop in to become increasingly internationally responsible. In the aftermath 
of the 1997 financial crisis, China demonstrated multilateral responsibility by 
engaging with ASEAN, and instigating a region-wide reform program aimed at 
improving the financial infrastructure that had induced the crisis. In so doing, 
China became more proactive and positive as it became apparent that these 
mechanisms could benefit its own interests. This cooperation widened in 2002 as 
the Asia Debt Reduction Plan was instigated, heralding the start of much wider 
China-ASEAN multilateral efforts, which became further strengthened in 2003, 
with the signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Although the 
SARS crisis and Southeast Asian tsunami highlighted significant deficiencies in 
China's capacities, China made greater multilateral cooperative efforts. Its active 
role in creating region wide FTAs and playing a prominent role in the developing 
plans for recovery from the 2007 financial crisis, have broadened the 
internationalist norm further. Despite this, some of its aid, notably in the GMS 
projects, has been considered irresponsible. However, this is being reconciled in 
terms of the developmentalist norm and China's overall view of the long-term 
benefits of its aid projects, despite the 'black GDP growth' that may result. 
Although it still refuses membership of the MRC, it has cooperated in providing 
information to assist in reducing further contention along the river, indicating at 
least an awareness of its internationalist responsibility to the region. This is 
reflected in Figure 4.3 by the position of the internationalist norm in 2010, which 
shows that although uptake of the norm has considerably increased, it has yet to 
become internalised. Internalisation of the norm would be represented by a 
leveling off of the number of institutions joined. This process is evolving 
alongside its growth as a great power. 
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Figure 4.3 The number of international organizations joined by the PRC 
(Source data: see Appendix 3) 
The number of international organisations within the Southeast Asian 
region, shown in Figure 4.3, which have associations with the PRC reflects those 
organisations that are exclusive to the region, such as ASEAN, as well as global 
institutions, such as the UN, whose global multilateral involvement necessitates 
their inclusion in Figure 4.3,5.1 and 6.1. From these diagrams, it can be seen that 
the internationalist trend is approximately constant across the three regions. The 
complete assignment of institutions throughout the various regions is shown in 
Appendix 3. 
Sovereignty 
China's adherence to sovereignty has varied over the period between 1950 and 
2010. As the PRC was founded on sovereignty, this dates its emergence to before 
1949. The Communist revolution and Maoist teachings had a detrimental 
influence on the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm, as China during 
the 1950s and 1960s continued to view this activism in terms of assisting 
communist comrades in Southeast Asia, in their fight against Western powers, 
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notably the US. As many of the countries in the region were colonised by the 
West, China did not view them as sovereign states; therefore they had no 
sovereignty to observe until they became independent. As China couldn't afford 
to donate vast sums of completely unconditional aid, it was able to place distinct 
conditions upon its receipt according to its own interests. From the 1970s onwards, 
the practice has increased as China's rhetoric has remained constant; since 1990, 
however, this rhetoric has gradually decreased. The Southeast Asian case 
highlights how China provided aid in the aftermath of SARS and the avian flu 
outbreaks, yet had to warn other countries about the dangers of the epidemics, in 
contradiction to its strict non-interference in a state's internal affairs. This is in 
contrast to the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm which evolved 
gradually between 1950 and 1970. 
The sovereignty norm influencing China's relations with the region since 
the early 1990s has been realised through multilateral alignments with ASEAN, 
and aims to protect the region against interference and intervention from external 
powers, mirroring the concepts initially extolled at Bandung in the 1950s. Though 
China has avoided conflict in the region, as part of its Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, it faces extensive international criticism over its support of 
Myanmar, and its reluctance to intervene in the matter is causing international 
condemnation. Despite this, the changes to the Westphalian concept of the 
sovereignty are increasingly aligning the norm with human rights and increased 
moral and internationalist responsibility. Though China adheres to the sovereignty 
norm, developmentalism and the desire to maintain a high level of development 
are exerting an effect on China's adherence to the sovereignty norm by making its 
rhetoric towards the junta more persuasive. Though it is still unlikely to intervene, 
the evolution of the norm is inducing a change of attitude in China, which may 
view developing strategic leverage through the support of an opposition party in a 
country as a means of appearing more internationally responsible, and in so doing 
increasing regional stability and its leadership role. Such moves appear in light of 
the Tropical storm Nargis in the region, the aftermath of which impacted heavily 
upon China's moral legitimacy and image as a great power. Figure 4.4 shows how 
a calculated coefficient related to the number of bi- and multilateral relations has 
varied over the period from 1950 to 2010. The rational behind the coefficient 
reasons 1 that the existence of a bilateral relation permits the opportunity for a 
I The equation shows that the probability of one country interfering with anothe~ is linked t~ the 
number of its bilateral relations; if there are only bilateral relations and no multtlateral relatIOns, 
the probability of a country interfering with its bilateral relative is high. This doe.s not imply .that 
interference will occur, only that the likelihood is strong. The presence of multIlate.ral relatIOns 
shows that the countries have shared interests with other countries across the regIOn, and are 
therefore constrained by them, consequently, the number of multilateral relations increases 
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country to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The presence of a 
multilateral relationship serves to constrain the bilateral relations, therefore 
reducing the probability of interference. This measure is displayed in its simplest 
case, in Figure 4.4, by considering the total number of bilateral relations in a 
region, relative to the number of multilateral relations formed during the same 
period. This assumes that the relations are of equal magnitude, with relative and 
equivalent weightings. It also assumes the absence of unilateral relations within a 
region, which would introduce additional factors into the equation. From the 
Figure, it may be inferred that in the absence of internationalism the probability 
that the PRC would interfere with countries through its bilateral relations was 
considerable. However, as the number of multilateral relations increased relative 
to the bilateral relations, this probability decreased, and the non-interference 
coefficient increased, proportionate to China's adherence to the sovereignty norm. 
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Figure 4.4 The variation of a coefficient of non-interference from 
1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
proportionally with the cost of direct interference. The probability of in~erference ~an be show~ by 
calculating the ratio of the number of bilateral relatio.ns to the nUT?ber bl- ~? m~ltllateral relat~o.ns. 
The probability of non-interference is therefore the mverse of ~hlS proba?lh1?', l.e. 1 - prob~blhty 
(see Appendix 3 for full calculation). It should be noted that thIS calc~latlOn IS at be~t an estlIl~ate, 
but the existence of a relationship does reflect why the PRe .mlght w~nt to l~terfere 1Il a 
neighbour's internal affairs for its own bene~t. Int~rference WIth. no?-dlplomahcally re!ated 
countries would be viewed internationally as umlaterahst and aggressIve 1Il ~ature, and contnbute 
to the destabilization of the regions involved as the international commumty became forced to 
intercede. 
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Developmentalism 
Since the manifestation of the developmentalist nonn, namely the Beijing 
Consensus, has only grown in prominence in the last decade, Figure 4.5 shows 
how the norm, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, has varied during this 
period. Although Western donors continue to question the Beijing Consensus's 
promotion of authoritarian control, the CCP is finding that since its development 
policies have created an increasingly affluent population, it is becoming necessary 
to appease this populace in order to retain its level of influence. There are distinct 
signs that much of the region is benefiting from the developmentalist guided aid 
from China. 
The increased practice of developmentalism since the late 1990s shows 
how China has actively increased development in the region, in line with its 
great-power identity and the uptake of Asianism. This highlights how a limiting 
step of the evolution of the norm was linked to its own development, which since 
the 1990s, has expanded more rapidly, facilitating greater nonn up take, and 
internalisation. 
China's adherence to the norms in this region can be interpreted from both 
norm-intended practical or norm-unintended rhetorical perspectives. The 
dimension of norm-intended practice provides an indication of the emergence and 
uptake of the norm, while the dimension of norm-unintended rhetoric highlights 
the extent to which China was attempting to convince others of its adherence to 
the norm. Figure 4.5 highlights how rhetoric, as measured by the number of 
summits held between ASEAN and China, is related to the practical deployment 
of aid throughout the initial decade of the 21 st century. Such summits are 
accompanied by high levels of rhetoric promoting the cooperative efforts of the 
parties. As the number of summits is also directly related to the growth of 
Asianism, this highlights the relationship between developmentalism and 
Asianism in Southeast Asia. 
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Figure 4.5 The increase in uptake of developmentalism between 2002 and 
2008 in Southeast Asia (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
Though significant second-order factors, as previously discussed, may be 
seen to moderate the norms, there are also first order factors visible through the 
norms, of which the most significant remains the power monopoly of the CCP. As 
China's aid activities increased in the region in the early 2000s, these positively 
fed back through the mercantilist driven aid formulation channels, endorsing the 
CCP leadership's direction of its activism. With a large proportion of the region's 
aid being formulated in successful projects related to trade and infrastructure, 
such as the FTAs and trans Asian supply routes, this trend looks set to continue 
well into the next decade and beyond. 
The next case study chapter will continue the investigation of China's 
foreign aid policies in the African continent, by studying how the norms have 
been influencing China's foreign aid policy in a continent external to China's 
traditional cultural values, with which it has developed long-term ties. 
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CHAPTERS 
CHINA'S FOREIGN AID TO AFRICA 
5.1 The significance of the African case 
Africa stands out as a region of significant importance to China, because of its 
role as a test bed for the application of the norms and because it is free from the 
historical influences and challenges to China's security and development. This 
raises pertinent and significant questions as to the motivations behind China's 
interest in the region. Unlike Southeast Asia with its geographical proximity, 
cultural links, and long tradition of trade and influence, Africa has provided China 
with an opportunity to expand outside its traditional spheres of influence into a 
region long associated with Cold War dynamics and the ideological and strategic 
battle of the superpowers. The significance of China's activities in the region, as 
demonstrated through its aid activities (Xinhua 2009a), lies in three distinct areas: 
firstly, the pivotal role that Africa has played in its re-emergence into the 
international community; secondly, its pursuit of natural resources to fuel its 
domestic development; and thirdly, the effect of these activities on more 
traditional aid donors' attempts to develop the region. 
Following the Sino-Soviet rift in 1960, China, through a necessity to 
survive and reconstruct its identity and global image, focussed upon the 
increasing awareness of the fact that the growing number of African countries that 
were members of the UN with voting rights constituted a very important 
percentage of the majority in the UN General Assembly in the early 1960s. These 
states were also subjected to often unwelcome influences from the superpowers, 
to which China was opposed; a point which strengthened China's identification 
with them, prioritised its aid policy during this time, and imposed limits on the 
extent of bilateral relations. During the early years of the PRC, and the initial 
development of Sino-African relations, China provided aid to struggling African 
states, many of whom were, at that time, aligned with Taiwan, to develop national 
independence, economic self-reliance, and nurture developing world cooperation. 
Through these schemes, it was able to empathise with many African states, having 
itself been a victim of Western aggression. This point still resounds in the rhetoric 
of the modern PRC even today, as Hu Jintao's speech, at the University of 
Pretoria, reiterated: 
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[T]he Chinese people once suffered from colonial aggression and 
oppression from the major powers in a similar way to the majority 
of the African countries which have similar historical experiences 
and tragic destinies. [ ...... ] After the founding of a new China, the 
Chinese Government and people have firmly provided political, 
material and moral support for the heroic struggle against colonial 
rule for the national liberation of the African people. 
(MFA 2007b) 
China's activities In Africa resulted in the region's countries increasingly 
identifying with, and providing significant support for, the PRC. This enabled 
China to gain its seat at the UN in 1971, thereby displacing the ROC in the 
process. Its subsequent aid engagement in Africa during the 1970s contributed not 
only to the transformation of its identity into that of an international partner, 
without the burden of association with the imposing superpowers, but also 
allowed it to nurture a foundation for establishing Sino-African relations on its 
own terms. This has been further strengthened with the image of China as a 
non-threatening international aid donor and champion of the developing world. 
That image was reinforced by its neutrality in the 1970s and 1980s, which was 
due in no small part to its providing developing countries with an alternative to 
the traditional aid programmes of the 'West', a point which Premier Wen liabao 
reaffirmed: 
Sino-African cooperation IS an important component of 
South-South cooperation. [ ...... ] We are ready to work together 
with African countries to further develop and strengthen long-term 
Sino-African stability, equality and mutual benefit and all-round 
cooperation for a new partnership to become a model for 
South-South cooperation. [ ...... ] Chinese economic assistance to 
Africa remains sincere, and without the attachment of any political 
conditions. 
(Xinhua 2003) 
The international attention that China's relationship has attracted is, in part, due to 
China's renewed international image as an aid donor (IMF and World Bank 2007: 
152). A combination of the factors, namely, the successful aid donor image. 
non-interference policies, challenges to traditional aid programmes, and its own 
remarkable economic success, has led many African states to associate the idea of 
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China being 'a significant partner in developing support' with the issue of aid 
contribution for Africa (DFARSA 2000). This transformation of its identity, and 
with it its internal self-perception nurtured primarily for its own population -
along with its image portrayed to the outside community - are all related to the 
norms shaping China's foreign aid policy. The significance of Hu's affirmations, 
coupled with the lack of transparency by China, which does not publish exact 
figures regarding aid donation, reflects its internal concerns over maintaining a 
popular image to their own population, who may regard domestic needs as a 
higher priority (Interview 2006a; 2006d; 2007b). This contributes to the 
reiteration of China's aid contribution to Africa through organisations such as the 
UN and IMF, being matched by reminders of African support of major Chinese 
agendas, such as its successful 2008 Olympic bid (MFA 2009b). 
Since institutional responsibility for China's foreign aid was shifted to the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in 1982, resulting in the creation of the 
Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, the number of regional bureaus has 
increased significantly, along with an enhanced emphasis on Africa (MOCOM 
2009). As Africa remains of considerable interest to China, the attention paid to it 
by academics and policy planners continues to grow. This has become rather 
significant, and caused many Western-led aid donor bodies to argue that China's 
aid donor role in the region undermines their own efforts to democratise and 
develop the continent, thereby raising concerns about how China's adherence to 
the norms in the region are reshaping traditional donors' plans for development 
(BBC 2007a). In contrast, China's lending is generally welcomed by African 
governments. Loan contracts are often made at the highest political level, as 
demonstrated in Zambia, where such activity has continued to raise the concerns 
of international organisations, as well as Zambian NGOs. In keeping with the 
sovereignty norm, of which non-interference in state affairs plays an integral part, 
the Chinese Government accords little importance to transparency in agreements, 
as is often a condition for aid by traditional aid donors, and may in fact divert 
internal priorities away from its principal poverty reduction drives (Huse and 
Muyakwa 2008). China's adherence to the sovereignty norm and its policy of 
non-interference has also benefited its own industrial and commercial interests, 
and generated significant returns on their investments, often in African markets 
that are unable to compete equally with Chinese markets. This has arisen since 
many of the aid projects are completed by Chinese engineering and mineral 
extraction companies, which expand China's own equity market. The diverting of 
priorities is invoking significant antipathy from the West towards Chinese foreign 
policy, due to its simultaneous pursuit of, engagement in, and critical stance 
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towards, those norms adhered to by international aid donors. International aid 
donors are arguably of the sam~ mind concerning the expectations and 
responsibilities they place on aid recipient nations, since China is now challenging 
the conventional behaviour that has come to typify donor and recipient relations. 
As these relations have enkindled the highest degree of interest among current 
China observers, they serve as the principal motivation for this study. 
5.2 Historical Relations with Africa 
Prior to 1949, there had been no notable established connections between the two 
regions, and what connections had existed contributed little to modern 
Sino-African relations (EPRCRSA 2006). This fact was due, in part, to there being 
no recognised sovereign African states, with the exception of Ethiopia, and as 
such, Chinese foreign relations with Africa remained dormant until the 
establishment of independent states and governments following decolonization, 
and the end of the Chinese civil war (Renmin Ribao 2006). 
The early Chinese-African relations of the 1950s, have been repeatedly 
reiterated in domestic and international meetings with African leaders across the 
continent, and have become widely taught in present day Chinese history classes 
(MFA 2006b). The PRC's foreign relations with Africa have traversed periods of 
intense involvement in the region, as seen during China's pursuit of international 
recognition and social revolution in the 1960s, and by lulls and in some cases 
withdrawals, as China's identity transitioned between that of victim and neutral 
player in the 1970s, which catalysed the reduction in its support for revolutionary 
groups, before re-emerging in a period of renewed and intense involvement in the 
region's politics, trade relations, and aid, as seen by its identity change into that of 
a great power. 
5.2.1 Years aligned with the Soviets 
In the early years of the PRC, China faced the challenge of attaining international 
recognition, and alongside its participation in the Soviet led world revolution, saw 
Africa, and their emerging struggles for independence throughout the continent, 
as an ally with whom to gain wider recognition for both its government and 
legitimacy. The establishment and promotion of shared experiences and injustices 
at the hands of foreign colonial powers was to prove central to China's 
re-emergence in Africa, and the main focus of its foreign policy efforts in the 
1950s, prior to the Sino-Soviet split. Due to its geographical remoteness, lack of 
cultural links, and sparse trade relations, China used its experience as a victim of 
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colonization to bridge the cultural and historical divide separating Africa from 
itself and other peoples in the struggle for self rule. Snow (1994: 284) highlighted 
this policy by stating: 
[T]he commanders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
compared the current situation in Africa with the state of China 
[ ...... ] between the Boxer Rebellion and the Fourth May 
Movement of 1919. The conclusion drawn was that [ ...... ] we 
must tell them [ ...... ] about the significance of the Taiping 
uprising, the Boxer uprising, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and the 
revolutionary experience of the Communists of this generation. 
This message had a significant impact on liberation movements across the region, 
as increasing numbers of independence struggles throughout the continent turned 
to the Soviets and the Chinese for support and aid in their struggle for 
independence. As Felix Moumi6, the leader of Cameroon's independence struggle 
commented in 1959, 'the Chinese revolution is an example to be followed by the 
people of the Cameroon and all other peoples in Africa' (Snow 1994: 284). 
Chinese involvement in Africa necessitated a public relations campaign to explain, 
and in some cases justify its presence in the region, in the face of decades of 
European indoctrination and teaching about the Chinese. African people had little 
knowledge of, or information about, the Chinese, other than what they had been 
taught by their colonial masters. It is worth remarking that China's own 
knowledge and history of Africa, suffered from the same lack of independent and 
personal experience. This fact is supported by the continued reliance on the same 
limited surviving historical accounts of earlier Sino-African encounters, notably 
from the fifteenth century chronicles of Zheng He, that were frequently recounted 
by the Chinese leadership. During the 1950s, the PRC's ongoing preoccupation 
with becoming internationally identified as the representation of China, along 
with concerns for its own security, influenced its relations with Africa. Through 
the sharing of this common revolutionary identity with African insurgent groups, 
China continued to build its relations across the continent, notably with 
communist and non-aligned states. 
In 1955, China took part in a major conference in Bandung, where many 
countries of the non-aligned world gathered to formulate their visions for their 
collective future and identities. At the conference, China asserted that it, along 
with Africa, was unified in their victimization by the 'West'. This conviction was 
conceptualized by Premier Zhou Enlai's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
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which became adopted as the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement, as 
co-founded by India's Nehru, Yugoslavia's Tito and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
and was subsequently incorporated into the final communique of the conference. 
In an effort to establish ties with the Muslim nations of North Africa, 
China sent envoys and diplomats from the Muslim regions of its own 
north-western provinces. The region north of the Sahara was home to some of the 
earliest states to secure independence from their European colonizers, with Egypt 
becoming the first African state to officially recognize the PRC in 1956 (MFA 
2009f). This recognition, along with other political moves by the Nasser 
leadership, led to a deterioration of relations between Egypt and the United States, 
who at the time recognized the Taiwan based ROC as the legitimate government 
of China. 'The American administration resented Nasser's apparent lack of 
interest in its Middle Eastern peace initiatives and his recognition of the People's 
Republc of China' (Kunz 1991: 69). When America withdrew support for the 
Aswan Dam project, over Egypt's recognition of the PRC, the Nasser led 
Government nationalized the Suez Canal, in a move that ignited the Suez Crisis 
and led to Egypt's closer ties with the Soviet Union. 
[W]ith Nasser seen to be increasingly courting the Russians and 
Red China, [ ... ] the Americans, swiftly followed by the British, 
announced their decision to withdraw their offer of a loan, thereby 
scuppering the whole project [ .. ] the unbearable pressure a $400 
million loan would impose on the Egyptian economy was cited 
publicly as the reason. 
(Shaw 1995: 3) 
China took full advantage of the conflict that ensued to argue that the European 
colonial powers and their American counter-parts, continued to interfere in the 
affairs of sovereign states (see Kunz 1991:51; Shaw 1995: 155, 163). 
Following the events in Egypt, it became apparent to the Chinese 
leadership that its future in sub-Saharan Africa also lay in the identification with, 
and support of, liberation movements in their fight for independence and 
de co Ionization. 
They have [ ...... ] played a conspicuous part in helping Africans 
liquidate the last vestiges of European rule on the continent, by 
supplying [ ...... ] nearly all of the various liberation movements 
with arms and money, food and medicines, and above all by 
131 
training the movements' commanders at the Nanjing Military 
Academy in the theory and practice of guerilla war. 
(Snow 1994: 286) 
5.2.2 Years of isolation 
The supporting of liberation movements in their fight for independence was the 
first form of Chinese aid to the region, and laid the foundation for future relations 
and aid programmes. An examination of the chronological history of African 
membership in the UN is significant in understanding the importance of Africa to 
Chinese foreign relations. In 1955, there were only four African member states in 
the UN, comprising 5.2 percent of the membership. By 1968, African membership 
had increased to 41, comprising 32.6 percent of the membership (Kay 1969: 21). 
The marked increase in UN membership reflected the increase in African nations 
attaining their independence from their colonial status. These newly independent 
countries began to rely increasingly more on support and aid from both the Soviet 
Union and the PRC. As such, China was positioned to exploit its new position and 
broaden its international status. By initially focussing its aid efforts on those 
African countries which had strong ties with Taiwan, China attempted to modify 
regional perceptions and identifications within those African nations. Chinese 
envoys were secretly dispatched to negotiate new agreements with their leaders in 
attempts to persuade them to change their allegiances (Yu 1988: 854). Although 
Larkin (1971: 35) observed that from the beginning of the contact with Africa, 
China did not support the Charter of the UN, in line with its victim and 
anti-Western institution stance, Ogunsanwo (1974: 59, 75) argues that China's 
policy in Africa made use of 'traditional methods of statecraft', 'diplomatic, 
cultural, and trade relations', 'infiltration of dissident', and 'organisational 
apparatus' to attain diplomatic recognition, and 'persuade as many African states 
as possible to vote for her', thereby demonstrating China's awareness of being 
recognised. Promises were ratified to continue Taiwan's existing aid projects, as 
well as loans provided to underwrite new additional projects (Yu 1988: 854). This 
began a period of enhanced activities through a series of aid packages to a variety 
of countries during the early 1960s. In many cases, aid distribution often 
pre-empted the actual commencement of diplomatic relations, as was seen in 
Ghana in 1960, when Ghana received the first of its official aid packages from 
China, which was followed shortly after by the establishment of a treaty of 
friendship. In 1961, Ghana's renewed loyalties were rewarded with a promise of 
US$19.5 million in aid to Ghana's President Nkrumah, in the form of an 
interest-free loan repayable over a ten-year period beginning in 197 L as a gesture 
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of goodwill following Ghana's extension of relations following the end of the 
initial aid package (Renmin Ribao 1961b). In addition, Mao's Government gave 
the Government of Guinea an interest-free loan of US$25 million, which became 
immediately drawn and remained viable during 1963 (Copper 1976: 89; Renmin 
Ribao 1960). Later that same year, China donated 10,000 tons of rice as a gift to 
Guinea (Larkin 1971: 94). This heralded the start of a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the nations, as noted on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs website: 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China has 
provided Guinea with aid for the construction of the People's 
Palace, Hydro power station at KINKON and TINKISSO, 
Freedom Cinema, President Office Mansions and so on. 
(MFA 2003) 
By September 1961, China had extended a loan to the Government of Mali for 
US$19.4 million, in the year after Mali established diplomatic relations (Renmin 
Ribao 1961 c). Although relations with Somalia were established in 1960, 
followed soon after in 1961 by China's granting of US$130,000 in medical 
supplies and extension of technical assistance in building a radio station, the first 
official aid arrived in 1963 and took the form of a US$3 million grant to help 
Somalia balance its budget, in addition to an US$18 million interest-free loan 
(Larkin 1971: 94; MFA 2009c; Renmin Ribao 1963b). In late 1963, Premier Zhou 
Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi toured Africa in what became considered 'a 
major milestone in the development of friendly relations' (MFA 2000d). During 
the tour, Zhou 'exchanged views with the leaders of the countries concerned, and 
reached extensive agreement with them on such questions as opposing 
imperialism, colonialism, racism, expansionism, safeguarding world peace, 
strengthening unity' and 'promoting the friendly relations' with African countries 
(ibid.). 
China's aid support continued to focus on various liberation groups such 
as those in Angola, providing guerilla training to the Frente de Liberta<;ao de 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) and its radical splinter group, Comite Revoluciomirio 
de Mozambique (COREMO) (Henriksen 1976: 377-99; Peking Review 1969; 
1972a; 1972b). Further support was provided in Zimbabwe, through Beijing's 
military and political training of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA), the military wing of Zimbabwe African National Union (lANU) 
(Renmin Ribao 1981) and in Namibia, where China provided training and 
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provisions to elements of the Maoist guerrilla military strategies of South West 
African People's Organisation (SWAPO) (Dreyer 1994: 61). In South Africa, the 
scale of aid was somewhat limited compared with elsewhere on the continent 
since 'the Chinese concentrated their effort on countries where there was an 
exploitable situation by which China could raise its prestige and influence' 
(Taylor 2006a: 130). However, China did provide economic assistance to two 
major nationalist movements: The African National Congress (ANC) and the 
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) (Lodge 1983: 304, 309-10). Even though China 
intended aid to serve as a model to drive its self-reliance against colonialism, 
ongoing interstate conflicts were being fuelled by the political campaigns of 
Maoist insurgents, who neglected to promote economic development between 
China and themselves. 
During the 1960s, China viewed Africa as an arena in which it could 
campaign against its opponents i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, free 
from threats to its security, unlike the threats posed by the involvement of the 
superpowers in Southeast Asia. With America's increasing involvement in the 
Vietnamese conflict, alongside its continued support for Taiwan in the UN, China 
sought to convince the newly independent African states that America was now 
their new 'common enemy'. China used the compelling argument that 'Western' 
support for the South African racist apartheid regime demonstrated that they were 
untrustworthy allies. Furthermore, the 'white ruled' government's recognition of 
Taiwan, like that of America, only confirmed its claims that America and Taiwan 
could not be trusted. Soviet support for the ANC in its struggle against 'white 
rule' in South Africa was central to American and 'Western' ambivalence. South 
Africa's location and rich endowment in natural resources were strategically 
important during the Cold War, and the behaviour of its Government was often 
ignored by 'Western' authorities as a necessary evil that had to be endured. Kay 
(1969: 35) noted this apparent duplicity when stating: 
As of 1968 the African states have been unable to energize the 
power of the United Nations into a frontal assault backed by 
mandatory collective measures on South Africa. In fact, the 
voluntary arms embargo and voluntary economic sanctions called 
for by the Security Council and the General Assembly in 1962 
have been flaunted by France and quietly circumvented by other 
states. 
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5.2.3 China's activities following its admission to the UN 
China's aid to Africa grew as it received support from African members in the UN 
in the final years of China's campaign to oust Taiwan from the international body, 
thus enhancing China's international position on the world stage, and leading Mao 
to laud that, 'it was China's African friends who carried China into its seat in the 
United Nations headquarters' (Renmin Ribao 2007). In the early 1970s, the ne\\ 
states of Africa successively secured independence. The superpowers took centre 
stage, with China occupying a position behind the scenes. With China no longer 
needing to promote itself as a victim of 'Western colonization and aggression' to 
secure support and establish relations with the new African states, the Chinese 
leadership initiated changes in its international image. China's split with the 
USSR, due to ideological differences, had directly affected Sino-African relations 
and is most apparent following decolonization. With both the Soviets and the PRC 
benefiting internationally from their support of African independence, ideological 
differences could be set aside and excused for the common good, thereby 
strengthening its opposition to Western dominance in international organizations 
such as the UN General Assembly. 
With their new-found influence as members of the UN, many African 
states sought the same support for their economic development as they had for 
their independence causes. However, economic development and international 
support in the form of aid and investment proved to be a much greater challenge. 
While the Soviets responded to African calls for aid in the liberation struggle, they 
proved substantially less enthusiastic in their response to Africa's development 
needs. 
The African states have realized that Soviet voting support on 
economic assistance issues is [ ...... ] of dubious value because of 
the Soviet's unwillingness to match this voting support with 
requisite amounts of financial support [ ...... which] deprives the 
African states of the manoeuvring room which they have used to 
such advantage on colonial issues. 
(Kay 1969: 40) 
However, as the Cold War became entrenched in Africa, the ideological 
differences which had led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, resurfaced. As a sign of 
the increasing friction between China and the Soviet Union, China began to view 
the Soviets as a growing hegemon in their relations with the region. and therefore 
no different from the Americans in trying to assert their influence and assuming a 
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role akin to new colonial masters of the region. This drew the continent into an 
ideological Cold War, as Kay (1969: 41) argues, when '[p]ushed by the pressures 
of the Cold War, both East and West have manoeuvred to obtain the largest 
possible voting majorities for their positions'. This led economic aid and support 
for African regimes, which favoured one side or the other, to become an element 
by which influence and alliances could be secured. China's reaction to the playing 
out of the Cold War struggle in Africa was to further condemn the Soviets in 
much the same light as they had done with the Americans, while, at the same time, 
transforming its identity and international image from a victim to that of an 
international partner, by denouncing interference in the affairs of sovereign states 
and seeking cooperation and mutual assistance, rather than ideological adherence. 
It is worth noting that the Chinese, unlike the Soviets, were never 
interested in establishing commissars or political representatives of the CCP in 
African countries. As Soviet socialism was deemed incompatible with these 
African states, the PRC held the view that Africa was also unwise to adopt either 
the Soviet or the 'Western' model and should seek a path best suited to its own 
historical circumstances and experiences. President Obote of Uganda had 
previously reported after a visit to Beijing, in 1965, that the Chinese leaders had 
told him that 'they did not wish to interfere with the systems of other nations', and 
that 'in the case of Africa ... they did not think their system could work' (Snow 
1994: 303). In promoting their international image of a benevolent partner, 
independent of the two superpower camps, China focused on expanding its 
relations with the region through trade, aid, and mutual cooperation, often in 
competition with the Soviets and the Americans. Snow (1994: 302) underlined 
this point by remarking: 
For the Chinese to spoon-feed African states their own political 
doctrine would have clashed with their role as champions of 
African freedom - and also, of course, with the very principle of 
national independence on which they themselves had broken with 
the Soviet camp. 
China took this opportunity to promote itself as a partner in the developing world, 
when it recognized that aid and investment had become the major priority for 
many African states, and that both the Soviet and the former colonial powers were 
not forthcoming in providing development assistance. China's African policy was 
outlined by Huang Hua's speech, in his position as Chinese Ambassador to the 
UN, to the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in October, 1972, which 
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echoed the words of Zhou Enlai, in his 1964 tour of Africa, by stating that any 
prospective national organisation 'should rely upon their own efforts and use 
foreign aid only as an auxiliary, and should never rely upon others to end colonial 
rule' (Renmin Ribao 1972). This demonstrated China's awareness of how the 
multilateral platform, of the UN, could be utilised in its struggle against 
colonialism. China argued that developing countries should no longer leave their 
fates in the hands of first world countries to decide. Beijing's view of the 'three 
world' global order and consequently of Africa was brought further into focus 
following the speech by Deng Xiaoping at the UN in April 1974 (Peking Review 
1974a). This served as an opportunity to implement the Eight Principles of 
Chinese Aid, pronounced by Premier Zhou Enlai during his earlier tour of Africa 
in 1963-64, which focused on development and aid that was free from the politics 
and ideological demands exposed by the developed world. Non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of the aid recipients became central to these principles, as did the 
focus upon meaningful and visible development projects, such as the construction 
of the TAZARA (Tan-Zam railway), at a cost ofUS$500 million. 
China volunteered to embark on projects like the Tan-Zam railway 
which were politically or psychologically important to African 
governments but which more profit-minded aid donors had 
rejected on economic grounds. 
(Snow 1994: 288) 
The PRC also continued to focus its attention on those African states that had not 
yet made the switch to recognizing them. China sought to leave the impression 
that recognition had its benefits, and a switch to the PRC meant support for 
African states in international institutions and a powerful friend in the developing 
world. 
During the 1970s, China enhanced this international developmental 
alignment with the Third World, through Beijing's UN delegates, who 
predominantly supported African countries' calls for a new international economic 
order (NIEO), by keenly promoting the involvement of African states in a variety 
of international organisations that promoted dialogue with the industrialized 
Second World. This move led to the Lome Convention being singled out by 
Beijing for praise as an organisation committed to this goal (Peking Review 1975). 
This united front approach became fundamental to China's burgeoning policy 
across Africa. Chinese support in liberation struggles challenged primarily the 
Soviet Union's dominance, and focussed its 'priority assistance' on the Portuguese 
137 
territories of Angola and Mozambique (Jackson 1995: 388-422; Peking Review 
1972b; Renmin Ribao 1975). China's addresses to the UN condemned the 
Portuguese for their territorial dominance and urged assistance from liberation 
organisations, such as the UN de-colonisation Committee. Through its enhanced 
activities on this and other international platforms, in advocating a more mil itant 
approach in Africa, China increased its prestige and stature as a concerned party. 
Changes in Chinese foreign policy towards Africa matched concurrent 
changes in geo-politics and Cold War power relations. As relations between the 
PRC and the US entered a period of rapproachement at the start of the 1970s, as 
exemplified by the subsequent visit to China of the American President Richard 
Nixon, the PRC focused on warming its relations with the United States and its 
global partners. With these -closer relations to the 'West', formed primarily 
through China's receipt of Western aid and investment, China began to identify 
with a role that was much less focused on challenging Soviet and 'Western' 
influence in Africa. 
Despite being unable to offer any significant opposition to the 
Superpowers' influence in Africa, the UN was able to provide a platform for 
China to project its responsible image. China feared that the Soviet Union was in 
a position in Africa where it could conduct an exercise similar to that which it was 
performing in Afghanistan at that time, following its invasion in 1979 (ibid.). 
Further frustration arising from its lack of influence in the region resulted in 1982 
in China confronting the US, when its approach towards South Africa became 
intent on exposing the US' connivance with the apartheid state. In the annual 
speech to the General Assembly of the UN on 4 October 1982, Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua attacked an unnamed superpower, implicitly accusing the US, for 
giving South Africa confidence to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, as 
well as for making military incursions into neighbouring countries (Beijing 
Review 1982b). China remained vocal in its criticism of the South Africans and 
their alleged allies in Washington, in a move which helped maintain a perceived 
favourable profile in Africa. 
Even though China had become one of the largest recipients of foreign aid 
and investment, China used its new access to funds to embark upon the 
modernization and development of its economy, which transformed the PRC into 
the economic miracle that it is recognized as today. This transformation, marked 
by the shift from a predominantly agricultural to a manufacturing based economy, 
would by the early 1990s, necessitate a re-engagement with Africa in search of 
vital natural resources required to continue China's economic growth and 
development. As its most recent identification as a great power began to take 
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shape, China began to re-emerge from its self imposed 'isolation' from Africa, 
and sought to promote itself as an alternative aid donor and positive role model in 
the developing world. 
In transforming its international image, China used its successful 
economic transformation to challenge traditional 'Western' aid models, and 
provided an alternative model for African and other developing countries. In 
contrast to the 'Western' approach to aid, China emphasized non-interference in 
the affairs of the developing world, promoting itself and its success as an example 
of economic development, with many African states responding positively to this 
new image. Unlike the 'West', with its patronizing approach to Africa over its 
human rights record, and failure to modernize and develop, China remained more 
reserved, choosing to focus on cultural and trade relations, which paid dividends 
for Sino-African relations. In the months following the Tiananmen incident in 
1989, the African response to China's crackdown on student protests contrasted 
sharply with that of the developed world. In a sign of solidarity, many African 
states were muted in their reaction, and in some cases, even praised the PRC's 
leadership and resolve, as seen by the congratulatory telegram to the Chinese 
army from Chairman Mlambo of Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), and 
President Nujoma, of Namibia and SWAPO, combined with the Angolan foreign 
minister's expression of 'support for the resolute actions to quell the 
counter-revolutionary rebellion' (Renmin Ribao 1989a; 1989b). Much of the 
support and response by African states to the Tiananmen incident reflected their 
own experience in dealing with the human rights issue, and 'Western' criticism. 
With the majority of African states sharing China's views on democracy and 
human rights, by presenting a united front on the matter, along with previous 
objections to UN pronouncements condemning China for its human rights records, 
many African states became further endeared to the PRC leadership. As many 
African states no longer benefited from the aid and support they once received 
from the Soviet Union before its collapse, China became viewed as a major 
source of aid, and any condemnation of the PRC leadership and its policies, 
would therefore be detrimental to their interests. With few exceptions, much of 
Africa is ruled by regimes that are both sympathetic and supportive of China's 
political stance on the issues of human rights and development. Taylor (2006b: 
939) discusses this issue thus: 
China [asserts] that human rights such as 'economic rights' and 
'rights of subsistence' are the main priority of developing nations 
and take precedence over personal, individual rights as 
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conceptualized in the West. 
China has reiterated over the past two decades that its record of bringing hundreds 
of millions of its own people out of abject poverty is a point of pride, and that 
Western forms of democracy and government are not compatible with China's 
needs (Interview 2007b; 2007e). Many regimes in Africa echo this view and are 
increasingly looking to China as a model for their own development. As China's 
domestic and foreign policies continue to be shaped by its evolving norms, these 
will provide a key to identifying in which direction their future will expand, and 
will be explored in the next section. 
5.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Africa 
Since the Asianist norm concerns the Asian identity within an Asian society, it is 
of little significance outside of Asia. Though China's pursuit of a regional 
leadership role within Asia is, in part, played out in this region through its aid 
competition with other Asian countries, notably Japan, the consequences of its 
activities in relation to Asianism is more pertinent within Asia (see Asia Times 
2006a; Japan Times 2006; 2008; Jaura and Kawakami 2008). Therefore, this 
discussion will focus on the norms of internationalism, sovereignty and 
developmentalism. 
5.3.1 Internationalism 
As discussed in Chapter 3, China's internationalist responsibility can be traced 
back to the early 1970s, when the PRC was admitted to the UN. A considerable 
proportion of its success in attaining this position has been attributed to the 
support that China received from African states in the 1960s. Consequently, China 
felt both an obligation and responsibility towards these states for its new 
international status (Interview 2007h; 2007i). 
Following its admission to the UN in 1971, China's policy focussed on the 
ethical cultivation of as many allies in Africa as possible, by nurturing 
self-reliance to kindle the countries' early developmental moves as a sign of its 
growing responsibility, and to maintaining friendships already in existence 
through low-level aid projects, and the limited granting of capital. China's support 
of insurgents throughout Africa consequently decreased as its neutral image 
expanded. The decrease in support for regional insurgencies marked the countries' 
successive attainments of independence from their former colonial status. 
Although China remained committed to providing aid, whilst remaining detached 
140 
from the hegemonic activities of the superpowers in Africa during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the focus was now on diplomatic endeavours designed to maintain 
existing Sino-African connections, and on continuing to provide developmental 
economic assistance to those states. Chinese leaders continued to highlight the 
importance of their ties to the continent, and reaffirmed their responsibility by 
donating aid through new-found multilateral channels, as demonstrated by 
China's donation of US$30,OOO to the UN Fund Board for Namibia and the UN 
Trust Fund for South Africa respectively (ZDJMN 1984: VI-7). Much of the 
promotional discourse that had advanced Beijing's version of Marxist-Leninism, 
and routine provocative threats against the superpowers had now been discarded, 
being replaced by quiet, viable, small scale developmental projects aimed at 
assisting Africa's agriculture and health. 
Due to China's drive for domestic economic progress in the 1980s, the 
internationalist norm behind its aid donation became more symbolic, and resulted 
in its overseas aid undertakings experiencing a decline. China argued in a series of 
moves, noted in Chapter 3, which transpired following Deng's 'Open Door' policy, 
that the industrialized world should provide more aid and better terms of trade and 
finance to developing countries. These moves helped China to attract even more 
international aid and investment from the UNDP and the UN Family Planning 
Association. Although this resulted in China becoming a competitor of aid 
recipient countries from these international organisations, it still publicly made 
efforts as an aid donor on a multilateral basis. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang 
announced, during a visit by Prime Minister Pedro Pires to China in May 1986: 
We hope that the ongoing special UN General Assembly when 
considering the African economic situation can make a positive 
contribution to reviving the African economy, improving 
North-South relations, and promoting world peace and 
development. 
(Xinhua 1986) 
The notable shift in the market which pushed China into becoming a recipient of 
aid was also reflected in the diverse nature of its subsequent aid, as Chinese aid 
officials were given leave to implement experiments to extend aid finance and 
help ensure that the projects completed by China <;ould sustain their benefits in 
the difficult economic environment of the 1980s and 1990s. In an attempt to 
continue to boost China's prestige, Beijing suggested 'tripartite cooperation', 
whereby financial assistance from developed countries would be used to fund 
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Chinese aid projects in Africa (ZDJMN 1989: 57). China's seeding of capital for 
multilateral cooperation was further demonstrated by its contributions to various 
organisations, such as the UNFPA and the UN Capital Development Fund. China 
expanded this policy in Somalia and Rwanda, where technicians, equipment, and 
management were supplied to World Bank financed well drilling and rice 
cultivation projects (Brautigam 2008: 205). This policy was further extended in 
Rwanda through the establishment of an agricultural project in collaboration with 
Canada, where China provided partial funding for the project which was 
implemented by state-owned Chinese companies (ZDJMN 1989: 57). China also 
displayed support for the Africa Development Bank, which it joined in May 1985, 
and though details of China's actual commitment remained sketchy, Beijing was 
keen to be seen to be involving itself in the region's development, and so became 
active in expressing how it had been involved in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) since its establishment in 1980 (MFA 2009h; 
Xinhua 2007c). 
The increasingly multilateral aid activities that developed during the 1980s 
may have continued to shape China's policies and the internationalist norm further, 
had the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and the end of the Cold War, not 
forced a significant reshaping of the internationalist norm. Following isolation by 
the West in the post-Tiananmen period, the PRC's foreign policy orientation and 
interaction shifted towards expanding its interactions with regional institutions in 
Africa. Between June 1989 and June 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
visited fourteen African countries, mindful of the fact that the West was in fact a 
minority in international organisations, such as the UN, and that the support of 
African countries might be valuable in helping China break out of its isolation. 
With the additional support of the UNDP and the Ford Foundation in the US, 
China exhibited a keenness to expand trade links in previously unexplored 
directions, by hosting a major Sino-African Seminar on Economic Reform and 
Adjustment in November 1989, to which more than thirty delegates from eight 
African countries attended (Renmin Ribao 1989c). As states began to lose the 
support that they had previously enjoyed as a client of one of the superpowers, 
links to international organizations and alternative sources of foreign aid 
dominated the foreign policy objectives of many developing countries. Realizing 
this, Chinese foreign policy makers saw a chance for China to break new ground 
in its relations with Africa, as it viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as an 
opportunity for China to assume a greater role in international affairs. Qian 
Qichen began a tradition in 1991 of visiting a group of African countries each 
January, which has continued with each successive foreign minister. In mid-1995, 
142 
after many high level discussions, Beijing started to organise conferences aimed 
at further reforming China's foreign assistance programmes, bringing them even 
more into line with the push toward economic rationality in China's domestic 
decisions. China expanded its economic and political engagement with African 
countries culminating with the launch in 2000 of the triennial Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). At the October 2000 Forum on Sino-African 
cooperation ministerial conference, the forum was used to advance a position of 
moral relativism with regard to human rights. It was suggested at the forum that 
China and Africa 'should [ ...... ] enhance their cooperation and consultation in 
multilateral organisations in order to safeguard the interests of both' (Renmin 
Ribao 2000). This shift was reflected again in yet another name change in China's 
economic bureaucracy, to the Ministry of Commerce in the spring of 2003, a 
move aimed to dedicate and direct China's cooperative efforts in accordance with 
the forum (Interview 2006a). 
The meeting of FOCAC in 2006, heralded the announcement of new plans 
for Sino-African relations with designs for a 'new type of strategic partnership 
between China and Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic 
win-win co-operation and cultural exchanges' in a whole range of areas, ranging 
from business development, healthcare, tourism, humanitarian ventures, education 
and anti-terrorism (MFA 2007d). At the meeting, an agreement was also reached 
that the foreign ministers of China and the African countries would 'hold political 
consultations in New York on the sideline of the UN General Assembly, to 
exchange views on major issues of common interest' (Xinhua 2006e). In May 
2007, at the sixtieth Annual World Health Organisation (WHO) meeting in 
Geneva, the Minister of Health Gao Qiang announced that Beijing would donate 
US$8 million to the WHO to build African countries' capacities and mechanisms 
to respond to public health emergencies. In line with China's public 
announcement calling upon other countries to be more responsible, with respect to 
aid and development, thereby further enhancing its own image of responsibility, 
Gao publicly called upon other member states to increase their aid to strengthen 
public health systems in Africa and other developing countries (Xinhua 2007b). 
On a multilateral basis, China and Africa agreed to work together to 
support the strengthening of UN authority and efficiency through reform, which 
should be based upon democratic negotiations that are conducive to maintaining 
unity among UN member states, and should consider the concerns of developing 
countries (MFA 2006e). In so doing, China demonstrated its propensity to use 
multilateral approaches in its speeches to show how it has been willing to support 
African countries, emphasize its great-power image as well as to call for moral 
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issues such as asking rich countries to assume their share of responsibility. China 
is able to use its institutional platform to counter claims that it is ignoring 
internationalist norms by citing its participation in UN peacekeeping operations in 
Africa, which are characterised by mandates aimed at transforming war-torn states 
into liberal democracies. Additionally important is China's role in African nations 
in regions commonly thought of as safe havens for groups linked to international 
terrorism, such as Al Qa'ida. By working multilaterally to bring additional 
prosperity and development to the regions, China's goal may even serve to bring 
stability to these countries by reducing these groups platforms for dissent and 
popularity, a move which would not only bring additional stability to the region, 
but allow China's participation in these operations to distance itself even further 
from the 'China threat', commonly perceived in Chinese policy-informed works 
(People s Daily 2000; The Washington Post 2008c; Xinhua 2006c). This threat 
arises not from a direct challenge to global power supremacy but through the 
exploitation of the global economy as a means of promoting China's own 
domestic stability (The Washington Post 2008c). In 2008 and 2009, China set a 
new precedent when, in response to Somali pirates threatening its cargo ships off 
the coast of Africa, it deployed its navy in international waters in a peace keeping! 
deterrent role. This highlights how yet more non-traditional threats to the security 
of its interests are shaping the internationalist norm, through the protection of its 
natural resources trade routes (Xinhua 20091). 
The nurturing and galvanising of cooperation as a way of increasing 
interrelatedness between countries, while encouraging them to work together, 
thereby making interstate conflict more costly to the states themselves, serves to 
foster stronger ties and interrelatedness, and also allows China to distance itself 
from its own past, acting as an agent of world revolution, and by featuring 
prominently in resolving long standing issues around the globe, such as poverty 
and lack of development in Africa. Having proved catalytic in triggering such 
events, it may underline the norm further by participating in areas of health and 
peacekeeping, further playing down its past revolutionary image and 
strengthening its global position. China's continued support for Africa in the 
recovery from the 2007 global financial crisis demonstrates its ongoing 
commitment to internationalism in the region, not only to Africa, but also to the 
wider international community (Xinhua 2009j). This was further reinforced 
through Hu Jintao's 2009 tour of Saudi Arabia, Mauritius, Mali, Senegal and 
Tanzania, where he reiterated China's commitment to Africa by stating that 
'China will honor its commitments, and never will reduce its aid to Africa' (lv/FA 
2009a; People s Daily 2009b). During the tour, Hu proposed several multi-point 
plans, with the various nations, to expand and further develop ongoing relations 
between China and Africa (MFA 2009a). 
Given the extent of its activities in the region, such multilateral efforts to 
resolve long standing problems have become tainted by 'black GDP growth', 
therefore demonstrating how Chinese development projects in the region 
potentially undermine their international responsibilities. This can be seen through 
China's deflection of criticism over its other roles in regional resource extraction, 
in Namibia, Zambia, Angola and Nigeria, and through its bilateral trade 
development with countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. Achieving long-term 
and sustainable success in developing these areas would enhance its image as a 
great power and ally not only across Africa, but also the world at large, without 
having to resort to the methods associated with former colonial countries. As a 
result of China's ongoing regional contention of these issues in transient terms, it 
puts itself under the critical eye of the Western powers, which criticise it for being 
less willing to follow their own condemnations of the rogue nations. This 
becomes clear when observing China's continued resistance to international 
sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe, which it feels would be internationally 
irresponsible and damaging to the stability of the entire region. This highlights 
how the norm intended practice of internationalism in China conflicts with, and is 
opposed to the norm unintended rhetorical exercising of internationalism by the 
international community. In so doing, China undermines the great power and 
responsible image that it has been so keen to nurture throughout. This image is 
being further undermined through China's ongoing trade relations with Angola. 
Its support for, and exploitation of, the country's oil supplies have become 
reinforced by China's opaque business interests elsewhere in Africa, notably in 
Tanzania, and further afield in Latin America (Asia Times 2009a). Another 
ongoing source of contention in China's international responsibility concerns its 
adherence to its 'one-China' policy, which it has continued to frame as a 
prerequisite for its continuation of aid to the region. This highlights how, despite 
its increase in activities throughout the region, this norm has yet to become 
internalised completely. 
5.3.2 Sovereignty 
As seen in Chapter 3, the sovereignty norm leads China to stress non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of aid recipient countries. In 1964, Mao Zedong met with 
African counterparts, and noted the 'equality between us', and that 'our relations 
are like relations between brothers, not like the relations between fathers and sons' 
(Li 2001: 433, 438). Chinese leaders have continued over the last sixty years to 
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indicate the orientation of China's African policy, whereby 'China will do its best 
to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political 
strings attached' (MFA 2006a). During the early years of the PRC, the sovereignty 
norm was influenced by its isolation from the international community. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, while China was able to deploy its 
technology and experience in agricultural techniques, non-interference in its 
foreign aid precluded multilateral cooperative efforts, through funding limitations, 
low levels of technology, and inexperience in the market economy. By refusing to 
seek cooperation with other donors, China's determination to achieve its goals 
independently limited the impact of its aid, as demonstrated by its limited 
capacity to produce locomotives efficiently. While these flaws are apparent in 
retrospect, the global environment of the early 1970s was not conducive to China 
being willing to introduce foreign elements into its assistance efforts. Such 
collaborative efforts and share of success would have detracted from its own 
perceived successful and independent image, which it desperately sought to 
enhance. This experience forced China to rethink its economic assistance strategy, 
and following a series of important breakthroughs which modified its 
non-interference policy, became manifested by a shift towards cooperation. 
China's aid to Tanzania demonstrates how China significantly stretched 
the role of the sovereignty norm in its foreign assistance. The TAZARA project to 
build a railway linking Tanzania and Zambia, and which ran from 1970 until 1975, 
is a significant example of China's aid activities to the Third World (Renmin 
Ribao 1968). The project was made possible by a significant amount of Chinese 
aid, and was carried out at a time before China's own economy had begun to 
reform. It was also subject to competition from both the West and the Soviets over 
projects in the region. Since this aid firmly adhered to the sovereignty norm, 
China demonstrated, somewhat detrimentally to itself, an unwillingness to 
introduce foreign elements into its assistance efforts. Ai (1999: 199) argued that 
since China lacked external technical experience, personnel and economic 
management systems, it was unable to be more efficient and productive in its aid 
projects. By carrying out its aid programmes on its own, without the benefits of 
foreign experience, China reinforced its independence and desire to secure its 
position as a donor in the international community. 
The TAZARA project occupied much of the period between 1970 to 1975, 
and during its first year of operation in 1976, the Chinese left behind advisers who 
continued to train and help with the operation of the line; even when the Chinese 
experts remained, they did so only in an advisory role that did not extend as far as 
management of the line. The Chinese technical expert team remained very 
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reluctant to be involved in the aid project's management until 1983. Following 
Zhao Ziyang's visit to Tanzania that same year, Zhao and the Government of 
Tanzania agreed a new form of aid provision, placing more emphasis on economic 
efficiency and benefits in providing aid. This allowed Chinese expert teams to 
become more involved in management and decision making activities in the 
operation of Chinese aid projects (ZDJMN 1984: VI-3). Under the agreement of 
August 1983, a team of 250 Chinese experts arrived in Tanzania to restore the 
performance of the Tan-Zam Railway. For the first time, the Chinese experts were 
assigned proper titles and the right and authority to participate in all decision 
making in relation to the operation of the railway. One of the first acts of the 
Chinese expert team was to purge the TAZARA organisation of incompetent 
managers; a move that resulted in 1984, in the TAZARA project reporting a profit 
(MFA 2000c). In view of the potential for interpreting this involvement in 
management as conflicting with the sovereignty norm, Chinese leaders sought to 
justify the transition by arguing that their participation in management did not 
constitute intervention in the recipients' internal affairs, but rather viewed such 
actions as being mutually beneficial in reducing economic costs (Interview 
2007b). 
Even in 1996, in a state visit to Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Namibia, 
and Zimbabwe, President Jiang Zemin continued to propose that 'equal treatment, 
mutual respect for sovereignty, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs' 
serve as the founding principles of comprehensive cooperation between China and 
Africa (ZRGN 1997: 246), thereby echoing both of China's identities, as a victim 
and neutral party, that had, at that time, played a prominent role in Sino-African 
relations. Premier Wen Jiabao in 2003, like his colleagues and prime ministerial 
predecessors, also took the initiative in attempting to emphasize the importance of 
state sovereignty at the opening ceremony of the second ministerial conference of 
the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, by reiterating the fact that: 
Being a developing country itself, China provides assistance to 
African countries with the deepest sincerity and without any 
political conditions [ ......... ], and we will never forget the invaluable 
support China has received from African countries over the years 
in our endeavours to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
(People S Daily 2003b) 
The current president, Hu Jintao, delivered a speech at the Nigerian National 
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Assembly in 2006, where he stated that: 
Africa has become a good friend, partner, and brother of China. 
[ ......... ] China has consistently supported the African countries in 
safeguarding independence and sovereignty, national self-selection 
in accordance with the wishes of the path of their development and 
supported the African countries' seeking of unity, self-reliance and 
independent efforts to solve the problems in Africa. 
(Xinhua 2006b) 
Hu reiterated China's adherence to its 'no-strings-attached' policy, in relation to 
the sovereignty norm and its foreign aid policy. The 'non-interference in domestic 
affairs', which is informed by this norm, has been welcomed by African leaders 
since China's 'non-interference' policy implicitly means supporting or at least 
tolerating the current regime. In countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, such a 
policy is of great significance (The Economist 2007). The inherent inertness of the 
norm over the decades reflects how China's extended period of isolation had 
significantly retarded its evolution. 
Divergence arose, In no small part, from the limitations of 
non-interference which appeared to induce conflict as China realized the need to 
protect its economic interests. China continues to exercise constraint through the 
sovereignty norm, in furthering its multilateral UN aid activities. Despite this, as 
the global sovereignty norm has undergone significant evolution in the last two 
decades, since the end of the Cold War, China's adherence to the sovereignty 
norm in the region has increasingly come under increased pressure to likewise 
evolve, as seen through its involvement in Sudan, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
i) 'Non-interference' in the political context 
While the 'non-interference' policy was stressed in the early years of Sino-African 
relations, China did not stay away from African aid recipients' domestic politics. 
China lauded its support for anti-colonial liberation movements, arguing that by 
supporting African independence movements, it was helping to establish the 
creation of sovereign African states, ruled by their own population and not by a 
distant imperial power. This view underpinned the ideology of world revolution, 
and was a central foreign policy goal for much of the communist world, and 
China was no exception. By aiding colonies in Africa fighting for independence, 
China was not interfering in a sovereign state's internal affairs; the African 
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colonies were not sovereign states, since their populace had not granted authority 
to their colonial leaders, but was imposed upon them against their will. In effect 
China was applying the sovereignty norm in order to help bring about 
independence for Africa. It was a crucial policy for China internationally, and the 
block upon which a majority of African states relations with the PRC are built. As 
Mao reassured his African visitors: 
[R]egardless of whether the country has been independent or not, 
one day you will attain complete independence and liberation, and 
as such the Chinese people, as a whole, will support all of you. 
(Zhong 1994: 283) 
However, Chinese leaders were less sensitive and more likely to violate the 
sovereignty norm in the case of the Angolan civil wars. Despite this, Chinese aid 
either proved insubstantial or was never actually implemented (Wolfers and 
Bergerad 1983: 210). China maintained ties and offered aid to three major 
opposing organisations in Angola, Movimento Popular de Liberta<;ao de Angola 
(MPLA), Frente Nacional de Liberta<;ao de Angola (FNLA), and Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNIT A) (Beijing Review 1982a; Marcum 
1978: 132, 160, 418). Bilateral developments matured in 1982 when China 
announced that it was 'willing to normalize relations with Angola' (Beijing 
Review 1982a). Following this normalisation, China continued its aid to the 
country, and linked its policy of reconciliation with Angola to the identity that 
both countries belonged to the developing world, thereby stressing the importance 
of mutual support (Renmin Ribao 1984a; 1984b). When an Angolan delegation 
visited Beijing, they concurred with the Chinese Government that 'both of us are 
facing common task of developing our economies' (Renmin Ribao 1992). The 
norm also exposes weaknesses in its own policies, betraying its propensity to 
control other nation's foreign policy through aid, rather than interference in the 
nation's affairs directly, as seen in its attitude towards African nations over the 
'one-China' policy. China's forcing of states to accept its perception of Taiwan 
displays the inertness of the norm of sovereignty. In the 2006 presidential 
elections in Zambia, the strong Chinese response to the radically anti-Chinese 
populism of the Zambian presidential candidate Michael Sata, challenged the 
sovereignty norm, leading to its warning that it 'might cut off ties with Zambia if 
Mr Sata is elected' (BBe 2006b). Although the Chinese argued that such action 
was instigated because 'Sata claimed his support for Taiwan', this implied that he 
did not respect Chinese sovereignty (Interview 2007b; 2007i; 2007j). 
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Zhang Haibing (2008) discussed these shortcomings at the Shanghai 
Workshop on Global Governance in 2008, by outlining that recognition and 
acknowledgement of a country, under international law, is considered a 
fundamental precondition for bilateral relations. By acknowledging Taiwan, 
African countries are denying China's unique international status, by undermining 
the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, under which it conducts its 
international exchanges. The countries therefore disregard the mutual respect 
required for bilateral relations, rendering them unworkable and impossible. 
Consequently, the 'one-China' principle is recognised as a prerequisite of China's 
foreign aid, and not a political tool (Interview 2007j). 
A basic principle in international law is that the acknowledgement 
of a country is the prerequisite and basis for bilateral relations. To 
acknowledge Taiwan is to deny China's unique status in 
international law [ ...... ] thereby making bilateral cooperation 
including aids impossible. [ ...... ] Therefore, the One-China 
principle is a prerequisite for China's foreign aids, not an 
additional political string. 
(Zhang 2008:235) 
These long-standing principles also help explain the Chinese resistance to calls by 
the West that they impose political conditions. As Huse and Muyakwa (2008: 28) 
argue, '[t]he case of Mwanawasa and Sata illustrates how the Chinese cannot keep 
out of politics'. This has resulted quite frequently in there being a distinct 
divergence between the norm and actual events, through the inducement of 
tensions when the norm conflicted with its interests. 
ii) 'Non-interference' in the economic context 
Links to China's self-interests are evident in the funding of projects in the 
recipient countries; as Huse and Muyakwa (2008: 15) argue, the policy of no 
attached conditions to loans does not mean that recipient countries are free to 
spend capital borrowed from China liberally according to national priorities: 
The flexibility of Chinese lending is restricted by the form of 
Chinese aid as China provides only project based funding, and 
almost exclusively as tied aid or in kind. China does not, for 
instance, provide budgets to support targeting health and education 
sectors. 
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(Huse and Muyakwa 2008: 15) 
As Chinese aid is almost entirely project based, grants are normally offered with 
the requirements mirroring the internationally accepted practices of more 
traditional aid donors. Like many Western donors, China requires that aid 
recipient countries use Chinese goods or services, or create a structure where 
China provides Chinese goods directly. The International Crisis Group (lCG) 
(2008: 1) also raised the issue that although Chinese support for problem regimes, 
such as in Sudan, is useful to state companies in signing initial energy agreements, 
it is less helpful in securing Beijing's long-term energy interests, especially when 
it is confronted with mounting risks to its investments, citizens, and security. In 
the Sudan, the bulk of the Chinese oil fields are situated in the South of the 
country, which anticipates a self-determination referendum in 2011, the results of 
which could see the region secede. Since China's non-interference strategy makes 
no effort to improve Africa's attractiveness for increased external investment, it 
appears that China's long-term reputation in the region may well diminish as did 
that of the West's (Sweeney 2007). It is clear that the sovereignty norm adhered to 
by the PRC will face pressure and will have to evolve to changes in a modem 
world. 
iii) The Sudan case 
The Sudan case is important as the impact of China's aid to the Sudan is subject to 
significant international scrutiny and criticism. In light of the imposition of 
sanctions on Sudan by the international community, China's growing economic 
role as an international partner of the country has attracted substantial 
international attention. China has for a long time refused to interfere in the affairs 
of the Sudan by resisting calls to join the international community in applying 
pressure on the Government of the country to bring about change in regions such 
as Darfur. This non-interference is generally interpreted as condoning the 
Sudanese Government's behaviour, in the interests of protecting its access to the 
resources it requires to meet its developmental needs, notably its oil drilling 
activities, within the country. These considerations were resounded by Morrison 
and Gill in their memorandum to the US House of Representatives Foreign 
Affairs Committee in February 2007: 
Sudan's energy is important to China and its future, but China's 
motivations for its policies in Sudan also have their roots 
elsewhere. An important, but often overlooked motivation is 
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Beijing's concern with protecting the principle of national 
sovereignty and non-interference. These have been cast as bedrock 
to China's strategy for becoming a global power backed by robust 
alliances. 
(Lantos et al. 2007) 
Responding to concerns that China's aid to Africa is detrimental to good 
governance on the continent, Sun Baohong, the Counselor to the embassy of the 
PRC in the US, has responded by stating, '[wJe are dedicated to non-interference 
and social development of African countries.' She further argued that the Chinese 
believe that sanctions and other methods as promoted by the West are 'not 
productive' and lead only to 'increasing hostility [ ...... J We think that when 
you're dealing with a failing state or a sensitive state, other methods than those 
used by Western people will be more productive' (Mutume 2008: 7). 
In accordance with this viewpoint, Beijing opposed the passing of UN 
resolution 1706, which called for UN peacekeepers to replace the ineffective 
African Union force in Darfur, without the agreement of Khartoum (UN 2006). 
China's response to the Sudan issue, demonstrates how its adherence to the 
sovereignty norm has conflicted with the internationalist norm. By raising the 
concerns of the institutions whose membership it prizes highly, Beij ing has 
demonstrated through its recent handling of the situation in Sudan, that it is 
learning there are further limitations to its policy of non-interference (MFA 2007c). 
Recent reports suggest that Beijing is beginning to heed the message from the 
numerous criticisms and attacks, thereby demonstrating the significant conflict 
that arises between the sovereignty and internationalist norms. 
After the AU reneged on its promise of the previous year to honour 
Sudan's bid for the chairmanship of the organisation, the AU chose Ghana in its 
place in order to prevent Khartoum from gaining control (The Guardian 2007a). 
This event placed further pressure on the Chinese leaders to rethink the 
sovereignty norm in Darfur. As Sudan comes under increased pressure from the 
UN Security Council, China has struggled to balance its policy of 
'non-interference'. There is little reason to believe that China will shift toward the 
isolation policy advocated by the West, but in Hu's meeting with President 
al-Bashir of Sudan, the Chinese president made clear the limits of 
non-interference, by taking his strongest stance yet on Darfur, and according to 
Reuters (2007), Hu told al-Bashir, 'Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to 
resolve this problem.' Despite this, China took every opportunity to reassure 
Kharioum that it has not fallen out of favour with Beijing, when Hu called upon 
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nations to 'respect the sovereignty of Sudan', and provided al-Bashir with an 
interest-free loan to build a new presidential palace, and wrote off another US$80 
million debt (The Washington Post 2007). In 2008, Hu once again urged Sudan to 
cooperate in the swift deployment of international peacekeeping forces and to 
help end humanitarian abuses (The Washington Post 2008a). Although China has 
remained careful about adhering to the sovereignty norm, even though its 
involvement with the UN is arguably driven by its concern that it may likewise 
become the recipient of some future interference in its own affairs, it has found 
that it has become a target of the asymmetric power that it has provided to Sudan. 
Whilst Western governments were the primary source of criticism for the Chinese 
support of Khartoum, Beijing remained confident of its ability to appease its 
critics, that it was not supporting a regime that had committed genocide, whilst 
endorsing its non-interference policies which aimed to protect its own interests. 
Yet as other African states have become more vocal in their disapproval of 
Khartoum's scorched-earth tactics in Darfur, Beijing has found it necessary to 
shift its course in the hope that subtle changes in policy will prove more effective 
in the long-term than imposing harsher conditions, the results of which may be 
more difficult to predict. 
5.3.3 Developmentalism 
As the developmentalist norm, which upholds its great-power image, is expressed 
primarily through the Beijing Consensus, this discussion will continue to examine 
China's aid to Africa, by reviewing the issues that exemplify the consensus, as 
outlined in Chapter 3. By promoting the Beijing Consensus, it is developing the 
region's technologies to build 'relations that will have a long lasting impact on 
Africa' (Chinafrica 2009). 
In recent years, Chinese developmental aid, in line with the fundamental 
promotion of economic development of the Beijing Consensus, has continued to 
play a part in its African quest for natural resources, notably through its mineral 
mining efforts in Zambia and Namibia, and its oil based industries in Nigeria, 
Angola and Sudan. China's increasing need for energy, raw materials, and 
markets for low price consumer goods, generated through its own expanding 
manufacturing industries, makes the economies of China and Africa relatively 
complementary. This enhances mutually sustainable cooperative efforts 
throughout the region. As such, China's aid has been primarily deployed where it 
serves its interests most favourably and strengthens its great-power identity, either 
through the supplying of technical assistance or through infrastructure based 
projects which are completed predominantly by state, or privately owned, Chinese 
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enterprises. Despite this investment in service and infrastructure industries, Africa 
has more recently reiterated its calls for China to balance its investment in 
regional manufacturing industries. While China remains cautious about expanding 
its investiture in immature regional markets, the 2007 global financial crisis may 
well induce China to reinforce African manufacturing industries to offset the 
extensive decline in its own domestic manufacturing that resulted during the crisis 
(China Daily 2009c). 
China's modern development aid to Africa is focused upon four main 
areas of technological assistance (Chinafrica 2009; MOCOM 2007). These 
include Industrial technology, Agricultural technology, Engineering technology, 
and innovative high technology (Table 5.1); the latter of which exploits Africa's 
most abundant natural resource, namely solar power. 
Table 5.1 Examples of activities within Africa's four main technology 
sectors 
Industrial Technology Agricultural Technology Engineering Technology High Technology 
food processing tractor and implement parts heavy duty trucks solar power products 
block making drills special vehicles (tapping Africa's abundant 
solar resources) 
electric tools generator/welding machines generator equipment electric products 
bottle blowing machines water pumps 
asbestos tile machines engines and electric motors 
woodworking machines grain processing 
animal husbandry 
incubators 
Chinese aid takes the form of modalities, such as grants, investment, tied 
aid, concessional loans, government guarantees, cancelled debt programs, and the 
implementation of low market tariffs for market access (Lonnqvist 2008). By 
investing aid in Africa's internal industries, China is demonstrating an 'ethos of 
solidarity and respect with developing countries', notably Africa, as it aims to 
multilaterally assist in the development of the countries' key industries. These 
industries are primarily the major sources of potential employment for much of 
the region's populations (Lonnqvist 2008: 1). By developing these industries, 
along with food crops in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, the recipient countries 
can improve not only their supply of sale-able commodities, but also develop their 
intra-regional markets through which to trade such goods. China's focus on 
engineering and infrastructural projects also helps develop the trade links across 
the region by improving access between these markets. China's continued support 
for African markets was demonstrated in the aftermath of the 2007 global 
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financial CrISIS, through examples of solidarity and ongoing commitment to 
developing the region (Xinhua 2009j).The developing of intraregional trade links 
and markets, through the multilateral channels within Africa, stimulates territorial 
self-reliance through the enhancement of regional self-confidence. This thereby 
induces a self-perpetuating need to sustain and continue to support these growing 
markets. By promoting multilateral growth across the region, China is attempting 
to induce developmental chain reactions throughout the regional economies more 
effectively than through targeting individual nations alone. Despite this, its 
multilateral motivations continue to work in its own interests as they significantly 
undermine Taiwan's regional alliances (Lonnqvist 2008: 8-9). 
China's regional rationalization of the 'three closeness' theory is 
exemplified by the' go out' policy, the prototype for which was formulated in the 
region around 1992, and further perpetuated following Jiang Zemin's tour in 1996, 
and aimed to 'maintain friendship and push for new development' (Lonnqvist 
2008: 2). Chinese businesses are becoming widely dispersed throughout the 
African continent in the pursuit of aid and investment, development projects, 
human resource training, and supplying medical and educational aid through the 
Confucius Institutes (Xinhua 2008b; 2008c). In addition to this, and fulfilling one 
of the promises of the 2006 FOCAC summit, is the realisation of increasing the 
number of African graduates from Chinese universities, who upon their return to 
Africa are creating a brain gain across the region (MOCOM 2007). This provides 
the region with heightened levels of professionals, who have acquired 
international experience, and who thereby strengthen Sino-African relations. 
Unlike in Southeast Asia, China's aid to Africa has yet to result in the 
formulation of FTAs. Its aid is currently helping to develop SEZs, such as those 
established in Zambia, as well as potentially in Dar EI Salaam, over the next few 
years. With Africa's current levels of development and intra regional trade still in 
its infancy, the development of FTAs would largely be meaningless across the 
region. However, by nurturing SEZs to expand the markets, and addressing the 
reduction of tariff access to the markets for the region's poorest countries, China 
is continuing to develop the regional economies through the multilateral channels 
of the region's institutions. 
i) The Case of Tanzania 
The origins of key features of the Beijing Consensus may be seen through the 
evolution of Chinese development aid to Tanzania. The PRC has been one of the 
most important aid providers to Tanzania since the 1960s. as was demonstrated 
through the Agreements on Economic and Technical Cooperation, which 
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reformed much of Tanzania's traditional industries,l the famous TAZARA project 
of the early 1970s linking to Zambia's Copperbelt with the Tanzanian port of Dar 
es Salaam, as well as China's aid to agricultural development in the country, as 
seen in the Mbarali Farm, the Ubungo Farm, the agricultural technical extension 
services in the Dodoma, Mbeya, and Morogoto regions and technical cooperative 
schemes (Bailey 1975: 587-93; Moshi and Mtui: 2008: 13-4 ). 
In the late 1970s, at a time when China began its own domestic economic 
reforms, China's aid to Africa began to reflect an emphasis on markets and profits 
in the form of joint profit schemes, rather than simple one-way transfers. Zhao 
Ziyang formalized the four principles guiding China's economic and technical 
cooperation with African countries so as to focus upon 'equality and mutual 
benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in form, and common progress' 
(ZDJMN 1984: VI-3). In the mid-1980s, there was a change in infrastructure and 
building projects such that Chinese enterprises became more focussed upon 
contract projects and labour cooperation, aimed at creating greater regional 
self-reliance. As a result, China's efforts in Africa refocused on the revitalization 
of former Chinese aid projects. Reports were compiled and returned to the higher 
level governmental authorities regarding the problems arising from the high cost 
Chinese aid projects in Tanzania, which were only generating low economic 
returns; these reports resulted in a notable change in policy. When Tanzania 
requested that China provide aid for building the Party's headquarters during a 
visit by State Councillor Chen Muhua in August 1986, Chen declined the request 
citing that the investment was too costly for China to afford (Interview 2007b; 
ZDJMN 1987: 413-4). Similar renovation requests in other Chinese aid projects 
were subsequently declined during the decade, notably at Ruvu Farm, Mbarali 
Farm, and the Friendship Textile Factory, which were under the collaborative 
management of teams of Chinese experts (ZDJMN 1989: 56). 
Through the stressing of beneficial cooperation and actual results, China 
not only aimed to strengthen economic development in Africa, but also helped 
I Before Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the nation of Tanzania, in 1964, China had 
given aid to both countries. Following their union, a period of enhanced joint activism commenced 
when China and Tanzania signed the first Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, 
whereby China announced aid to Tanzania in the form of a US$2.8 million grant and a US$42 
million interest-free loan, that was repayable over a twenty year period, and took the form of a 
complete set of projects, equipment, general goods and technical support. This support would be 
provided in an interest-free loan, which would be appropriated in accordance with project 
construction during the five year lifespan of the project (Copper 1976: 97; Renmin Ribao 1964). In 
1965, China and Tanzania signed a protocol on the agreement of Economic and Technical 
cooperation as outlined in the Agreement of 1964. In this protocol concrete aid projects, such a~ 
the Friendship Textile Factory, the Ruvu Farm, and the Ubungo Tool Factory were formulated (AI 
1999: 175, 176). In 1966, during a Tanzanian delegation visit to China, aid projects were promised 
to 'initiate or bring to completion a number of development projects, most of which the British 
Government had promised to help build' (Ogunsanwo 1974: 198; Renmin Ribao 1966). 
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conceptualise its own 'three closeness' theory and' go out' policy. In March 1992, 
China and Tanzania signed an agreement establishing a joint-owned automobile 
assembly factory, which was to become the first non-governmental joint 
Sino-Tanzanian venture in Dar es Salaam (Interview 2007c; ZDJMN 1993: 779). 
In 1995, when vice Premier Zhu Rongji visited Tanzania, he strongly campaigned 
for action to transform the Friendship (Urafiki in Swahili) Textile Factory into a 
joint venture, in line with the idea that aid should be used to support Chinese 
enterprise in the country. The two Governments reached an agreement to 
transform the factory into a joint China-Tanzanian venture under the support of 
Chinese aid, making it the first Chinese aid project in Tanzania to undergo such a 
change (Interview 2007d). Although Chinese aid complied with its 
'no-strings-attached' policy, 'aid provision has become more practical with more 
focus on benefit and economic efficiency for Chinese interests' (Interview 2006d). 
This trend mirrors the path followed by most of the Chinese companies in 
Tanzania, which initially entered markets with governmental support, but 
subsequently moved into the private construction sector. Consequently, foreign 
aid was viewed as a means of providing greater political stability in the region 
through offering new opportunities for economic development (Renmin Ribao 
1995). After 1995, China accelerated the 'win-win' cooperation of the 1980s in its 
pursuit of strategic partnerships, where aid had become an increasingly robust 
economic instrument following its successful trialling in the previous decade. 
By the new millennium, trade and political engagement sharply expanded 
and Chinese companies increased their outward investment across Africa, which 
resulted in a well-planned policy that culminated in the year 2000 with the launch 
of the triennial FOCAC meeting. Following the third FOCAC meeting in 2006, 
where China unveiled the Beijing Action Plan commitment for Africa, with the 
view of establishing between three and five SEZs in Africa before the FOCAC 
summit in late 2009, the Chinese Government formally announced two such 
zones; the first of which was established in Zambia. While the remaining zone has 
yet to be confirmed, current opinion believes this will most likely be established 
in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, as Zhang Dejiang, a member of the Politburo and 
secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee visited the city in 2007 to 
negotiate with the Tanzanian Government (MFA 2006f; People s Daily 2007c). 
Over the past three decades, as seen in the Tanzanian case, the 
developmentalist norm has reshaped the contents and forms of aid provision that 
have been supplied to the nation. These modifications have gradually converted 
China's aid into a manifestation of the Beijing Consensus, in order to meet the 
economic needs of the country's economic development. 
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ii) Comparison of develop mentalism with the Western model 
With regard to Africa, China has long considered itself to have held fortuitous 
mutual relations, nurtured through South-South cooperation, and based not only 
upon mutual poverty issues, but also upon the abilities to provide suitable 
resolutions to them. Through this relationship, the developmentalist norm has 
become empowering through China's ability to raise the living standards of 
hundreds of millions of its own people above the international poverty level, 
thereby resolving a long standing problem of its own. 
With the distinct possibility of a changing economic world order 
becoming increasingly likely, the construction of a foundation for Africa's 
industrial development which IS capable of supporting industrialisation and 
endogenous growth would seem to be more beneficial to inducing African 
development than the current Western focus upon social development. 
Correspondingly, Chinese political discourse refrains from promoting ideologies 
of 'democratisation' and 'neoliberalism', which have dominated traditional 
Western efforts. In so doing, China highlights the significance of state 
involvement during early economic development, which was critical in 
developing Western levels of prosperity in both the West and in Asia. Dominant 
donor institutions however choose to ignore such concepts in favour of promoting 
economic and political liberalisation, despite the economic development 
successes that have transpired within China, which demonstrate, somewhat 
controversially, the relative importance of liberalisation in development. This 
'development without democracy' policy has met with concern even amongst 
African states, where civil society analysts have noted how this may compromise 
an important path to political liberalisation through development, leaving it open 
to abuse from individual African governments. 
In talking about China's aid in Africa, Liu Jianchao, deputy spokesman of 
the Foreign Ministry commented that, 'although people may call it a Beijing 
Consensus, we are not trying to pose as a model for other countries' (The New 
York Times 2005). However, as seen in Chapter 3, in China, enthusiasm for the 
Beij ing Consensus is found among those who seek to make their country a world 
leading state. As Dirlik (2006: 5) argued the key aspect of the Beijing Consensus 
may be its acknowledgement of the desirability of a global order. 
This global order would also be founded, not upon homogenizing 
universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a 
simultaneous recognition of commonality and difference. Deng 
Xiaoping's reforms beginning in the 1980s gave priority to 
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economic intercourse over political correctness. 
In many ways, the Beijing Consensus in Africa mirrors those 'Asian values' that 
have proliferated throughout Southeast Asia in the late 1980s. As seen previously 
in Southeast Asia, with regard to Asian values, Africa, with its large concentration 
of developing states, serves as the main testing ground for the Beijing Consensus. 
Although the PRC's institutions of cooperation mirror the form and much of the 
content of the institutions of developed states, the Beijing Consensus appears 
much the same as Japan's institution of the 1990s through the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD) (TICAD 1993). This arises because 
China approves of African states concentrating their investment in infrastructure 
and human capital, rather than on primary products, and the addressing of 
development problems that are not being solved through market fundamentalism's 
favoured corporate initiatives. By expanding this influence successfully in 
competition with more traditional Western powers, it is further expanding these 
zones of prosperity, through development, outwards from its core mainland. 
China's aid in Africa continues to be formulated by the channels and 
policies of the EXIM bank. This continues to encourage authoritarian control 
throughout the region, as seen in its aid to Sudan and Zimbabwe which notably 
fuels government ownership in the region, rather than more beneficial citizen 
ownership. Given the social infrastructure throughout the continent, however, the 
concept of citizen ownership remains diffuse (UN 2009: 51). China's resource 
extraction processes are generating a large proportion of 'black GDP growth', not 
only attracting significant international concern, but also raising questions and 
fears throughout the multilateral institutional channels within Africa itself of 
China's long-term motivations and the consequences of its behaviour. China's 
buying up and reopening of mineral mines, in Namibia and Zambia, to mine 
copper, zinc and lead, along with oil in Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, is 
perpetuating poor employment practices throughout the region, as the safety of 
workers remains of very low concern compared to the actual extraction process 
(Chinafrica 2009). The extraction processes are also carried out with little regard 
to the environment or local populations upon whom the local industries depend. 
These activities therefore endanger the sustainability of these businesses. While 
the light industrial manufacturing sectors in many African nations are suffering 
from growing imports from China, the dominant extraction industries are 
benefiting from Chinese capital investment, as well as a seemingly bottomless 
market. China's respect for national sovereignty is attractive not only to 
Zimbabwean President Mugabe, but scores of other African nations that are 
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reluctant to implement economic and political reforms considered necessary by 
Western donor institutions and countries. This results in China being the target of 
much international condemnation over its behaviour in Africa. China counters 
such condemnation, which negatively affects the internationalist norm and 
China's great-power image, by claiming to be constrained by local laws and 
sovereignty. China has also responded to claims by highlighting the regional 
neglect of the traditional donors, along with demonstrations of the inherent 
difficulties of conducting any kind of business operations in the region, due to the 
poor levels of infrastructure or regulation, which it has refrained from altering in 
line with its non-interference policy (Chinafrica 2009). 
The deployment of China's aid across Africa is also notably empowering 
the region's asymmetric powers. Though this aid is welcome throughout a large 
portion of the African continent, and enhances regional self-confidence, China's 
aid activities in Sudan and Zimbabwe, in particular, are further subjecting it to the 
same asymmetric forces by those recipients who have become empowered 
through China's aid. While China's aid in Sudan supports the regime, which 
stands accused of committing numerous atrocities in Darfur, Zimbabwe is also 
using asymmetric power to realign its relationship with China from a recipient to 
equal partner, where its receipt of aid would be replaced by increased direct· 
investment (Chinafrica 2009). Though this scenario may be achievable through its 
distinctly bilateral relations with the country, its adherence to sovereignty and 
internationalism would significantly impact upon such actions. China's failure to 
act to counter such efforts would also empower additional nations in the region to 
utilise their asymmetric power in a similar manner. By conforming to its 
non-interference policy and insistence on perpetuating self reliance, it seems 
unlikely that China would easily conform to such requests/demands from the 
recipient countries. 
Despite the 'black GDP growth', as a result of China's mineral extraction 
processes, Africa in recent years has noted a significant increase in the price of its 
commodities, which has had the effect of improving the local economies and 
export businesses within Africa. This is not only strengthening regional 
self-confidence, but also empowering the region with additional asymmetric 
power which will enhance its business standing in the international community. 
However, with China providing so much of the impetus for this development, 
Chinese aid is creating a significant amount of inequality, in terms of low 
indigenous innovation, and value added levels, potentially making its policies 
unsustainable, which further impact upon the internationalist and 
developmentalist norms. 
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By fostering self-reliance through the regIOn, China is also reducing 
Africa's reliance on traditional aid donors, by encouraging Africa to take more 
proactive steps in its own development through the African civil society 
organizations and African Union. By working alongside these multilateral 
organisations, China can focus on reducing its 'black GDP growth' through the 
encouragement and implementation of regulatory standards, thereby fuelling 
China's beneficial influence. In doing so, it can improve human rights issues 
(Lonnqvist 2008: 9). Such precedents for China reorienting its 'black GDP 
growth', despite its reluctance to partake in the multilateral regulatory channels of 
regional institutions, are seen in its development projects in Southeast Asia along 
the Mekong River, demonstrating at least a willingness to appear internationally 
responsible, even if the actual improvements to its activities are not immediately 
forthcoming. Additionally, China is undermining its own reputation in the region, 
by perpetuating regional working practices. China bears a responsibility to 
improve such practices, in order to improve its 'green GDP growth'. This 'black 
GDP growth' is also indicative of the same lack of infrastructure that undermined 
the policies of the Washington Consensus. China's additional support of 
infrastructure development may improve infrastructure to the point where such 
working practices become transient and undergo change as a necessity to keep up 
with progress. 
5.4 Summary 
The summary will conclude this case study with an examination of the norms by 
highlighting internationalism through the membership of multilateral institutions, 
sovereignty and non-interference through the comparison of the relative ratios of 
bi and multilateral relations, and developmental ism, through comparing the norm 
intended practical and norm unintended rhetorical perspectives of the norm. The 
examination of developmentalism will serve to demonstrate how the intentions 
behind the policies, guided by the norms, namely the unintended rhetoric, vary in 
relation to the actual effects of the norms in practice, as seen by the intended 
practical perspectives. Each of the norms are represented in Figures 5.1-5.3 and 
demonstrate how they have changed over time. 
Asian ism 
As the norm of Asianism pertains to formation of an Asian identity and relative 
status within Asian society, the investigation of this norm in relation to Africa was 
considered irrelevant. China's aid to Africa has no bearing on the aid recipient 
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countries' identification with an Asian identity, as this concept in itself is 
meaningless outside of Asia. Although with regard to an Asian leadership role. 
several major aid donors are currently active in Africa, including China and Japan, 
the effect of their aid driven mechanisms remains relatively more domestic, and as 
such was the focus of the investigation of the norm in the Southeast Asian region. 
Internationalism 
The norm of internationalism initially emerged following China's admission to 
the UN in 1971. Prior to this date, China's activities in Africa had been motivated 
by its pursuit of social revolution and international recognition. As such, though it 
sought to demonstrate multilateralism, there was little in the way of associated 
responsibility. Following its admission to the UN and the change of its identity 
into a neutral power, it realised that its aid activities could be enhanced through 
the multilateral channels of the UN, and actively became engaged in utilising 
these channels to enhance its image as a responsible and non-hegemonic state. 
This can be seen in Figure 5.1, by the increase in membership of international 
institutions during the 1970s. As China began to focus upon its domestic 
development, its direct activities in Africa decreased. Following a reformulation 
of its aid programmes to enhance their cost-effectiveness and in order to maintain 
its image of responsibility and neutrality, China relied more heavily upon the 
multilateral channels of the institutions it had joined to maintain a steady support 
for the African nations. So although its activities moderated, it maintained its 
interest throughout the continent. This steady growth in membership of the 
institutions can be seen throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. China's image 
underwent transformation into that of a great power in the early 1990s. This 
stimulated China's expanded need for resources to fuel its increased growth, in 
line with its great-power image. This strengthened China's re-emergence in Africa 
as a notable aid donor, and was further endorsed in 1996 by Jiang Zemin's tour of 
the continent, during which he helped to nurture the foundations of China's 'go 
out' policy, as well as lay the foundations for the newest regional institution, 
FOCAC. The triennial meetings of FOCAC have resulted in an enormous increase 
in aid activity between meetings, most notably after the 2006 meeting, in which 
long-term multilateral plans for the development of the region'S markets were 
formulated. This shift in the norm is visible in Figure 5.1 by the increased number 
of international organisations joined in the early 2000s. As with the Southeast 
Asia diagram, figure 4.3, the cumulative number of organisations reflects the 
combination of regional and global multilateral organisations that are active in 
Africa. Though the increase in activity represents considerably greater multilateral 
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responsibility, this is remaining tempered by the sovereignty and developmentalist 
norm in nations such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, where its reluctance to conform to 
growing international concerns has resulted in its becoming increasingly criticised 
for its inactivity. Therefore, although the uptake of the norm has increased 
substantially, it has yet to undergo cascade and internalisation. 
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Figure 5.1 The cumulative membership of international organisations by 
decade from 1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
Sovereignty 
The sovereignty norm has progressed along a different path from the other 
embedded norms in China in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, sovereignty 
played an important role in China's aid and relations within Africa, as it strove to 
gain support and recognition globally. At this time, although the norm was already 
internalised in the PRC, it was heavily influenced by China's Communist leanings 
and Maoist teachings. This influence also isolated the norm from developing 
beyond the form that it had existed in during the 1940s. As many of the countries 
in Africa were seeking independence by the 1950s, China did not view them as 
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sovereign states, so consequently felt no obligation to adhere to sovereignty in its 
revolutionary pursuits. In Figure 5.2, the probability of non-interference is 
calculated from the relative ratios of bi and multilateral relations across the 
continent. This may be seen through its relatively high probability of interference 
in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the gradual decrease in probability of 
interference as membership of institutions increased. After it gained admission to 
the UN in the early 1970s, and its identity changed to a neutral actor, it continued 
to practice its policy of non-interference; however as many of the nations in 
Africa were by this time independent, China's practice of sovereignty became 
more apparent. This also reinforced China's practice of internationalism. By the 
1980s, there was a notable shift in sovereignty, as the newly emerging norm of 
developmentalism began to motivate its greater involvement in managing regional 
projects. Though it has continued to practice sovereignty in its activities 
throughout the region, in more recent times, notably since 2000, its policy of 
non-interference has adjusted through its institutional roles. This reflects not only 
how global sovereignty has evolved since the late 1990s, but also how 
developmentalism has enhanced China's desire to evolve at a similar rate, thereby 
overcoming the norm's inertia that arose through China's isolation from the 
international community. This may be seen in Figure 5.2 by the renewed decrease 
in probability of direct and unconstrained intervention. 
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Developmentalism 
The developmentalist norm in Africa, as seen in Figure 5.3, has undertaken a 
comparatively similar path to the norm in the case of Southeast Asia. Since the 
study of developmental ism focused upon the promotion of the Beijing Consensus, 
the figure displays the norm unintended rhetorical and norm intended practical 
perspective between 2002 and 2008, by relating the number of countries visited 
by senior members of the CCP, primarily Hu Jintao and Wenjia Bao, throughout 
the period, as a measure of rhetoric, compared with the estimated aid distributed 
throughout the region along the practical dimension. The rhetorical dimension is 
purely relative as it does not account for the rhetoric originating from earlier tours 
of the continent, such as the tour in 1996 by Jiang Zemin. With the founding of 
FOCAC in 2000, China's practice of developmentalism expanded significantly 
into what became known, in 2004, as the Beijing Consensus. Though China has 
strengthened regional mechanisms of self-reliance, and asymmetric defence, its 
increased activities have affected the internationalist norm, through the increase in 
'black GDP growth', from its mineral resource extraction programs, most notably 
in Namibia and Sudan. Despite this, China continues to increase its rhetoric in 
promoting the benefits of its activities in the region, through the creation of SEZs, 
with the long-term goals of enhancing intraregional markets, and in so doing 
demonstrates how the norm of developmentalism has undergone cascade and 
internalisation in China. 
The first order factors guiding China's aid, notably the CCP's maintenance 
of control over the disbursement of aid projects, have continued to shape China's 
ongoing activities in Africa in line with its own interests and pursuit of 
great-power status. A large number of these projects continue to promote its own 
development, through regional resource extraction programs, which in turn fuels 
its equity markets. As traditional aid donors evaluate the direction of China's 
activities in the region, in light of their effects on their own practices, there 
currently appears to be no rapid solution to the long standing issues that China's 
activities have raised. 
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Figure 5.3 Comparison of norm unintended rhetoric and norm intended 
practice of developmentalism between 2002 and 2008, in 
Africa (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
The next case study will continue the investigation of China's foreign aid 
across Latin America by studying how the embedded norms in China, have 
shaped a region in which its aid activities and historical connections are relatively 
recent. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CHINA'S FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA 
This chapter focuses upon the relations between China and the Latin American 
region, which comprises the countries of Central and South America, in addition 
to the islands of the Caribbean. Out of all the locations reviewed in these case 
studies, this region has historically had the least contact with China and played a 
marginal role in Chinese foreign relations. Recent changes in the politics of 
international relations, global trade, and China's developmental needs have 
redirected attention towards the region, as it has become a focus of modern 
Chinese foreign policy and aid. These new moves into the region by China were 
highlighted in the Chinese Government's new policy paper on Latin America and 
the Caribbean which was released on 5 November 2008. 
6.1 The significance of the Latin American case 
Studies of China's aid policy in Latin America have contended, among other 
things, that the significance of Chinese aid engagement in the region is linked to 
three main issues: firstly, its recent foreign economic policies, which continue to 
broaden China's expansionist activities (Asia Times 1999); secondly, its domestic 
sovereignty concerns over Taiwan and promotion of the Beijing Consensus, 
particularly in the face of declining US regional involvement (BBC 2004c; 
Erikson and Chen 2007; Gore 2000: 789-804; IFICIIA 2008); and thirdly, China's 
response to international pressure for it to contribute more towards realizing its 
international responsibilities (Lum et al. 2009: 14-5; The New York Times 2009). 
As China has entered the region after having internalised the developmentalist 
norm, China's behaviour reflects its management of the norm rather than its 
exclusive promotion. 
The shared identity that China had been successful in promoting 
throughout Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, namely that of a victim of Western 
colonial aggression, had less impact on governments in Latin America, and 
corresponded to a period when the PRC's presence in the region was limited by 
ongoing American support for Taiwan, and the region's support of American 
foreign policy. As Xiang Lanxin (2008: 46) argues: by 'lacking local power bases 
and real influence, China did not pay much attention to the region in the 1950s 
and the 1960s'. Although during that period, Mao expressed support for the Latin 
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American struggle against US 'imperialism', most Latin American political 
leaders were anti-communist and Latin America remained a difficult region for 
Mao's revolution to penetrate (Jiang 2008: 29; Xiang 2008: 46). In the 1960s, the 
CCP 'experienced not only problems with governments in Latin America, but also 
with Communist Parties of the region - even if they were pro-Chinese 
factions.[ ...... J Che Guevara, for example, was never verbally or materially 
helped by the Chinese' (Deckers 1989: 246). 
In response to the support that China received from the developing world 
in gaining admission to the UN in 1971, China consistently voiced its support for 
a new world order, as advocated through the framework of South-South 
cooperation. Although Latin America has not been directly cited as being 
instrumental in China's successful admission to the UN, its inclusion within the 
developing world enhanced China's identification with it. China's involvement in 
Latin America before the mid-1980s was largely restricted to nurturing bilateral 
relations with Cuba in the early 1960s, and in Chile in 1970, making it the first 
South American country to recognise the PRC. By the 1980s, however, by which 
time its identity had transformed into that of a member of the international 
community, China began to express a desire for state-to-state relations. Hence, the 
countries of the region became significant with respect to China's rising 
great-power identity, during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Dominican Today 2008; Johnson 2005; Lum et al. 2009: 14-5; The New York 
Times 2009). Since the late 1990s, the Chinese Government has continued to 
develop its foreign policies in Latin America, as seen in the increase in the 
number of official visits and growing economic exchanges (Zhang 1994: 38-9, 
Zhang 2007: 27). While many have highlighted how China's aid to Latin America 
rationalised this activism with China's mercantile interests, China's policy paper 
at least acknowledged its responsibility based on international and developmental 
issues (MFA 2008b). Latin America has become a major area of Chinese foreign 
policy attention, with greater focus on both trade and investment, becoming an 
integral part of China's role as an aid donor (Dumbaugh and Sullivan 2005: 4). 
This chapter aims to discuss whether the norms, implied in the 2008 policy paper, 
namely sovereignty, internationalism, and developmental ism, have had any 
impact on China's aid distribution in the region. 
This region is the source of an abundance of natural resources, many of 
which the PRC lacks and, as such, requires in order to continue the programme of 
modernization and economic development. China's drive for the natural resources 
of Latin America has focussed primarily upon securing minerals and oiL 
particularly from Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and Cuba (BBe 2008b; People s Daily 
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2006a). The 'loans-for-oil' agreement, signed by China in early 2009, provided 
Brazil with US$5 to 10 billion and Ecuador with a further US$l billion (People s 
Daily 2009f; Xinhua 2009b). Geographically speaking, the region is of great 
significance to China's global trade, as the Panama Canal represents an important 
transport route for Chinese goods to North American and European markets, as 
well as a major channel for the transport of resources from West Africa and the 
Caribbean. The region is also significant in that in comparison with Africa, Latin 
America, whilst being comprised of many countries in the developing world, now 
also has considerably more enhanced political stability, a more developed 
infrastructure, through which resources and goods may be distributed or exported, 
and well established global trade links, facilitating alternative paths of access to 
overseas markets. Having greater integration in the global economy, Latin 
America is viewed as a region that can not only meet China's resource needs, but 
is also becoming a major market for Chinese products (Interview 2007a). 
Concerning diplomacy, since most of the ROC's remaining official 
diplomatic allies are situated in Latin America, Li He (2005: 77-102) has argued 
that the region is a major focus of Chinese foreign policy, as the PRC continues its 
ongoing dispute over political recognition vis-a.-vis Taiwan (also see Interview 
2006j; 2006k; 2007a; 20071; ZRGN 1986: 252-3; 1989: 353; 1991: 276, 286). 
Unlike Africa, a region in which China has played a significant role politically, 
especially during de-colonization, Latin America had been viewed as beyond 
China's reach for the majority of the Cold War, as it was seen in terms of its 
relative proximity to America (Interview 2006b). Although most of the countries 
of Latin America had gained their independence during the nineteenth century and 
secured their positions in the community of nations, China perceived a decline in 
overall Latin American authority to the United States' 'Doctrine of Limited 
Sovereignty' (Li 1991: 11). Many of the region'S countries had increasingly 
become ruled by pro-United States, and increasingly dictatorial, junta 
governments, such as Peron in Argentina, and Batista in Cuba. China's 
engagement with the Castro Government in Cuba following the revolution in 
1959, and the Chilean Government in 1970, following the election of leftist 
Salvador Allende, were among the first governments in the region to recognize 
the PRC and were increasingly anti-US (Montalva and Navia 2007). 
Since much of the region remained heavily influenced by the US until the 
early 1990s, much of Latin America's foreign relations involved cooperation with 
Western powers and allies of the United States. This factor played a major role in 
the region, by contributing to Taiwan's regional political and diplomatic success. 
However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold \Var, 
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the PRC found the political environment III Latin America more favourable, 
which led it to re-evaluate the region's political and diplomatic potential. As 
China continues to seek diplomatic relations throughout the region following the 
thaw of the Cold War, pressure on countries that continue their support for Taiwan 
has intensified. The argument of isolating Taiwan through the use of foreign aid 
was observed in 2004, when the Dominican Republic changed its allegiance 
following Beijing's counter-offer of assistance, in the form of a pledge ofUS$122 
million, compared with Taiwan's US$9 million (BBe 2004a; 2004b). Furthermore, 
when China established diplomatic relations with Costa Rica in June 2007, the 
Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange agreed to buy US$300 million 
in Costa Rican Government bonds (The New York Times 2008). This relationship 
is further illustrated by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez's statement: 
'China offered US$20 million in aid for more than 3,000 victims of the flood 
disaster in Costa Rica in 2007, the year when the two countries established 
diplomatic ties' (People:S Daily 2008), which further infers China's use of aid in 
achieving its political objectives. The clarification and understanding of these 
factors is critical in the continuing discussion of norms, as it highlights cases 
where China's perceived adherence to the norms, of internationalism, sovereignty 
and developmentalism, influences its foreign policy, and in some cases violates it. 
This has been seen through the manner in which it upholds the sovereignty norm, 
initially through its attempts to reduce Soviet spheres of influence that remained 
in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, to provide a trade alternative to the 
United States or to intervene in a sovereign state's foreign policy of recognising 
the ROC. 
The importance of Latin America to Chinese foreign policy can also be 
seen in Chinese discourse. On a tour of five Latin American countries in 1990, 
President Yang Shangkun outlined the four principles of China's new foreign 
policy towards Latin America: firstly, that China will establish and develop 
friendly cooperative relations with all Latin American countries on the basis of the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; secondly, bilateral trade and economic 
and technological cooperation should be expanded on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit, for the purpose of meeting each other's needs, and by way of 
learning from each other's strengths to offset weakness; thirdly, both China and 
Latin American countries should respect each other's traditions and concept of 
values, learn and draw on each other's experiences, strengthen people-to-people 
contacts, promote understanding and friendship, and develop various forms of 
cultural exchanges on a broad basis; and lastly, China and Latin American 
countries should make joint efforts to establish a new international political and 
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economIC order through mutual support, earnest consultation, and closer 
cooperation in world affairs (ZRGN 1991: 286). Whilst the first and fourth points 
reflect the internationalist norm, the second and third points are endorsements of 
the developmentalist and sovereignty norms respectively. These norms were 
pointed out again in Jiang Zemin's address in San Diego, Chile in April 2001 
(MFA 2001) and Hu Jintao's oration to the Brazilian Parliament in November 
2004, (Xinhl!a 2004a). These two speeches underline the focus of China's Latin 
American policy, and how it relates to wider multilateral issues of South-South 
cooperation, and the creation of a new economic world order. The argument of 
China's policy is that economic globalization and rapid technological 
development have induced a globally imbalanced developmental situation, which 
has resulted in biased international political and economic orders. Developing 
countries have therefore found it increasingly difficult to control their national 
sovereignties, security, and interests. Hence, 'developing countries should work 
together to establish a reasonable, new international political and economic order' 
in which Latin America plays a key role (Xinhua 2004a). 
Following the release in Beijing of the Chinese Government's new policy 
paper on Latin America and the Caribbean by China's Foreign Minister Yang 
Jeichi on 5 November, 2008, the country's ambassador to Barbados, Liu 
Huanxing, highlighted the benefits of aid assistance, debt cancellation, and 
cooperation in developmental issues, relating to environmental protection, climate 
change, human resources and social security, that Latin America could reap 
economically. The policy paper did not clarify how the Chinese Government 
would implement Chinese investment in Latin America, nevertheless, it maintains 
the policy framework outlined in the two speeches, emphasizing that China and 
Latin American states are developing countries, and thus have to share a common 
emphasis on South-South cooperation, by stressing how the two sides should 
continue to 'strengthen the coordination and cooperation in international affairs, 
consistently communicate with each other regarding important international and 
regional issues', and 'support each other on such important issues as sovereignty 
and territorial integrity' (MFA 2008b). Additionally, China and Latin America 
should 'strengthen the role of the United Nations, make the international political 
and economic order more fair and equitable, promote democracy in international 
relations and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries' 
(MFA 2008b). The policy paper also highlights how China would provide Latin 
American countries with political support in those affairs that would influence 
their development, such as environmental and ecological protection, and foreign 
debts. 
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During a tour of Peru in November 2008, Hu Jintao stressed the 
importance of building ties between China and the countries of Latin America and 
used the visit to propose a five point plan for strengthening innovative 
development and aimed to increase 'the mutual understanding and friendship 
between the Chinese and Latin American peoples' (Xinhua 2008e). Further afield, 
nations throughout BRlCSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and 
Mexico), especially Brazil, have voiced agreement over the importance of China, 
the structure of the global institutions and the dynamics of international relations, 
especially in relation to trade. The idea that the development of China will prove 
beneficial to the entire world order has increasingly necessitated the engagement 
of the BRlCSAM nations with China (Moore and Tranjan 2008). 
6.2 Historical relations with Latin America 
China's relations in Latin America expanded, albeit marginally, from their initial 
relations with Cuba in the 1960s and Chile in the early 1970s. As its victim 
identity and communist leanings impeded the significant development of relations 
with other countries in the region, it was not until relations elsewhere throughout 
the Americas improved during the 1970s that further significant relations began to 
develop. These relations formed initially through a shared common identity under 
the framework of South-South cooperation. Once these relations began to emerge, 
there was a steady and progressive broadening of relations across the region. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, China's relations with Latin America were 
limited by the United States Cold War policy of containment. Following Fidel 
Castro's successful revolution in 1959, Cuba became the first country in the 
region to formally recognise the PRC. The significance of Cuba in Chinese Latin 
American relations cannot be overstated, as it has played a major role not only 
within the region, but also externally, affecting China's interactions with both the 
US and the wider international community (Li 2007a: 834). The Cuban revolution 
offered a valuable opportunity for China to reappraise its relations with Latin 
America, with the realization that revolution in the backyard of the US was not 
only possible, but had also become a reality. When Cuba became the first Latin 
American country to recognise the PRC in September 1960, it marked the 
commencement of Chinese engagement in the region. Premier Zhou Enlai 
reassured Castro that 'China would furnish all the necessary assistance to the 
Cuban people in fighting for freedom' (quoted from Zhang 1995: 91). After the 
establishment of formal relations, their shared communist ideology provided 
China with a framework for defining its aid provision to Cuba, which was the first 
country in the region to receive assistance, and resulted in the signing of a trade 
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and payments agreement pledging to help train Cuban technicians and supply 
economic aid (Li 2001: 468-9). A pledge to ship 10,000 tons of Chinese rice to 
Havana was fulfilled within a year, and marked the commencement of 
Sino-Cuban aid activities (Warner 1961: 101). In addition to substantial assistance, 
China offered Cuba a US$60 million interest-free loan in 1960. This was 
delivered between 1961 and 1965, and was designed in part to support the 
permanent residence of Chinese technicians and their equipment on the island, 
who were involved in 24 agricultural and industrial projects, and RMB 70 million 
in 1963, the purpose of which remains unclear (Copper: 1976: 34; Li 2001: 
469-71; Renmin Ribao 1963a). China also established the Institute of Latin 
America Studies, a faculty of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in Beijing 
in 1961, as a national research organisation dedicated to studying the region (ILAS 
CASS)o In 1963, China signed a protocol, promising the transfer of Sino-Cuban 
trade surpluses into the existing interest-free loan. In order to resolve the Cuban 
trade deficit, China transferred the outstanding balance into a commodity loan, 
which amounted to US$40 million in 1965. This move reflected Zhou Enlai's 
earlier postulation in 1963, that a 'loan is merely a form. It can be paid back later 
or even not at all' (Li 2001: 498). 
With Castro's failure to convince the Americans of the legitimacy of the 
Cuban Revolution, and the subsequent US embargo on Cuban trade, the Cuban 
Government sought formal markets and allies beyond the influence of the US, by 
aligning with Soviet Communism. With the Soviet expansion of the Cold War into 
the Americas, this international structure further limited the opportunity for the 
PRC to broaden its international recognition in the region. Following the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962, the fear of socialism spreading further into the region 
preoccupied American thinking, and became a focus of its national security policy. 
While the Sino-Soviet split was contemporaneous, American support for Taiwan 
and its presence in the region continued unaffected, leaving the PRC confined to 
its position of isolation. It would take almost a decade for the PRC to distance 
itself from its socialist revolutionary origins, and convince the international 
community of its independent foreign policy. As Mora (1999: 94) observes: 
'Beijing was unable to establish normal diplomatic or economic and trade 
relations with any country except Cuba until the early 1970s', and as a result, 
'China supported revolutionary groups that sought to overthrow "reactionary" 
governments', though in Latin America, its actual engagement remained limited 
(Deckers 1989: 246). It would not be until the PRC replaced the ROC at the UN 
in 1971, and entered a period of rapprochement with the US, that the PRC would 
be able to broaden its official relations with Latin American countries. With much 
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of Latin America dependent upon US aid and access to its markets, many Latin 
American states took their foreign policy cues from Washington, and as such, a 
new rapprochement with the PRC allowed the countries of the region to establish 
a dialogue, and later on, formal relations with China. 
From the 1970s onwards, Sino-Latin American relations began to adapt to 
the changes in the PRC's identity. The PRC's early self-perception as a victim had 
been promoted during the 1950s and 1960s, along with its shared colonial 
experience, and had helped to secure international recognition in Africa and 
Southeast Asia. However, this image did little to facilitate Chinese relations in 
Latin America, as countries in the region had secured their independence in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and had few revolutionary movements 
requiring international support. As a result, this identity soon became an 
impediment, as the PRC sought the vital resources and investment that it required 
to modernize and develop its economy. As Mora (1999: 95) explains: 
[Owing to] Beijing's long exclusion from the post-war 
international system and the desperate condition of its economy, 
the search for legitimacy and sources of capital, technology, and 
markets, along with the need to deny Taiwan diplomatic 
recognition, became the concrete goals of China's policy toward 
Latin America in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Following a decade of independent foreign policy, the PRC concentrated on 
promoting an international image in support of the Third World, and demonstrated 
that it sought to playa responsible role by promoting South-South cooperation, 
thereby increasing its interaction with Latin America. The world-wide 
expansionist power of the Soviet Union provided the Chinese with the 
opportunity to unite with all possible anti-Soviet forces during the 1970s; Hsiung 
(1980: 1-15) argues that anti-hegemony and self-reliance were the milestones of 
Chinese foreign policy towards Latin America in the 1970s. With Latin America 
under strong US influence, the region played a marginal role in the broader 
Sino-Soviet competition throughout the Third World. This role, however, was 
sufficient to fuel accusations of Chinese collaboration with reactionary regimes, 
such as those of Pinochet in Chile (Deckers 1989: 247). Many Western powers, 
particularly those aligned to the left, remained astonished at China's indifference 
towards the brutal military coup against Salvador Allende, especially following its 
refusal to accept refugees at their embassy in Santiago, continued diplomatic 
relations, and even the further development of trade exchanges following the coup 
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(Deckers 1989: 247). China's muted reaction to the events in Chile became 
indicative of the PRC's foreign policy behaviour, which reflected its adherence to 
non-interference. 
As China sought to modernize and develop its economy, the need for a 
favourable international image, in order to acquire the economic assistance and 
investments that it needed, became its priority. The PRC softened its 
anti-American rhetoric and focussed its efforts on domestic concerns and 
economic development. This policy was extended to Latin America during the 
1970s, where China followed its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of sovereign states, choosing to concentrate on mutually beneficial trade relations. 
After China ended its self-imposed isolation from the international community, it 
adopted a more proactive foreign policy which promoted its Cold War neutral 
image and focussed upon trade and economic exchange. By establishing trade 
relations with states that had not yet recognized the PRC Government, the 
Chinese leadership believed that it could further enhance its diplomatic relations 
by beginning a discourse on establishing formal relations and asserting its stance 
towards Taiwan. Between 1970 and 1977, China distributed US$179 million of 
economic assistance in the region, primarily to Chile (US$65 million), Guyana 
(US$62 million), Peru (US$42 million) and Jamaica (US$l 0 million), in a move 
which prompted the establishment of diplomatic relations (Lin 1996: 34; Li 1991: 
47). In addition to its economic cooperation agreement with these nations, it 
offered further economic and technical assistance to Suriname and Barbados. 
China's assistance to Peru in 1971, took the form of protocols, which offered 
loans to help with the purchase of well digging equipment (Li 2001: 507). This 
assistance came less than a year after China had contributed RMB 1.5 million to 
Peru in humanitarian disaster aid relief, in the aftermath of the region'S 
earthquake in 1970 (Li 2001: 482). Additionally, Chile received US$2.5 million, 
and Bolivia, a country without diplomatic relations with China, received 
substantially lower disaster relief payments of US$80,000 (Ratliff 1972: 859). 
Soon after, China signed an agreement with Guyana offering £ 10 million 
over five years between 1 July 1972 and 30 June 1977, in which it emphasised its 
condition-free aid (MFA 1977: 130-1). This was shortly followed by the dispatch 
of Chinese agricultural experts to Guyana to help with rice growing activities. In 
1975, China signed a further agreement, with Guyana, offering RMB 20 million 
(MFA 1982: 33-5). In 1976, China and Jamaica signed a trade agreement, a 
commodity loan agreement concerning China's provision of 5,000 tons of rice to 
Jamaica, and a protocol on a project for producing polyester cotton mills with 
Chinese assistance. 
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Having championed the cause of the Third World, in line with its neutral 
identity, at a time when the world remained divided by the Superpowers, China 
continued to expand its regional relations during the 1980s in response to the 
enhancement of its role in the politics of the international community and its 
domestic development needs. This expansion initially occurred through its 
South-South cooperation, but later on expansion occurred as its institutional role 
developed to form the foundations upon which its more recent developmentalist 
expansion activities in the region have been based. 
China's official interactions in Latin America began in October 1981, 
when Premier Zhao Ziyang attended the North-South Conference in Cancun, 
Mexico, in what became the first state visit by a Chinese Government leader to 
mainland Latin America. At the meeting, Zhao Ziyang proposed the Chinese 
Government's five principles of international cooperation, which aimed to 
establish a New International Economic Order (People's Daily 1981). This 
focussed attention on the debt problem in Latin America during its notorious La 
Decada Perdida. During a later meeting with Brazilian president Joao Figueiredo 
in Beijing in 1984, Deng Xiaoping identified peace and development as the most 
pressing world challenge, categorizing each as the East-West problem (peace) and 
the North-South problem (development) (Jiang 2008: 30). Foreign Minister Wu 
Xueqian further highlighted that: 
Serious debt problems have become a pressmg Issue that the 
developing countries, especially those in Latin America, are facing. 
[ ...... ] We believe that the solution to the debt problem should be 
the responsibility of the creditors, commercial banks, international 
financial institutions and debtor countries. The principle of solving 
this debt problem should be the promotion of development in order 
to pay back the debt. 
(ZRGN 1985: 195) 
Wu was to reiterate these same concerns during a subsequent visit to Peru, 
Ecuador and Chile, in 1987 (ZRGN 1988: 203). 
From October 28 to November 12, 1985, Zhao Ziyang returned to the 
region where he visited Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (ZDJMN 
1986: 349). During this visit, he highlighted that 'both sides are victims of the 
unjust world order, and reiterated his proposal to establish a new world order by 
promoting North-South dialogue and deepening South-South cooperation'. in so 
doing, emphasising China's identity as a victim of imperialism (ZRGN 1986: 
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251). 
While continuing its support for, and identification with, the developing 
world, the PRC began strengthening its position diplomatically across Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Li 2007b: 23-43). Part of China's diplomatic 
offensive involved the increase in the number of visits to the region by high 
ranking Chinese officials and diplomats, which were matched by reciprocal 
invitations for Latin American leaders and trade representatives to visit Beijing 
(Zhang'1994: 38-9, Zhang 2007: 27). During the 1980s, Sino-Latin American 
relations expanded, as Mora (1999: 97) highlights: 
During this period, 10 Latin American presidents from eight 
countries, and eight prime ministers and vice premiers from six 
countries visited China. Foreign ministers from 15 Latin American 
nations and 30 legislative delegations from 14 countries also 
visited Beijing. 
The countries which subsequently received aid after establishing such relations 
included Ecuador, Columbia, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the 
Bahamas (Li 2001: 536-53). Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1985, the 
Chinese Government provided the Bolivian Government with both economic and 
technical assistance, by helping with the construction of seven complete sets of 
projects which included cultural centres, well-drilling projects, and small 
hydro-electric power stations, the carrying out of three technical cooperation 
projects, including rice and vegetable cultivation, and seven rounds of material 
assistance (MFA 2006d). 
As the 1980s ended and most of Latin America experienced a favourable 
balance of trade with China, political events such as the collapse of communism 
in Europe, and the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, forced the PRC to re-examine its 
foreign policy performance in the region. Western criticism over Tiananmen 
prompted China to solidify and rally support from the Third World, and resulted 
in China's temporary re-isolation from the West. In 1990, China established a 
channel for political dialogue between itself and the Rio Group. Since that time, 
nine talks have been conducted at the foreign-ministry level. China had repeatedly 
praised the important role of the Rio Group and considered it to be an important 
political force among developing countries (MFA 2000a). The praising of the Rio 
Group, in contrast to the wider Organisation of American States (OAS), reflected 
China's preference towards, and identification with, South-South cooperation in 
the region, despite the ongoing improved relations between China and the United 
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States. During that same year, Chinese President Yang Shangkun toured five Latin 
American countries, Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, where he 
strengthened commercial, technological, and cultural ties between China and the 
countries of the South American Cone and Mexico, by initiating dialogue on 
peaceful coexistence and the advocacy of international cooperation. During the 
tour, he postulated four principles of China's new foreign policy towards Latin 
America. Yang's visit was also cited as heralding 'a new chapter in Sino-Latin 
American friendship', and became recognised as 'an important milestone in the 
history of Sino-Latin American friendly relations'. Yang reiterated the call that 
'China and Latin American countries should make joint efforts in establishing a 
new international political and economic order, through mutual support, earnest 
consultation, and closer cooperation in world affairs' (ZRGN 1991: 286). 
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, aid to the 
region from the Superpowers consequently began to decrease. This provided 
China with an opportunity to further its role as an aid donor in the region. As Li 
He (2005: 88; 2007a: 847) stated, 'the region's leaders have turned to Asia for 
help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently have played the 
PRC and Taiwan against each other' in the face of 'declining aid from the West 
and the former Soviet bloc'. From the 1990s onwards into the new millennium, 
many leaders in Latin America came to view US investment and the shift of 
manufacturing to China as their loss. With many countries in the region mired in 
poverty, through having followed development models proposed by the West, 
disillusionment amongst many populations was mirrored by the successive rise of 
left-wing parties, which formed governments across Latin America. This 
strengthened the developmentalist norm by enforcing self-reliance and provided 
China with an opportunity to promote itself as a potential model for economic 
development. As Li He (2007 a: 851) points out: 
It is worth noting that as China's economy and its soft power keeps 
growing, and the region continues to be frustrated with the 
perceived lack of attention and interest from Washington, some 
Latin American countries might turn to the Chinese way of 
development: that is, blending economic growth and authoritarian 
form of government. 
The subsequent focus of attention on China by many Latin American countries, 
extended beyond trade, access to markets, and technology. Consequently, China 
took advantage of this new found interest in its system and development model. 
178 
This caused many China observers in the West, and specifically in the United 
States, to view China's rise as a threat to American influence in Latin America 
(The Washington Post 2006a). 
In 1992, Li Peng led a Chinese Government delegation at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Li Peng's 
proposition of attributing equal importance to environmental protection and 
economic development, met with general approval from the Latin American 
countries and the international community. During the conference, Li Peng also 
held separate talks with the President of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello, on 
issues relating to bilateral relations, in addition to talks with President Menem of 
Argentina, the President of Chile, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, the President of 
Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, the 
Cuban President of Council of State, Fidel Castro Ruz, and a representative of the 
President of Suriname, thereby multilaterally enhancing China's bilateral relations 
network (China). In 1993, China became an observer of the Latin American 
Integration Association. In November of the same year, President Jiang Zemin 
visited both Brazil and Cuba in his first foreign visit as president of the CCP, 
where he emphasised the improvement of Sino-Latin American trade, and 
promised its continuation (ZRGN 1994: 129). By proposing a New International 
Economic Order, Jiang Zemin affirmed that every country in the world should 
participate in the network of global economic and commercial relations, where 
every country should have the right to decide on the structures of its social and 
economic system, in order to be able to control its own resources and 
development. He called for South-South cooperation, in order to share 
experiences and expand the opportunities for development that existed within 
each country (Li 2001: 524-5). 
During the 1990s, China enhanced its efforts on developing a common 
market of the south with Latin America, through the dealings with APEC and 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). In June 1994, when China became an 
observer to the Latin American Integration Association, it held two official talks 
with MERCOSUR, and formalised a regional trade agreement among Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay that had been founded in 1991. APEC offered a 
venue for China to develop its multilateral ties with Asian-Pacific and Latin 
American countries. Since China commenced its participation in APEC, 
Asia-Latin American interactions have progressed, with the addition of three 
Latin American countries to the institution: Mexico, Chile, and Peru. China has 
continued to send high level delegations to the Forum for East Asia-Latin America 
Cooperation (EALAF IFEALAC) meetings, in a key role aimed at improving 
179 
cooperation between East Asia and Latin America. In 1995, Premier Li Peng 
visited Mexico, Cuba, and Peru, where he reiterated his call for a 'new 
international political and economic order', where China and Latin America 
should expand 'mutual support, consultation and cooperation in world affairs' to 
strengthen their position internationally (ZRGN 1996: 204). Li returned to Brazil, 
Chile, and Venezuela in 1996, where he reaffirmed their mutual support, 
consultation and cooperation, and targeted four main priority areas: trade, direct 
cooperation among enterprises, joint tapping of natural resources, and exchanges 
in science and technology (Li 2001: 529-35, Mora 1999: 102; ZRGN 1997: 265). 
The relations between China and multilateral organisations and institutions 
in the Latin American region became closer as political consultations and 
dialogues intensified. In 1997, China applied for borrower member status of the 
Caribbean Development Bank, further strengthening financial links between the 
two regions. This position was granted early in the following year (Hogenboom 
2008: 8). In October 1997, a delegation from MERCOSUR, held initial talks 
during a visit to China (MFA 2006c). China's diplomatic and economic effort was 
not only directed at key individual countries, but also focussed on old and new 
multilateral organisations. At about this time, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia 
was at its peak. This proved a timely reminder of the importance of multilateral 
efforts, outside of South-South cooperation, and resulted in a shift in China's 
policies to embrace greater multilateral responsibility. This became apparent 
through its broadened commitment to more Western and American dominated 
institutions that were external to those traditionally associated with South-South 
cooperation. 
With the strengthening of economic ties between China and Latin America 
in the 1990s, Chinese investment in the region, along with bilateral trade, has 
grown significantly. Since 1991, when China officially applied to join the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a Chinese delegation has regularly 
attended their annual meeting in an observer role (MFA 2002b). As the leading 
multilateral source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the IDB has also been the main source of multilateral financing for economic, 
social and institutional development projects, in addition to trade and regional 
integration programmes. 
The significance of Latin America to China, however, extends beyond the 
economic realm, since it is also a potential partner in China's ongoing quest to 
establish a 'just and harmonious world order'. As Hirst (2008: 90-7) explains, 
through joining multilateral institutions, such as the UN, China and Latin America 
have accessed an assembly through which they may unite through mutually 
180 
shared perspectives on various international issues in the context of South-South 
cooperation. In accordance with this view, China has continued to hold regular 
talks with the Rio Group since 1990, along with similar talks with Mercosur since 
1994. In 2004, the Organization of American States (OAS) accepted China as a 
permanent observer. Furthermore, China gained an observer status in the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI), and the Latin American Parliament, 
in addition to attaining full membership of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(lDB), in 2009 (China; China Daily 2009a; People s Daily 2004b). 
After gaining membership of the bank, Liu Kegu, the Vice President of the 
China Development Bank (CDB), signed a memorandum of cooperation with the 
IDB, stating that: 
[T]he CDB will take an active part in the IDB's financing activities 
in Latin America, especially in areas of energy, transportation, 
urban infrastructure and agriculture, to promote economic and 
trade cooperation between China and Latin America. 
(Xinhua 2009d) 
The direction of this foreign policy was complemented by a concentrated 
economic offensive, aimed at expanding the PRC's influence by utilizing aid as a 
practice. Since the PRC's role as a foreign aid donor in the region was less 
established, and in light of criticism of China's need for long-term commodities 
and energy solutions, as a step towards its involvement in the region, the analysis 
of the norms provides an approach to establishing whether the norms of Chinese 
aid commitment are consistent with, or proportional to, its rational concerns. 
6.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Latin America 
As explained earlier in the thesis, since the Asianist norm pertains to the 
formation of a shared Asian identity within Asia, its relevance in Latin America is 
of little direct consequence. As such, this case study will focus upon the norms of 
internationalism, sovereignty and developmentalism. 
6.3.1 Internationalism 
China's policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean reflects how the status 
of Latin America and the Caribbean had been upgraded to a regional concern, 
thereby addressing the points of Chinese economic assistance and the 
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internationalist norm: 
The Chinese Government will also continue to call upon the 
international community, developed countries in particular, to take 
more concrete steps to reduce and cancel debts owed by Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. [ ...... ], with a view to 
promoting South-South cooperation, bringing about a more just 
and equitable multilateral trading regime and ensuring a bigger say 
and greater role in decision-making for developing countries in 
international trade and financial affairs. 
(MFA 2008b) 
i) The evolution of internationalism in Latin America 
China's involvement in the region's institutions became considerably enhanced 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. The changes that shaped internationalism in 
other regions, such as the Asian financial crisis, SARS, and the global financial 
crisis in 2007, reshaped China's involvement in Latin America, as its policies 
became further focussed towards international responsibility. 
In the early 1990s, as China's internationalist involvement was largely 
focussed upon South-South cooperation, there was a gradual expansion towards 
the promotion of responsibility for global issues. This was seen in Li Peng's 
delegation to the UN conference on the Environment and Development in Rio in 
1992, as well as China's increased interactions with MERCOSUR in 1994, 
following China's attainment of an observer role to the Latin American 
Integration Association. By 1997, the onset of the Asian financial crisis marked 
the turning point in the internationalist norm, as China renewed its focus upon 
international responsibility. China began to engage institutions that were more 
Western and American-dominated in the region than those with which it had 
traditionally become associated with. By the early 2000s, though China's efforts 
towards South-South cooperation remained strong, as seen, for example, in 
President Hu Jintao's speech to the Parliament of Brazil in 2004, where he pointed 
out the need for 'maintaining consultation and coordination, strengthening 
international cooperation on the tone of addressing South-South cooperation' 
(Xinhua 2004a), their internationalist activities had become directed towards 
global issues. This became apparent in the aftermath of the SARS epidemic in 
Southeast Asia, when non-traditional security threats reshaped China's realisation 
that epidemics such as SARS, and avian flu, could spread prolifically throughout 
the world, and prove devastating to a region's development. As such, there was an 
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increased need for countries to work together to prevent and contain the spread of 
disease. This factor would heavily influence China's response to the outbreak of 
Swine flu in Latin America in 2009. 
In addition, China's growing regional responsibility on a multilateral basis 
was reflected during one of Premier Li Peng's most important trips to Latin 
America in 2001, where he delivered a speech at the UN Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC), and clarified through a series 
of defined stages how multilateralist informed internationalism had strengthened 
the relationship between China and Latin America. The first stage made full use 
of the existing mechanisms for intensifying dialogue and cooperation, through 
such organisations as the Rio Group. The second stage intensively developed 
consensus and broadened cooperation in international forums and organisations, 
such as the UN, the Asia-Pacific Forum for Economic Cooperation, the Group of 
77, and the EALAF. The third stage broadened economic cooperation and trade in 
favour of common development based on mutual benefits and reciprocity. The 
fourth stage established long-term relations of broad and integrated cooperation 
(Xinhua 2001a; ZRGN 2002: 338). China has continued to participate in Latin 
America's regional organisations through the mechanism of the UN. In May 2004, 
it officially achieved observer status in the Organization of American States 
(OAS); an institution that had been founded in 1948. This was followed soon after 
by its admission to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Its role in these institutions allowed it to provide wider support for 
Latin American governments in their economic and social development. As China 
enhanced its bilateral relations through multilateral channels, its commitment to 
the internationalist norm in the UN, 'reinforced a movement by the Chinese 
government to play a larger role in world affairs, including participating more 
actively in regional groups' (The Washington Post 2004). As China has been 
subject to criticism for not sharing a greater proportion of the burden of 
peacekeeping duties in the region, it voted in April 2004, for UNSC Resolution 
1542 which authorized the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization , 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (UN 2004), a move that led Vice Minister Meng 
Hongwei to state that: 
China's active involvement in peacekeeping missions of the UN, 
especially in Haiti which has not set up a diplomatic relationship 
with China, fully exhibits a peace-loving and responsible image of 
the country. 
(China Daily 200.+) 
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This move reflected trends following the end of the Cold War, that along with 
China's rise as a great power, there was a need for China to demonstrate 
internationally that it could behave as a legitimate and responsible great power. 
By sharing its duties in the international community, rather than abstaining and 
maintaining levels of suspicion as to its motives, it could contribute to stability 
within the international community. 
This was not only the first time that China had dispatched a police unit in 
a multilateral peacekeeping role, but also marked the first time that China had 
dispatched peacekeepers to a UN member state with which it did not share 
diplomatic relations. China's involvement in UNPKO in Haiti, assisted in 
stabilizing an area of conflict, and has contributed to the overall economic 
development of a region. This move demonstrated how the internationalist norms 
of the international governing body and multilateral activities in peacekeeping 
have shifted China's principle of non-interference. Its peacekeeping role has 
further enhanced its interaction with other major Latin American countries such as 
Chile and Brazil, further demonstrating how the strength of the responsibility 
image underlines the internationalist norm (People s Daily 2004c). Such a move 
also demonstrated the setting of a significant precedent, in contradiction to its 
previously observed regional behaviour, as Haiti remains one of the region's 
remaining nations that is diplomatically allied with Taiwan. The setting of this 
precedent, however, does not preclude the possibility that China may in the future 
use its veto within the UN for curtailing these peacekeeping operations, thereby 
further demonstrating how it may potentially influence its goals, adhere to the 
internationalist norm, and prevent the infliction of damage to its responsible 
image in countries of low strategic importance. 
Less than a year later in February 2005, China allocated US$l million to 
create a Cooperation Fund within the OAS (China 2005), in a move that further 
demonstrated its renewed focus on wider multilateral regional institutions. The 
global financial crisis in 2007 provided a further opportunity for China to 
demonstrate its international responsibility. China renewed its activism in the 
region in late 2008, when President Hu visited the APEC summit in Lima, ahead 
of a three-nation tour, which also included Costa Rica and Cuba (BBC 2008a; 
2008b). During the visit, Hu made efforts to reassure his Latin American 
counterparts of China's commitment to the region, by renewing promises for 
long-term investment in the commodity markets of the region, and the promotion 
of infrastructure development; an area that had been neglected since the last aid 
promises to the region. The sources of potential investment lay in further 
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developing the free trade area with Chile, which was constituted in 2007, and the 
establishment of further free trade markets with Peru and Costa Rica, all of which 
also further strengthen the developmentalist norm in China. Hu's tour was closely 
followed by a similar tour by two senior officials, Vice Premier Hui Liangyi and 
Vice President Xi Jinping, in a move which reinforced China's commitment to the 
region, and accompanied the release of its regional policy paper. Such a move 
reaffirms its commitment to the sustained long-term development of the region 
and its image as a responsible leader (BBC 2009a), which it has reinforced by 
continuing to display its dedication to growth by increasing its investment in 
commodities such as oil, minerals and soya beans, thus downplaying its 
mercantile image. As Eriksson highlights: 
China now wishes to show that it is a responsible stakeholder in 
the Latin American region. Previously the image of the Chinese 
people in Latin America reflected solely doing business in the 
region, by only displaying interest in the regions resources. Now, 
the Chinese want to show they're interested in the long-term 
development in Latin America. 
(BBC2009a) 
China's growing awareness of environmental problems and concerns has become 
more prominent through its association with the region. This policy paper also 
outlined tighter controls and regulations on environmental protection, by 
providing training, education, and capacity building on bilateral relations, in 
addition to the prevention of pollution and desertification. These measures 
complement the bills on climate change collaboration efforts that were proposed 
through the multilateral mechanisms of the UN. In apparent efforts to expand 
regional development, China has also been keen to expand in many areas, 
especially in those related to agriculture and crops, notably connected to its 
enhanced soya bean export trade (MFA 2008b). 
To reconfirm this, a four point plan was put forward to encourage the 
promotion of mutual trust, particularly in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis 
(People s Daily 2009c). This plan centred on boosting human and cultural 
exchanges, and the strengthening of consultation and cooperation in international 
affairs. China's multilateral expansion has broadened its potential for mutual 
cooperation as a basis for enduring these current difficult times, allowing it to 
emerge significantly stronger over the coming years. Chinese Vice President Xi 
Jinping highlighted this point by stating that: 
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In face of the global financial crisis, China is ready to work with 
Latin American nations to strengthen coordination and boost 
confidence so as to contribute to the stable growth of the global 
economy. 
(People s Daily 2009c) 
When China became the 48th member country to join the IDB in January 2009, 
Zhou, the governor of the People's Bank of China, noted that it had become 'the 
most important platform' for China's collaboration with this region when he 
announced that: 
China is ready to join hands with other IDB members in the face of 
the ongoing financial crisis to promote sustainable economic and 
social development in the region. 
(Xinhua 2009c) 
By joining the IDB, China's ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, 
also highlighted that: 
[S]uch multilateral tools were the key to solving the international 
financial crisis, which threatens Chinese and Latin American 
growth. We don't want to compete with the U.S. for anything here 
in Latin America. 
(McClatchy 2008) 
In its role as a member, China contributed US$350 million to the IDB Group, and 
was represented at the Board of Executive Directors by sharing a chair with other 
donor nations. The role of the Executive directors, primarily, but not exclusively, 
has been to approve loans, establish policies, and set interest rates (China 2008). 
US$125 million out of the total US$350 million donation was allocated for 
investment in the IDB's Fund for Special Operations, which provides soft loans to 
Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Meanwhile, multiple IDB 
grants, an equity fund to be administered by the Inter-American Investment 
Corporation (IIC), along with the Multilateral Investment Fund were each 
allocated US$75 million (HKTDC 2008). In early May 2009, China continued to 
demonstrate its responsible image through its dispatch of two major aid shipments 
to Mexico, along with a promise of US$5 million in cash and medical supplies in 
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response to the outbreak of Swine flu (Xinhua 2009h). By taking the initiative to 
be the first international response to the outbreak in the region, China seized an 
opportunity not only to demonstrate its responsible image, but also to show how it 
had evolved since its own unfortunate experience with SARS in 2003. 
6.3.2 Sovereignty 
As seen in the case studies of Southeast Asia and Africa, the sovereignty norm in 
China is founded on both practical and ideological grounds. This can be seen 
through the manner by which it exercises pragmatism towards its material 
considerations, yet refuses to compromise its 'one-China' policy. This section 
continues the discussion of the sovereignty norm in relation to China's recent 
activism in Latin America. 
i) The effectiveness of the sovereignty norm 
China's adherence to the sovereignty norm III Latin America, unlike that in 
Southeast Asia and Africa, has been heavily influenced by the proximity of the 
region to the United States. In the early 1960s, the United States' response to 
communist activities in the region, such as the events that led to the Bay of Pigs 
and Cuban Missile Crisis, demonstrated how seriously the US responded to 
threats of regional interference. In view of this, given the sovereign and 
decolonised status of the region's countries, not to mention the Cuban-Soviet 
relationship, China's compliance with the ideals of sovereignty was a less costly 
compromise, especially with the recent memories of the Korean War and its 
aftermath. Since the late 1970s, China's continued and enhanced adherence to the 
sovereignty norm is reflected in the termination of interactions with regional 
insurgents, in favour of enhanced multilateral involvement in regional institutions 
such as the UN, OAS, Inter American Development Bank, APEC, the China-Latin 
America forum, the China-South American common market dialogue, and the 
China-Andean Community (Li 2007a: 834). This highlights how sovereignty has 
become strengthened through China's pursuance of, and adherence to, other 
norms such as internationalism. China has realised that membership of such 
institutions is a more effective method for providing support for other countries 
without directly interfering in their domestic affairs. 
During the Cold War, the sovereignty norm informed the Chinese foreign 
aid policy in Latin America, which focused mainly on encouraging greater Third 
World independence through its opposition to what it viewed as US interference 
in the region. This was reflected in China's rhetoric towards powers that violated 
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regional sovereignty. Somewhat ironically, though, such violations, commonly led 
by the United States, were conducted in response to communist backed insurgents 
fighting for regional independence and world revolution, which China strongly 
endorsed at that time. This demonstrated how although its rhetoric was strong, its 
practice of sovereignty remained subjective. US sanctions on trade with Cuba 
have for several decades fed anti-US sentiment, which China has benefited from 
and was equally keen to nurture, during the Cold War. This has at times 
engendered increased US animosity aimed at regime change on the island, 
ranging from the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion, which enforced China's rhetoric 
about regional interference, the US's policies aimed at the de-stabilisation of the 
Castro Government, through to issues related to its war on terror, and 
controversies over Guantanamo Bay. China further demonstrated its opposition to 
outside interference in the region, even with Latin American countries with which 
it had no established relations at that time, when the US intervened with the use of 
force during an internal political crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Mao 
issued a statement denouncing the US action, and offered to 'support the 
Dominican people in their patriotic armed struggle against the U.S.' (Mao 1966: 
15). 
After China's admission to the UN, it was now able to demonstrate its 
adherence to sovereignty by using international responsibility as an argument for 
promoting non-interference. During this time, the Chinese leadership perceived 
the strength of the sovereignty norm in Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
factor which promoted this norm broadly. As Zhou Enlai pointed out: 
The struggle in Latin America to oppose imperialism and for 
national independence has made marked progress and a 
breakthrough has been brought about; the beacon of this struggle 
has brought light to the whole Western Hemisphere [in the 70s]. 
(MFA 2000b) 
Furthermore, at a banquet in honour of the visiting Mexican president, Luis 
Echeverria, held in April 1972, Zhou stated that: 
Latin America is emerging on the world stage with a new face. 
[ ...... ] The Chinese Government and the Chinese people firmly 
support the just struggle of the Latin American people, and believe 
that a united Latin America, through its struggle, will win a greater 
victory over the expansionary influence of imperialism, and new 
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and old colonialism. 
(MFA 2000b) 
As a member of the UN, and in line with its neutral identity, China implemented 
institutional efforts to help countries maintain their sovereignty, and promote 
non-interference, in the face of what it viewed as ongoing hegemonism by the US. 
Among the institutional efforts supported by the PRC was the establishment of a 
200-nautical-mile territorial water zone along the region's countries' coasts, a 
regionally exclusive economic zone, economic independence, and the Latin 
American nuclear-weapon free zone (MFA 2000b). Despite these activities, there 
is no data supporting China's use of aid to influence Latin American domestic 
policies. Though the sovereignty norm had been upheld in its assistance, China's 
involvement with institutions made its involvement in the domestic affairs of the 
region's countries imprudent. Furthermore, as Deng's reforms progressed after 
1978, there was a significant decline in China's institutional involvement in 
regional affairs, as it focussed upon its own domestic reform. From the outset of 
the 1980s, China's aid subsequently took the form of promises to its newly 
diplomatically aligned allies. As previously illustrated, Antigua and Barbuda 
(1983), Belize (1987), Bolivia (1985), Columbia (1980), Nicaragua (1985) and 
Uruguay (1988) established diplomatic relations with the PRC, and subsequently 
received aid from China. 
Through its policy of non-interference, China continued to support Latin 
American countries through institutions and in its opposition to ongoing 
interference from other nations. The most notable regional interference during the 
1980s emerged from the US, which had traditionally been proactive in the region, 
as a consequence of continued and vestigial communist and independence forces, 
around the Panama Canal. Between 1983 and 1989, the US invaded Grenada, 
funded the Contras in Nicaragua and Honduras, aided the ongoing civil war in EI 
Salvador and invaded Panama. It also participated in intelligence gathering 
operations in South America, which served its anti-insurgent and anti-narcotics 
policies during the 1990s. These policies fuelled a substantial portion of regional 
anti-US sentiment, which accentuated the region's search for alternative markets, 
such as China (Li 2007a: 836, 856). 
While China has been keen to expand bilateral assistance with Latin 
American nations such as Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay, 
its adherence to its non-interference policy has been demonstrated in recent years 
by the restraint it has shown in actively expanding the military technologies of the 
region beyond that of a defensive capability (see Chu 2003: 3, 4, 7; paz 2006). 
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This was demonstrated by its provIsIOn of spy satellite technology to Brazil 
(Johnson 2005), and its expanding of military training programmes for Latin 
American officers, following the termination of US backed programs in the region 
(Bachelet 2005). It also remained detached from distinctly pro-active arms 
procurement activities in Venezuela in 2004-5 (Dominguez 2006: 8), and by 
conducting distinctly low key naval activities in the early 2000s around the 
Panama canal, so as to downplay any hegemonic intention (Roy 2005: 72). 
The case of Argentina further highlights how China has exercised its 
non-interference policy in the region. Even after developing links with China that 
resulted in significant improvements in its global financial position, China 
stopped short of providing a means for Argentina to fully settle its IMF debt loan 
by the end of 2004, which would have freed it from its regional obligations (Paz 
2006: 109). China's fear of antagonising the US served to counter any bargaining 
power that Argentina might have had using developmental issues, which only 
appears to have played a role in pre-relational discourse. 
As global sovereignty has undergone change, this has affected the 
sovereignty norm in several notable ways. In the recent elections in Ecuador, as 
well as in Venezuela, under the Chavez Government, the installation of left-wing 
governments has fuelled regional nationalism, which opposes foreign oil 
investment and resource extraction (Kurlantzick 2006c: 33-40; LatinAmerican 
Post; Li 2007b: 24-7). Despite this, China remains content to maintain relations 
across the region and in accordance with its non-interference policy, despite this 
potentially affecting its business interests. Further divergence from the 
sovereignty norm was demonstrated by its multilateral UN involvement in 
peacekeeping activities in Haiti (China Daily 2004; People:S Daily 2004c; The 
Washington Post 2004). The deployed contingent of Chinese military police, 
under the direct command of a Brazilian, represents the first incidence of the 
deployment of Chinese military personnel in the Western hemisphere. Though this 
may be viewed with alarm in some quarters, this transition mirrors the more 
recent shift in other regions under the influence of human rights policies, 
reflecting more benign intentions. 
ii) Limitations of the sovereignty norm 
The most obvious contradictions to the sovereignty norm in the region have arisen 
through Beijing's overt measures to reduce the region's ties to Taiwan, and its 
involvement in UN Peacekeeping operations in Haiti, the latter of which has been 
discussed previously. China's ongoing relations with Cuba also provide an 
interesting contradiction to the sovereignty norm in the region. 
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In the 1950s, most of Latin America had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
These relations began to erode when the Cuban regime, under Fidel Castro, 
established ties with China in 1960. In the 1970s, Chile led a major shift in 
relations in favour of the PRC, which resulted, over the following decades. in 
many of the region's countries gradually following its example (Watson 2004). 
The latest major transition in allegiances was seen in Costa Rica, which was 
rewarded with a presidential visit, along with a new football stadium for its 
decision in 2007 to recognise China. Furthermore, China agreed to buy US$300 
million in Costa Rican Government bonds (The New York Times 2008). The aid 
compliance can be further illustrated by China's aid assistance following the 
regions floods in 2007, when diplomatic relations became established (People's 
Daily 2008). China's policy has, like in Africa and Southeast Asia, resulted in 
Beij ing being played off against Taipei. The forcing of nations to renounce 
Taiwan, thereby constituting a violation of the sovereignty norm, is fuelling more 
recent efforts by China to coerce members of MERCOSUR into pressuring a 
long-time ally of Taiwan, Paraguay, into joining free trade area negotiations (Li 
2007a: 844). 
By supporting and adhering to its non-interference policy, China has in the 
last two decades benefited from advantageous relations with Cuba, and shared 
many international cooperative efforts in the face of ongoing sanctions against the 
Castro Government. While China openly flaunted its relations with Cuba during 
this time, it did so carefully, in order to maintain amicable relations with 
Washington. The cooperative efforts proved beneficial to China through its 
numerous nickel resource contracts, as well as ongoing Cuban endorsement on 
issues relating to China's domestic policy on human rights, Taiwan, and Tibet (Li 
2007a: 839) By heavily investing in nickel operations in Cuba, China has in tum 
become a much needed ally from Cuba's direct sources of debt, Europe, Russia, 
Japan, and three major Latin American countries of Argentina, Venezuela and 
Mexico. Since these three Latin American nations along with Brazil, form 
important strategic bilateral alliances with China, China is positioned to serve its 
own needs in Cuba by influencing the foreign policies of several of Cuba's major 
financial donors. This raises a dilemma for China: how much would China assist 
Cuba's ability to remain free from foreign influence by coercing other countries. 
Though China's role as a peace-keeper was already discussed in 
internationalism, this role marks a notable deviation from sovereignty, since 
China's international role is directly linked with shaping Haiti's development, by 
offsetting regional violence, maintaining regional stability, and through the direct 
enforcement of an internationally determined resolution to Haiti's domestic 
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troubles. Though this contradicts China's long standing policy of 
'non-interference', it shows how the sovereignty norm is evolving and how China 
is adapting to changes in its evolution. The UN's peacekeeping role of addressing 
conflicts, with economic, social and political origins, is an example of the 
soveriegnty norm's evolution and its focus on increased moral legitimacy. 
China's involvement in Haiti, through the rebuilding of the national infrastructure, 
demonstrates to the international community that China is willing to take on the 
responsibility of a legitimate great power. 
6.3.3 Developmentalism 
China's relations with Latin America have for the most part, with the exception of 
Cuba, where China had an established aid relationship since the 1960s, focussed 
on greater trade and economic growth, by sharing a common interest in 
modernization and economic development. Despite the non-existence of extensive 
historical and cultural ties between the regions, China, during the 1970s, 
considered the Latin American development model in the formulation of its own 
domestic reforms (Xiang 2008: 45-6). However, the realisation of this 
pro-Western development model, in China, was abandoned in favour of China's 
own domestic model. Subsequently, in the 1980s, Latin America succumbed to its 
own model of development, which resulted in its 'lost decade', as mounting debt 
across the region brought regional development to a standstill, and in some cases, 
forced it to regress. 
Following the end of the Cold War and with China's wider involvement in 
regional institutions and its increased uptake of both internationalism and 
developmentalism, relations between the two regions began to broaden 
economically. During the 1990s, China's involvement in the region was largely 
confined to the institutions with which it was affiliated. However, by the early 
2000s, China's investment in the region became enhanced, as it commenced 
wide-scale regional bilateral and multilateral projects. This generated significant 
regional interest in China's model of development (Ramo 2004), especially with 
respect to declining Western regional economic activities, which many countries 
in the region found particularly appealing. The region's countries viewed this 
model of development as a means of recovering and enhancing their former 
prosperity. In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, in the face of even 
greater Western protectionism, countries of the region appeared to be increasingly 
turning to China (The Washington Post 2009b), in pursuit of forging what they 
perceived as a 'missing link' in global economic markets, namely the link 
between the markets of Latin America and Asia (Paz 2006: 104). 
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China's development aid to the region has grown steadily since China 
renewed its regional activities in 2004 (Paz 2006: 46). Since then, investment in 
the region's resource extraction processes and industries, principally in Venezuela, 
Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Argentina has grown significantly, and as suggested by 
Paz (2006) can be seen as a form of financial support, and thus a type of aid. The 
scale of the aid reflects its importance to China's interests in the region. For 
example, countries such as Venezuela and Brazil received in excess of US$16 
billion and US$8 billion in aid respectively in 2007 (Lum et al. 2009: 15), a figure 
that is annually increasing, whilst Central American countries, such as Costa Rica, 
received an estimated US$400 million (Lum et al. 2009: 15). 
i) The practice of the Beijing Consensus 
In continuing the investigation into how the Beijing Consensus is perceived and 
embraced through China's development aid to the region, this section will 
investigate how the stimulation of innovative growth, expansion of regional 
self-confidence, localisation of development, formation of regional free trade 
areas, counterbalancing of 'black GDP growth', and development of asymmetric 
power, have been induced through China's foreign aid policy to the region, and 
informed by the developmentalist norm. 
China's development aid has been focussed on a range of cost effective 
and innovative projects across the region, as highlighted in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Chinese aid supported projects in Latin America (Lum et al. 
2009: 15) 
Country Aid supported project areas 
Argentina Agriculture 
Brazil Infrastructure (aviation, rail and ports), satellite technology, agriculture 
Chile Natural resources, ports 
Columbia Steel, oil exploration, mining 
Costa Rica Humanitarian aid, infrastructure , 
Cuba Natural Resources 
Venezuela Oil and Gas exploration and production, transportation, telecommunications, i 
light industry 
I 
As seen in the cases of Southeast Asia and Africa, the focus of China's 
activities in the region has been on resource extraction, such as nickel and copper 
from Cuba and Chile, and oil from Venezuela; all of which are exported to 
China's equity markets (Zweig and Bi 2005: 25-38). China's aid also re-enforces 
the regional supply routes, as seen by the development of export infrastructure on 
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both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continent (Lum et al. 2009: 14-5). The 
enhancement of region-wide supply routes could also reduce the region's 
dependency on more traditional trade routes, like that of the Panama Canal (Roy 
2005: 72). This also serves China's interests, as this trade route is also a major 
shipping route for its exports from Africa. The development of telecommunication 
and satellite technology also enhances these channels of distribution, through 
improved levels of communication technology. China's focus of aid on Argentine 
agriculture, notably through investments in its soya bean markets, has helped the 
country's economic recovery and development, and exemplifies how China's 
development model has proved to be effective. 
The disbursement of innovative aid not only aims to provide a cost 
effective method for creating sustainable development but also aims to raise 
regional self-confidence, by triggering developmental chain reactions in growth. 
China's aim to promote mutual trust, through its aid to the region, hopes to 
demonstrate that it is 'ready to work with Latin American nations to strengthen 
coordination and boost confidence' (People s Daily 2009a). This is also 
complementary to the internationalist norm. Its four point plan, as outlined in its 
2008 regional policy paper, centred on enhancing cultural exchanges, and 
strengthening consultation and cooperation between itself and the region. When 
Vice Premier Hui Liangyi and Vice President Xi Jinping toured the region in 2009, 
they were keen to highlight that China's interests in the region extended beyond 
resource extraction, and lay 'in the long-term development of Latin America' 
(BBe 2009c). Although China's aid rhetoric and practice varies, evidence of the 
region's growth in self-confidence can be seen through the notable expansion of 
projects and aid through the region, as governments are widely embracing China's 
increasing investment in the region. The enhanced prosperity in Argentina in 
recent years has fuelled considerable regional self-confidence, and provided clear 
evidence that redevelopment outside of the traditional paths of development, as 
prescribed by the Washington Consensus, are not only possible, but also 
achievable (Paz 2006: 106-7; 109). 
China's UNPKO efforts in Haiti are fuelling self-confidence in the region, 
by demonstrating China's commitment to long-term multilateral resolutions to the 
region's fundamental problems (People s Daily 2004c). China's policy paper in 
2008 highlighted China's growmg awareness of prominent regional 
environmental issues and concerns, such as pollution, desertification and climate 
. 
change, and outlined the need for implementing tighter regulations and controls 
across the region, through the providing of training, education, capacity building, 
and using the multilateral channels of the UN (Xinhua 2008d). 
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While China's 'go out' policy is primarily focussed on its infrastructural 
projects in Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile, it is also providing aid to humanitarian 
growth and development, notably in the region around Central America and the 
Caribbean. In order to counter the seemingly ambiguous differences in cultural 
perception between the regions, and to establish their own image of Chinese 
culture, the PRC has continued to establish Confucian institutes across the region, 
in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru, 
aimed at expanding regional knowledge about China (Hanban). By raising levels 
of mutual understanding between the two regions, China hopes to build upon the 
foundations of its relationships, which are also being strengthened further through 
China's role in UNPKO in Haiti, as previously outlined. 
A central principle of the Beijing Consensus is the promotion of equality 
in the economic development of a region. Although economic equality is often 
tarnished by 'black GDP growth', the pursuit of this goal has been demonstrated 
in Southeast Asia and in Latin America through the establishment of Free Trade 
Areas. China's development aid to the region was instrumental in the foundation 
of the Sino-Chilean FTA in 2007. Chile was chosen as the most suitable country 
in the region to establish an initial regional FTA, since it was the country with the 
highest levels of development in the region, with an increasingly well developed 
regional infrastructure, and access to markets. The success of creating this FTA 
has fuelled China's aspirations of developing further region wide FTAs, involving 
Costa Rica, Peru, and Paraguay, the latter of which remains one of the only 
countries in the region still to maintain relations with Taiwan. The expansion of 
free trade in the area, not only contributes to enhancing intra-regional markets, but 
also provides China with better access to wider global markets. 
ii) Limitations to develop mentalism in Latin America 
One of the obstacles to development across the developing world is the growth of 
'black GDP', which diminishes the magnitude of positive development in the 
region. China's aid to the region has significantly contributed to this growth, 
though China remains resolute in promoting the long-term benefits for the region, 
and as such, reconciles 'black GDP growth' in transient terms relative to 
long-term prosperity. China's mineral extraction processes across the region are 
contributing to significant environmental damage, as was also seen in Southeast 
Asia and Africa. The rapid influx of cheap Chinese goods into Latin American 
markets (Xinhua 2005a) is also inducing 'black GDP growth', through the 
undermining of local businesses, and fuelling of regional unemployment. China is 
correspondingly attempting to compensate for this growth, as highlighted in its 
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regional policy paper, by showing its awareness of the environmental problems in 
the region; despite this, its paper failed to provide definitive plans for 
implementing solutions to these problems. In response to the influx of Chinese 
goods into the region's markets, countries have increasingly introduced 
anti-dumping duties upon Chinese imports, which have resulted in China 
increasing its investment in the development of regional markets; a move that 
indicates China's interest in enhancing the sustainability of the markets in the 
region (Xinhua 2005a). 
In recent years, 'black GDP growth' has further fuelled regional 
nationalism, as seen in Ecuador and Venezuela, and has resulted in the increased 
incidence of left wing semi-authoritarian governments that have taken office 
across the region (Kurlantzick 2006c: 33-40; LatinAmerican Post; Li 2007b: 
24-7). These governments are increasingly opposed to foreign oil investment and 
resource extraction activities, fuelling another significant factor in the Beijing 
Consensus, namely self-reliance. Ramo (2004) highlights how self-reliance in a 
region could be achieved through the development of asymmetric forms of power, 
thereby increasing states' abilities to cope with external influences. The promotion 
and development of asymmetric power, through China's aid, is a fundamental 
factor behind China's developmental activities in the region, due to the proximity 
of the United States. The development of regional asymmetric power is critical 
along the trade routes through the Panama Canal, which are heavily defended and 
policed by the US military. Regional anti-US sentiment has remained significant 
throughout the continent over the past sixty years, due in no small part to its 
prominent exercising of military power across the region, which has accentuated 
the region's pursuit of alternative markets (Li 2007a: 836, 856). This is most 
visible in countries such as Venezuela, under the Chavez Government, as well as 
in Cuba, both of which have increasingly tense relations with the United States. 
Cuba's potential to use asymmetric power in the region is disproportionate to its 
size. Having remained a long-term ally of the PRC, and the recipient of a 
significant amount of its aid, Cuba has developed significant levels of asymmetric 
power over other countries in the region, which it has received investment from, 
and who rely on China for aid, such as Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. China, 
however, remains cautious about its activities in the region, since it also maintains 
prominent business interests in the US market. American President Barak 
Obama's policies in the region, announced in 2009, towards Cuba, following its 
re-admission to the OAS after five decades of exile (BBe 2009b), indicated a 
reduction in hostilities towards the nation. These moves serve to potentially 
undermine China's regional asymmetric power (The Washington Post 2009a). 
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A further indication of China's promotion and development of regional 
asymmetric power was evident through its distinctly low key naval activities near 
the Panama Canal (Roy 2005: 72), along with its reluctance to become involved 
in regional arms procurement activities (Dominguez 2006: 8). Innovative 
technological aid to Brazil, in the form of spy satellite technology, highlights how 
China has supported defensive, rather than offensive, policies in the region, as 
demonstrated by its provision of military training programs to the region 
following the cessation of similar programs run by the US. Further evidence of 
China's promotion of asymmetric power in the region can be seen in Argentina, 
where China's increased export business and investment is also serving to help the 
country reduce its IMF debt, thereby reducing its dependency on dollar reserves. 
By increasing its investment in Argentina, it is slowly diminishing the region's 
dependency on dollars for trade, by providing an alternative currency over which 
it retains significant control through the mechanisms of the CCP. The replacement 
of the dollar as a trading currency would enhance its image as a major global 
power (Toyoda 2008: 21-4). 
6.4 Summary 
As with the case studies of Southeast Asia and Africa, the summary will conclude 
this case study with a similar examination of the intended practical and 
unintended rhetorical perspectives of the embedded norms in the Latin American 
region to those seen in the other case studies. Asianism was not investigated in 
this case study, as its role in the formulation of aid to the region was not 
considered important. While sovereignty continues to reflect changes in global 
politics, China's non-interference policy in the region highlights how its 
behaviour has been reactive, whereas in Africa and Southeast Asia, its behaviour 
has been more proactive. The other two norms, internationalism and 
developmentalism, have emerged and evolved in line with China's relatively 
recent activities in the region. 
Internationalism 
In the early 1970s, when China gained admission to the UN, the newly emerging 
internationalist norm informed its foreign policies towards the provision of 
South-South cooperation. This is shown in Figure 6.1, by the explosive admission 
to international institutions in the region from 1970 onwards. In the early 1980s, 
as it became increasing engaged in Latin America through its institutional role, 
rather than through its former bilateral relations, many of which it formed in the 
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previous decade it demonstrated its promotion of South-South cooperation in its 
institutional interactions, which at that time eclipsed its international 
responsibilities. By the 1990s, though its international responsibilities remained 
inferior to its South-South cooperation efforts, these combined efforts through the 
institutions had significantly increased the practice of internationalism. At this 
time, the newly emerging developmentalist norm was beginning to exert an 
influence on its activities. By the late 1990s, as the internationalist norm had 
increasingly evolved in other regions, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, 
which had had a significant impact upon Latin America, there was a shift towards 
international responsibility, which began to match and surpass its South-South 
cooperative efforts. This corresponded to an increase in international 
responsibility, rather than a decrease in South-South cooperation, which it still 
promoted quite strongly. In the early 2000s, as the global sovereignty norm was 
also evolving towards the promotion of human rights, this added moral legitimacy 
to internationalism and multilateral responsibility, and resulted in China's 
increased involvement in UNPKO. In the aftermath of the SARS epidemic in 
Southeast Asia, internationalism and multilateral responsibility expanded as China 
became increasingly aware of the non-traditional threats that virulent disease 
could inflict upon its interests. In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis 
and the 2009 Swine Flu epidemic, which originated in Mexico, China has been 
motivated by both its international responsibilities and promotion of South-South 
cooperation to provide assistance to the region, in moves that will further 
strengthen its internationally responsible great-power identity. Moves such as 
these demonstrate how the norm continues to be taken up in the region, but has 
yet to undergo cascade. 
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Figure 6.1 The cumulative membership of international organisations by 
decade from 1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
Sovereignty 
The sovereignty norm in Latin America provides the clearest indication of all 
three regions of China's long-term adherence to non-interference. Although the 
sovereignty norm was prominent at the founding of the PRC, China's 
revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia and Africa have complicated the 
analysis of the norm. An important consideration in Latin America, which 
contributes to understanding this divergence, is the fact that countries within Latin 
America gained their independence and sovereign status in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. As such, and given their relative distance from the PRC, 
China remained more reluctant to become involved in regional insurgencies. The 
only notable exception was in the 1960s, when China became allied with Cuba, 
marking the foundation of interactions with the region. At this time, China's 
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unintended rhetoric was prominent, despite its ongoing pursuit of world 
revolution. This can be seen in Figure 6.2, by the initial high probability of 
non-interference. In the face of increased US action in the region, adherence to 
this policy remained significant. From the early 1970s, it became involved in the 
region through both its bilateral and institutional relations. These early 
multilateral relations arose notably through its capacity within the UN. This can 
be seen by the shift of the probability of non-interference, and highlights how 
China was able to provide legitimate assistance to the region, through the 
multilateral channels of the institutions. By the 1990s, China's relations with the 
US had become further strengthened, in line with the development of the 
internationalist and developmentalist norms. US action in the region also declined 
from its elevated levels of the 1980s. China continued to promote sovereignty and 
non-interference in the region, though this practice was moderated by its 
adherence to its 'one-China' policy. As global sovereignty underwent change in 
the late 1990s in a direction towards the promotion of human rights, these new 
factors moderated China's adherence to sovereignty, as it not only increasingly 
engaged in relations with countries who had formerly been allied to Western Cold 
War countries, but also, became involved with them through its increased 
interactions with the UN. China set a new precedent by deploying a UNPKO 
force in Haiti, in line with its increasing uptake of internationalism. Rather than 
prove detrimental to the probability of non-interference, this increase in moral 
legitimacy through multilateral involvement increases the probability of 
non-interference, as seen by the continued increase in the early 2000s in Figure 
6.2. This demonstrates how the evolving sovereignty norm has affected China's 
international relations since its re-emergence in the international community. 
However, the evolving sovereignty norm is in balance with the existing 
sovereignty norm, as it has yet to undergo further cascade and become fully 
internalised. 
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Figure 6.2 The variation of a coefficient of non-interference from 
1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
Developmentalism -
Though Chinese relations with Latin America date back, in the cases of Cuba and 
Chile, several decades, its developmental aid to the region is extremely recent. 
This has been due largely to the proximity of the region to the United States, as 
well as the region's geographical distance from the PRC. China became 
increasingly involved in the region through its institutions during the 1990s, with 
its promotion of South-South cooperation, in the aftermath of the notorious La 
Decada Perdida. As the developmentalist norm fuelled its newly emerged 
great-power identity, the region shared a common need for accelerated recovery. 
The internationalist norm in China increasingly evolved from providing 
South-South cooperation towards greater international responsibility. Despite this, 
China's actual initial aid disbursement did not begin until after Bu lintao's visit to 
the region in 2004. As a consequence of its recent commencement of aid activities 
in the region, its development aid closely projects the concepts of its own 
developmental path, described by the Beijing Consensus. As China has become 
more engaged in the region, primarily through investment in regional resource 
extraction and through channelling its own exports into the region's markets, it 
has through its range of regional projects disbursed innovative aid, which has 
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assisted countries, such as Argentina in 2004, to enhance their self-confidence 
after having experienced extended periods of financial uncertainty. China's 'go 
out' policy has become prominent throughout its projects in the region, notably, in 
its infrastructure projects in the cone of South America, and through humanitarian 
aid to Central America in response to crises and epidemics, and its involvement in 
UNPKO. China's involvement in the creation of regional FTAs is becoming more 
prolific, following the creation of the first Sino-Chilean FTA in 2007. As seen in 
other regions, China's developmental aid has also created significant 'black GDP 
growth' through environmental damage from its resource extraction projects to 
the region, and through its excessive importing of cheap products, which are 
proliferating throughout regional markets. This is inducing regional nationalism 
and fuelling an embracing of left wing semi-authoritarian governments, which are 
expressing growing anger towards the effect of foreign economic policies. 
Arguably, the most important regional factor that is being fuelled by China's 
developmental aid is asymmetric power, which is empowering regional countries 
to offset unwelcome influences from the US; a factor which has fuelled 
widespread regional resentment in recent years. Figure 6.3 highlights how the 
developmentalist norm has grown in the region in line with China's changing 
practice of distributing development aid between 2002 and 2008. The practical 
increase in this figure as measured by the increased in distributed aid reflects the 
enhanced promotion of the developmentalist norm. The accompanying increase in 
rhetoric is attributable to the regional visits by Hu Jintao, in 2004 and 2008. It 
should be noted that due to the recent commencement of activity in the region, the 
rhetorical axis, as reflected by the number of visits is relative, and does not 
include additional factors which have contributed to the regional rhetorical 
promotion of developmentalism, such as the policy paper released in late 2008 
and the nine nation tour of 2009, by Hui Liangyu and Li Jinping. The increased 
growth in developmental ism since 2004 reflects how China has internalised this 
norm and become increasingly active in the region. 
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Figure 6.3 The increase in uptake of developmental ism between 2002 and 
2008 in Latin America (Source data: see Appendix 3) 
As this was the final case study, this thesis will conclude its investigation 
of China's foreign aid by reviewing and analysing the findings examined 
throughout the case studies. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion presents the empirical findings of the investigation of the norms to 
the understanding of China's international behaviour and foreign aid policy from 
the three case studies. The implications of the findings are further discussed in 
order to address the question raised in the introduction. This discussion concludes 
by outlining the contribution that this work makes to the study of Chinese 
international relations, and sets out the broader theoretical and empirical 
implications for the continued study of this topic. 
7.1 Findings of the study 
This analysis primarily explored the behaviour of China as an aid donor, 
following its admission to the UN in 1971, and suggested that China's aid policies 
were influenced by the norms, which had, in turn, been shaped by its identity. The 
examination investigated the impact of internationalism, sovereignty, and 
developmentalism on its aid programmes and regional policies within the three 
regions, and further examined the case of Asianism within Southeast Asia. The 
examination concluded with an appraisal of the impact of the norms upon China's 
aid policy. 
7.1.1 The role of norms for the making of China's foreign aid policy since 
1949 
During the early years of the PRC, when China adopted a victim identity, the most 
significant norm shaping its behaviour was sovereignty. Sovereignty remained a 
dominant domestically embedded norm, irrespective of how undermined it 
became by China's revolutionary tendencies. The absence of internationalism, at 
that time, allowed China to become influenced heavily by its Soviet and Maoist 
teachings. 
The extent to which China sought to project sovereignty raises several 
issues. Sovereignty became a significant norm upon which the PRC was founded 
in 1949 as a result of China's century-long struggle against colonial and regional 
interference in its domestic affairs. The formation of the PRC was also 
accompanied by the foundation of China's identity as a victim of external 
204 
interference. The victim identity, along with its leaning towards Soviet 
commUnIsm, fuelled its revolutionary ideals throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Although China upheld the sovereignty norm, its revolutionary ideals and victim 
experiences prompted it to view other colonised developing countries as occupied 
rather than sovereign states, and as such, it was obligated to provide aid in the 
restoration of sovereignty to what it viewed as the legitimate ruling bodies in 
these countries, rather than acknowledge their colonial masters. This theme was 
prominent in its rhetoric of the time, which echoed its revolutionary inclinations, 
most notably in the aftermath of the Bandung conference, where it stressed that 
the limits of its interference extended only as far as regional decolonisation. 
China's victim identity and the absence of internationalism prompted the 
PRC to exercise its own subjectivity in defining non-interference throughout 
Southeast Asia and Africa. Its adherence to the sovereignty norm, despite its 
revolutionary activities, may also be inferred through the absence of its activities 
in countries in Latin America, which had gained their independence in the late 
nineteenth century, and were already sovereign states. Consequently, China 
observed this and correspondingly refrained from engaging in revolutionary 
activities in those countries, with the exception of Cuba. In this case, the island 
had already undergone revolution before China established relations with the 
Castro Government in 1960. The sovereignty norm evolved due to three key 
factors that became prominent from the early 1970s onwards in China: firstly, 
many of the colonised developing countries, in Africa and Southeast Asia, had, by 
this time, gained their independence; secondly, China's victim identity 
transformed into that of a neutral actor; and thirdly, the internationalist norm 
began to emerge in China. 
The extent to which China projected the developmentalist norm reflects 
the norm's absence at that time. This factor, along with the absence of 
~nternationalism, is highlighted by China's lack of urgency in developing to keep 
up with the international community. In the 1950s, its leanings towards Soviet 
communism fuelled its long-term goal of developing a communist world order, 
separate from the capitalist West. This can be seen in its rhetoric and enhanced 
activities aimed at decolonising countries of the developing world. These 
developmental efforts, following the Sino-Soviet rift of 1960, became 
increasingly desperate throughout the 1960s as it attempted to demonstrate its 
relative self-reliance and capabilities through its projects, as seen through the 
formulation of the Tan-Zam railway project. 
As already outlined, China at this time resisted any accommodation of 
internationalism, and as it adhered to the ideology of communism, it only 
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marginally accommodated its regional non-aligned neighbours, which reflected its 
resistance to Asianism. When China's identity shifted to that of a neutral actor, the 
transition stimulated its uptake of internationalism. This continued to reshape its 
international relations, as the combined effect of both internationalism and 
sovereignty became apparent through its exercising of greater responsibility 
through institutions, and its significant decrease in revolutionary activities. 
As China's neutral identity expanded in the 1970s and resulted in its 
discontinuing support for insurgents throughout Africa and Southeast Asia, China 
was increasingly able to project its adherence to sovereignty, and further 
strengthened its adherence to the internationalist norm through the UN. Since that 
time, it has adhered to the sovereignty norm, through its policy of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The exception to this 
is its insistence on bilateral relations being founded upon the 'one-China' policy, 
which it frames in terms of obligations to international law. 
The onset of developmentalism in China resulted in further shifts in 
sovereignty becoming more noticeable. Developmentalism has become one of the 
most important embedded norms to be projected within modern China, as its 
emergence at the end of the 1970s fuelled China's initial economic reforms, and 
resulted in the shift towards multilateral aid distribution through the institutions, 
at a time when its aid activities in the developing world were decreasing. The 
developmentalist norm affected China's policies in Africa in the mid-1980s, as 
reflected by the shift towards post-project management, in the Tan-Zam railway 
project, and thereby indicated how the increasing uptake of developmentalism by 
China, was affecting the sovereignty norm and policy of non-interference. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, as China's identity was changing to a 
neutral actor, and it was becoming increasingly more accommodating of 
internationalism, China's activities and relations were limited largely to its former 
bilateral alliances throughout the regions. During the following decade, it 
focussed its activities on its support of South-South cooperation, and the nurturing 
of new relations with non-communist countries. As it began its period of reforms 
in the late 1970s, and improved relations with the US, it increasingly used the 
channels of the UN to distribute aid multilaterally. The increase in 
accommodation of internationalism through the institutional framework of 
South-South cooperation, highlighted how it was also increasingly regionally 
accommodating, if not actively taking up, the norm of Asianism, in Southeast 
Asia. By the end of the 1980s, as the Cold War was ending and China's identity 
shifted towards that of a great power, it increasingly took up the norm of 
developmental ism, which further increased its uptake of internationalism and 
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Asianism. As the 1990s progressed, the effect of the increase in norm uptake 
began to induce shifts in the sovereignty norm. 
A particular element of the sovereignty norm in China arises from China's 
extended period of isolation from the international community. China internalised 
the sovereignty norm before the late 1940s. Between that time and the early 1970s, 
China remained isolated from the evolving global sovereignty norm. Once China 
re-entered the international community, it became re-exposed to the evolving 
sovereignty norm. While the global sovereignty norm increasingly evolved 
towards human rights, the older sovereignty norm embedded in China, displayed 
less flexibility. The sovereignty norm in China is gradually evolving along with 
global sovereignty, as it re-emerges in the norm life-cycle, and becomes exposed 
to increasingly competitive factors on its path to cascade. The positive factors 
fuelling its evolution include internationalism and developmental ism, whereas the 
negative factors arise from the legacies of the early PRC, notably through the 
authoritarian mechanisms of the CCP. The balance between the internalised 
sovereignty norm in China and the re-emerged norm highlights many of China's 
seemingly contradictory divergences from sovereignty in recent years. The shift 
towards the re-emerged sovereignty norm is projected through its increased 
involvement in UNPKO, while its stringent adherence to older non-interference 
policies, which have been the hallmark of the PRC, is projected through its 
adherence to sovereignty, as seen in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
China's most recent projection of developmentalism, following its identity 
shift to a great power in the late 1980s, is highlighted prominently through 
regional activities and its desire to accelerate its level of development after years 
of isolation from the international community. The increased uptake of the norm 
throughout the 1990s not only fuelled China's uptake of internationalism and 
Asianism, but significantly increased China's motivation and activities towards its 
regional resource extraction programmes and overseas market expansion. The 
developmentalist norm as framed by the Beijing Consensus has subsequently 
cascaded and become internalised within China, as it increasingly promotes the 
norm throughout its regions of activity. 
As its great-power identity has become increasingly strengthened, China 
has significantly increased its accommodation of internationalism, as is seen 
through its increased involvement in institutions throughout the world. 
Throughout the 1990s, this involvement matched its uptake of developmentalism 
and the newly emerged Asianist norm. The improvement in China's position 
regarding international responsibility also affected the evolution of the 
sovereignty norm, as previously discussed. This is reflected in its increased 
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involvement in regional peacekeeping activities through the UN, and its 
humanitarian aid. Although internationalism has been taken up increasingly over 
the past two decades, the norm has still to cascade and undergo internalisation. 
This can be seen, most notably, where it challenges the norm of sovereignty, in 
Southeast Asia and Africa. 
China has increasingly accommodated Asianism since the early 1990s, 
following the shift in its identity to a great power. As the economies of Asia 
underwent growth, fuelled by the developmentalist norm, the success of this 
growth was attributed to 'Asian values'. China's identity as a great power was 
becoming manifested, along with the increased uptake of both developmental ism 
and internationalism. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provided China with an 
opportunity not only to demonstrate its more constrained behaviour, but also its 
increased affinity with Asian unity and identity. Following the crisis, China began 
to widen its multilateral involvement with the institutions of ASEAN, through the 
newly emerged institutions of ASEAN+ 1 and ASEAN+3. Its institutional 
activities in the early 2000s provided it with greater opportunities to demonstrate 
its commitment to Asian unity through regional cooperation. The onset of the 
SARS and avian flu epidemics in 2003-4, as well as the Southeast Asian tsunami 
in 2004, highlighted the importance of regional cooperation to China for the 
management of non-traditional security threats, and catalysed a greater 
enhancement in its activities in the region, as it sought to compensate for the 
deficiencies in its capabilities that these events had highlighted. By 2009, in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, many countries within Asia increasingly 
looked to China for solutions to the recovery of the region, thereby highlighting 
how much China had increased its regional leadership role. China's enhanced 
cooperation with the region will become further enhanced in 2010 with the 
establishment of the Southeast Asian regional Free Trade Area. This has been 
created as part of China's ongoing regional multilateral projects which include the 
development of major transportation routes linking Shanghai to Singapore and 
demonstrates how Asianism is increasingly being taken up throughout the region 
as its great power identity strengthens. 
The identities that China has adopted during these times have shaped the 
norms that it took up and in some cases internalised. Appendix 1 highlights the 
events that have transpired over the past sixty years in each region, and Appendix 
2 highlights the factors that transformed China's identities, and the corresponding 
effect that these changes had on the accompanying norms. Appendix 3 provides 
the reported data which was used to create the case study summary figures in 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 6. Figure 7.1 highlights the norm emergence during each 
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identity period, demonstrating the relative influences of the emerged norms at the 
start and end of each period. Each plot displays the norms positioned relative to 
domestic and international sectors, as well as whether they have cascaded or not. 
The scale of each norm is a relative measure of the number of years that the norm 
has existed within the life cycle. As a norm enters the life cycle and approaches 
the tipping point, it attains a critical mass, reflecting its acceptance. The mass 
attained by the norm at the point of cascade may therefore reflect the length of 
time it has taken to reach the tipping point; hence, rapidly tipped norms, such as 
developmental ism and Asianism, attain a critical mass sufficient to transcend the 
tipping threshold more rapidly than internationalism which in the diagram has 
taken longer to reach its respective critical mass. As such, this may suggest that 
the critical mass required for the tipping of internationalism exceeds that of the 
other norms that preceded it. Though the factors contributing to the tipping of 
each norm undoubtedly differ, and the thresholds may well differ between the 
norms, the plots merely reflect the fact of whether the norm has tipped or not; 
such states will therefore be common to all norms. Once the centre of gravity of 
the norm crosses the tipping threshold, however, the cascaded norms growth 
ceases as it has exceeded the critical mass required for acceptance. Although each 
norm increases in size over time, the relative density of the older norm then 
begins to decrease compared to the newer surrounding cascaded norms, as the 
tipped norms become internalised in the society. This causes more recently 
cascaded norms to impact upon the older norms, and cause them to distort, under 
their newer influences, as seen by the distortion of sovereignty by 
developmentalism. As older norms, such as internationalism attempt to cascade, 
their ability transcend the cascade threshold becomes impeded by the recently 
cascaded norms, such as Asianism. Though the critical mass of Asianism may be 
less that of internationalism, their relative densities may be more comparable. As 
sovereignty is the oldest of the four norms, it has become distorted due to the 
relative impact from the other norms. The emergence of the global sovereignty 
norm in the life cycle, is reflected by the newly emerging uncascaded sovereignty 
norm, which displays both domestic and international character as seen by its 
position traversing the central axis. Although it has recently re-emerged into the 
norm life cycle, it appears larger as the norm has been present in the international 
community for a longer period of time. Since the interactivity between each pair 
of norms may occur along multiple and differing dimensions, the exact 
representation of the norm interaction is difficult to visualise in the figure. 
Additionally, though the spacial positions of the norms that have crossed the 
tipping threshold may reflect the degree of internalisation of the cascaded norm, 
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their relative positions have been accentuated In the diagram to enhance the 
clarity of the figure. 
1950 Victi m ldertily 1970 
cascadOO' 
InlBmalised 
Donl9Slic I nlBrnalional Domestic InlBmalional 
Neutral Ide~ty 1990 Great Powe r Identity 2010 
• 
• Sowrei!ItY 
S<Nemi!ItY (EMlIYed) 
InlBmalionaism 
~ IJEN9Iopmenlmsm 
§ Asiaism 
Domestic I nlDrrBional Domestic IntBnUional 
Figure 7.1 The evolution of norms affecting Ch ina's forei gn aid poli cies 
between 1950 to 2010, reflected through its corresponding 
identity I 
I The di agram highlights how shortly after the formation of the PRe, the sovereignty norm was 
not only the first of the four norms to have emerged, but also that it was fiml ly intemali sed. As a 
result , thi s embedded norm is positioned across th e cascade threshold . Since the interacti on 
between the norms occurs across multiple dimensions, it is not poss ible to reflect th e exact inter 
norm interactions on this diagram. This diagram can only hi ghlight when the norm s emerged 
relati ve to sovereignty, and the fact that the emerged norms affected th e existin g norms. The 
re lati ve inerti a and density of the norms is refl ected by how much th e embedd ed norm shi ft s when 
impacted upon by other more recently cascaded norm s. As Sovereignty is firml y intern alised. and 
signifi cantly o lder, its res istan ce to the other norms is demonstrated in 20 I 0 by th e fac t th at it is 
becoming di storted. As oth er norms, such as developmental ism and As iani sm ha\ e become Ill orc' 
recentl y intern ali sed th ey are small er and of greater de nsity. and th erefo re able to exe rt greatc' r 
influences ove r th e o ld er norm s, des pite their extended period o f intemali sa ti on. The plots al so 
demonstrate how deve lopmental ism has not onl y grown substanti all y sin ce 1990 but also has 
a ffec ted a II of th e oth er norms th rough its growth . 
~ I O 
7.1.2 Norm implications for China's foreign aid 
The significance of the norms to China's foreign aid is linked with the 
circumstances that shaped its emergence as an aid donor from the 1970s onwards. 
Since then, China's status has grown with its stature as both a rising economic 
power and aid provider, therefore mirroring the evolution of its own self-image. 
In the early years of the PRC, sovereignty existed as an internalised norm but 
became undermined by revolutionary tendencies. After it gained admission to the 
UN, its identity shifted from that of a victim to a neutral actor, as it adopted 
further norms from the 1970s onwards, in place of its former revolutionary ideals. 
The developmentalist norm has grown in significance since the late 1980s, due to 
China's own accelerated development, and highlights the nascent tension between 
itself and dominant liberal developmental paths. 
The implications of the Asianist norm for China's foreign aid policy 
remain dependent upon factors within Asia, rather than Africa or Latin America. 
In the aftermath of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami, China has become more 
involved within the framework of ASEAN+3, as seen through its proposal of 
renewed measures to expand region wide cooperative efforts. Although many 
Asian nations participated in the London G20 meeting in 2009, China remained 
one of the key Asian contributors to the meeting. Later in 2009, at the Boao 
Forum in Hainan, Asian countries met to discuss, among other things, the global 
financial crisis, and advocated increased multilateral cooperative efforts as a 
solution, highlighting its clear commitment to continuing to provide aid to the 
region through the multilateral mechanisms of the region'S institutions. The Boao 
Forum highlighted the extent to which China's vision of a future Asian identity 
would be reflected, through the diverse range of novel and innovative fields into 
which Asian countries seek to diversify. 
The implications for internationalism highlight the seriousness of China's 
engagement of international responsibility through institutions. Significant recent 
factors that have increased China's responsible behaviour internationally arise 
from the realisation of the dangers it faces from non-traditional security threats, 
for example, from the SARS and Avian flu epidemics, as well as regional 
catastrophes, such as the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004. A clear indicator of 
norm uptake by China has been visible by the extent to which China has not only 
acted responsibly but encouraged responsible behaviour through its aid. China is 
increasingly responding in a responsible manner conducive to its role within 
international institutions, as seen through its involvement in UN peacekeeping, 
and humanitarian aid activities. There has also been an increase in its institutional 
involvement with projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Though membership 
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of these regional institutions will constrain its business interests in the region, 
China has become more involved in recent years in an advisory role, in the face of 
increasing criticism of its activities. The continued increase in China's 
responsibilities in Southeast Asia, in responding to regional development, will 
also impact upon both Asianism and developmentalism, in such projects as the 
Trans-Asian Highways, linking China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand to 
Singapore. Its international response to countries such as Myanmar may also 
affect its status through its adherence to the sovereignty norm (MFA 2008a; 
National Development and Reform Commission 2003: 117). In Africa, factors 
influencing multilateral responsibilities in the region will be similarly affected by 
its non-interference policies in both Zimbabwe and Sudan. As pointed out in 
Chapter 5, in 2008 and 2009, China faced new challenges to its demonstration of 
international responsibility, as its cargo ships from Africa became the target of 
Somali pirates, thereby highlighting how yet more non-traditional threats to the 
security of its interests are shaping the internationalist norm. In Latin America, 
China's responsible image is empowering its efforts to counter the apparent zeal 
of both its regional resource exportation and the influx of Chinese exports. 
Through its increased investment in regional markets and infrastructure, in moves 
it hopes will temper the region and prevent the collapse of internal markets, China 
is simultaneously protecting its long term regional prospects and moderating the 
increase in regionalism. Internationalism, out of the four norms studied, remains 
the least taken up of the norms. 
Sovereignty not only represents the norm that has undergone the most 
significant divergence in international opinion in recent years, as Kofi Annan's 
UN paper illustrates (The Economist 1999), but also, as it was the norm upon 
which the PRC was founded, it has affected, and has become affected by, all of 
the other norms. The promotion of sovereignty was of considerable benefit to 
China during the early days of the PRC, as non-interference in countries' affairs 
encouraged the formation of alliances in Southeast Asia, Africa and Communist 
countries. It also accounts for China's lack of involvement in revolutions in Latin 
America during that same period. However, such behaviour has more recently 
affected negatively the internationalist norm. The sovereignty norm remains 
pivotal in China's diplomatic efforts in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe, within 
the frame of non-interference, and will be a contributory factor in the future role 
of this norm. At present, this norm remains a significant impediment to solving 
long standing issues like that between Myanmar and the international community. 
Although developmentalism, within the framework of the Beijing Consensus, 
infers the adherence to sovereignty, regionalism in Latin America has 
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demonstrated that the acceptance of the developmentalist norm adhered to by 
Cl)ina in the regions may still be impeded somewhat within a Chinese framework. 
Since sovereignty is also evolving, due in part to a mix of influences from 
internationalism and developmentalism, China's activities within UNPKO will 
also significantly influence how the re-emerged sovereignty norm becomes taken 
up in its regions of activity. 
The embracing of the Beijing Consensus remains the strongest indicator of 
the efficacy of the developmentalist norm. Factors such as non-interference and 
declining Western interest, induced through the 2007 financial crisis, are 
compounding the internalisation of this cascaded norm. In Southeast Asia, the key 
to China's continued success remains through its multilateral efforts to raise 
standards of development in the region, whilst offsetting negative influences, such 
as its non-interference in the domestic affairs of Myanmar, which has prolonged 
the international ostracism of the country and delayed the country's development, 
and has contributed to a substantial increase in 'black GDP growth'. In Africa and 
Latin America, increased regional acceptance of this norm arises not only through 
providing a more welcome alternative to current Western policies, but also arises 
from the reduced activities of more traditional aid donors. This acceptance is still 
facing considerable resistance from factors such as regionalism in Latin America, 
which continues to be induced in response to this norm. 
7.1.3 Factors contributing to and resulting from shifts in China's identity 
An examination of the factors contributing to China's identity shifts, in Appendix 
2, highlights three factors that have been common throughout China's identity 
transformations over the past sixty years. The first factor highlights how China's 
transformation of its identity has occurred during periods when its security was 
increasingly threatened, and was followed by an increase in its uptake of norms. 
In the early 1970s, after facing increasing isolation from the international 
community, China's identity transformed from a victim to a neutral actor, as the 
country took up internationalism. By the late 1970s, as China's reform period 
began, the domestic developmentalist norm emerged. In the late 1980s, in the 
latter years of the Cold War, and in the face of increasing US unilateralism, 
China's identity changed to that of a great power, which induced its increased 
uptake of developmentalism. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
China took up Asianism further. The second factor highlights how its embracing 
of these new norms has stabilised and enhanced China's behaviour as a nation. A 
third factor that is common to these transitions concerns the incidence of identity 
change, which based upon these observations, has occurred approximately every 
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twenty years throughout the life of the PRC. This approximately corresponds to 
each successive generation in China. While, as previously discussed, the change 
of each successive identity has affected China's demonstrated behaviour, the 
uptake of norms by China is increasingly less likely to induce significant shifts in 
its identity, as China's behaviour becomes more constrained due to the ability of 
its strengthened identity to withstand significant threats to its security. Any 
external activity short of outright direct action against it or its regional activities is 
likely to be countered by the asymmetric power it has developed to maintain 
peace and stability throughout Asia, and its regions of activity. 
7.2 Contributions and future work 
This study has contributed to the ongoing understanding of Chinese foreign policy 
from an IR perspective, by presenting a current account of the effect of China's 
aid activities around the world from a constructivist perspective. By including an 
analysis of the historic relations between China and its respective regions of 
activity, the importance of historical events, which have been commonly 
neglected from conventional theoretical discourses of China's foreign policies, 
has been demonstrated, particularly at periods when China's identity underwent 
notable shifts. The study addressed the question of why these identity shifts were 
induced in different periods, and explored not only the relationship between the 
identity shifts and the norms of behaviour during those periods, but also the effect 
that these shifts had on the resulting norms that China took up and internalised. 
Furthermore, this investigation addressed the relative importance of 
China's internationally and domestically embedded norms, which have commonly 
been confused with policies. By carefully discussing and analysing the four major 
norms that are related to China's aid, the influence and interaction of the norms on 
aid and foreign policy behaviour was addressed. Through understanding the role 
of norms in China's current foreign policy, it was possible to identify and explain 
key aspects of China's relationships across the various regions studied. The 
importance of the norms was highlighted and used to understand the problems 
confronting China as it diversifies into different regions of the world. It was 
additionally shown how China's future activities will not only become shaped by 
changing norms, but also how the integration of factors from other IR theoretical 
studies, such as realism, may help to clarify the extent to which its aid efforts are 
effective. This serves as a foundation for a future and broader discussion of norms 
to the understanding of China's international behaviour. 
While this study addressed the above issues, a further field which could 
serve as a future direction for the continued study of this subject regards the 
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factors affecting the internalisation of the norms. Such factors play an important 
role in the localisation of the norm following cascade. Addressing these factors 
may help to clarify exactly why developmental ism and Asianism were 
preferentially taken up by China, whilst the internationalist norm has experienced 
a more protracted period of uptake. Addressing these factors may also highlight 
whether the internalisation of internationalism arises predominantly from China's 
accommodation of the rules and legislations of global communities, or whether 
global communities are becoming more accommodating of China as it continues 
to grow in its great power role. China's continued role in events such as the pirate 
issue in the Indian Ocean, or its continued relations with Sudan and Zimbabwe, 
may provide key indicators to the direction that internalisation of this important 
norm may ultimately take. 
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ApPENDIXl 
China's identity and behaviour between the I950s and 20IOs 
-- Southeast (SE) Asia, Africa and Latin America 
Period/ Regional Behaviour 
Identity 
SEAsia 
• aligned with Soviet Camp in aftermath of civil/Korean War 
• led to hostile relations with pro-Western neighbours 
• irresponsible international pursuit of decolonisation through revolution 
• following Bandung, enhanced regional cooperation 
• after Soviet rift, aid became symbolic with communist neighbours, through 
bilateral relations 
1950s-1970s • pursued international recognition 
Identity: Africa 
• aligned with developing nations following Bandung conference 
Victim • responsible behaviour negated by revolutionary pursuits in decolonisation 
• following Soviet rift, increased relations in pursuit of international recognition and 
support for seat at UN 
• development projects in early 1970s largely symbolic, e.g. Tan-Zam railway 
Latin America 
• marginal regional relations, limited by regional political alignment and proximity 
to US/ distance from PRC, and sovereign status of countries 
• relations limited to Cuba, through revolutionary affinity, led to exclusive partnership till 1970s 
SEAsia 
• significant reduction in revolutionary support and improved regional relations, 
through enhanced adherence to non-interference, in interests of regional stability 
1970s-1990s and greater independence of regional nations 
• used multilateral mechanisms of UN to improve relations in region, under the Identity: framework of South-South cooperation to assist with redevelopment of region 
Neutral Actor • a shift to institutional efforts behind the scenes at the UN to improve responsible 
Image 
• acted to stabilise US/Soviet influence in region, through institutional mechanisms 
• undertook domestic reform and improved relations throughout region through ASEAN (early 1990s), mirroring its uptake of developmentalism 
Africa 
• reduction of revolutionary activities/support, mirrored independence of nations in 
Africa 
• 
I 
! 
I 
having ascended to UN, a shift from exclusive bilateral relations to mixture of 
bilateral and multilateral efforts towards improving its developing world supporter/' 
neutral image in region 
• used own position to reciprocate influence for regional benefit 
• increased institutional efforts to reduce superpower politics influencing and impeding regional development, to enhance its image of neutrality and 
responsibility 
• adherence to sovereignty noticeable by its reluctance to manage aid projects in 
region 
• shift towards assisted project management in 1980s, mirrors emergence of developmentalism . . 
• activities changed focus in mid-1980s towards project based efforts, to maximise productivity/cost effectiveness 
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I 
i 
, 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1990s-2010s 
Identity: 
Great Power 
I Latin America 
• relatively minor activities and enhanced adherence to sovereignty due to enhanced 
. US regional presence 
I. extensive use of rhetoric to challenge US in region through channels of UN 
I SE Asia 
i. pre-1997 China displayed aggression over territorial claims, led to creation of New 
I Security Concept 
• increasing multilateral involvement in region to play down China threat 
• played pivotal role in 1997 Asian financial crisis recovery; led to increased 
• 
• 
• 
• 
multilateral cooperation through ASEAN, and signing the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation 
enhanced multilateral efforts, with renewed efforts focussing upon more reform, 
following 1997 financial crisis, mirrored uptake of Asianism 
enhancement of regional activism, seen through 'go out' policy and wider regional 
involvement, enhanced business activities in region! region wide infrastructural 
projects e.g. GMS, trans Asian highway, regional FTAs 
post- SARS/tsunami even greater involvement in institutions in face of 
non-security threats, resulted in enhanced unity and activism in region, even 
greater uptake of developmentalism 
change in global sovereignty norm increased moral legitimacy, led to change to 
greater promotion of human rights and environmental concerns, evolution of 
sovereignty norm 
• quest for resources led it to promote its own development model as paragon 
• distributed soft power through region 
,. proactive in creation ofFTA in region 
• post-2007 financial crisis seeks greater reform of international financial systems, 
being sought as role model in region for advice 
• adherence to the sovereignty norm over Myanmar, though in other cases where this 
affects human rights, notable moderation in rhetoric becomes more apparent 
Africa 
• greater incidence of managing projects in region through bilateral and multilateral 
efforts, which reduce perception of actual intervention 
• enhanced business activities in region, mirroring uptake of developmental ism 
• enhanced deployment of entrepreneurs throughout region to enhance regional and 
domestic prosperity, through creation and expansion of 'go out' policy 
• activism resource extraction backing its own development 
• promotion of Beijing Consensus throughout region to counter Western models 
which have perceived failings 
• creation ofFOCAC enhanced cooperation in region further 
• responsible image moderating, towards enhanced moral legitimacy, but slow 
change in non-interference policy 
• increase in moral legitimacy of sovereignty norm induces greater involvement with 
UNPKO/anti pirate activities, mirror evolution of sovereignty 
• non-interference policy continues to assist pariah states, thereby impacting on 
internationalism 
• tolerance of nations like Sudan decreasing in recent years as adherence to human 
rights in other norms has impact here 
• developmentalism impacting on sovereignty through formation of SEZ to expand 
markets, though framed as multilateral enhancements to region 
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Latin America 
• notable involvement in multilateral institutions in region 
• enhanced business activities in region, mirrors uptake of developmental ism 
• notable continued downplaying of revolutionary/hegemonic image due to 
proximity of US 
• increased multilateral efforts to effect influence over region provide channels for 
varying from norm 
• maintenance of key supply routes that are key to its business enterprises in region 
and Africa 
• responsibility image being strengthened by shift towards human rights and 
involvement in UNPKO in Haiti 
• notable variations from sovereignty norm include involvement in UNPKO as well I 
as continued efforts to reduce Taiwanese regional influence 
• adherence to sovereignty norm noted by reluctance to completely modify regional 
nations' obligations to us (e.g. Argentina) 
• long term relation with Cuba may provide insight into propensity to influence 
internal politics of region to support its interests 
• bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote regional acceptance of Beij ing 
Consensus as developmental model 
• post-2004, enhanced business and investment activism in region, becoming 
countered by regionalism, which is prompting renewed activism by China to 
increase investment in region, to support export trade and formation of new 
markets 
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ApPENDIX 2 
Factors inducing evolution of the norms between the 1950s and 2010s 
Period/ Identity Factors contributing to identity Influence on Norms, from identity shift 
shift/adjustment 
1950s-1970s • deterioration of relations with Asianism 
Identity: Victim Soviets in late 1950s, and 
• current Asianist norm had not emerged increasing international 
isolation Internationalism 
• progressive regional failure in • norm emerged in early 1970s inciting revolution e.g. 
backlash towards China in • shift to pursuance of South-South 
Indonesia cooperation! international recognition 
• gradual de co Ionisation of 
following displacement of ROC as principal 
! colonial states through 
embodiment of China, through increased 
legitimate means membership of institutions 
I • ascension to UN and ability Sovereignty 
to apply mechanisms of • norm internalised pre-1949 
I institutions to achieving goals • adherence to non-intervention policy 
undermined by revolutionary tendencies, in 
SE Asia and Africa 
• policy of non-interference served its 
interests during its period of global isolation 
Deveiopmentalism 
• modern developmentalist norm non-existent 
1970s-1990s • collapse of Soviet Union and Asianism 
Identity: Neutral end of Cold War undermined • norm emergence in early 1990s its neutral position, and 
• demonstrated by regional institutional increase in US unilateralism involvement and formulation of New 
• declining Western Security Concept involvement in regions 
• reduced regional Internationalism 
condemnation in aftermath of • broadening of international responsibility 
Tiananmen Square incident from bilateral relations under South-South 
framework to more multilateral 
responsibility 
! Sovereignty 
• shift in policy towards greater sovereignty 
and non-interference as it distanced itself 
from revolutionary past, aimed at 
maintaining regional stability 
Deveiopmentalism 
• norm emergence in late 1970s 
• success in own domestic development 
I • greater uptake in late 1980s, fuelled by 
! increase in urgency to develop following 
I I 
end of Cold War 
- --- --------- -- ---
- -
-~ 
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1990s-2010s I. assisting regional countries Asianism 
Identity: Great recover from failure of • post-1997 led to greater multilateral traditional aid donors policies, 
cooperation and pursuance of strong Power such as Washington 
regional unity, greater uptake of Asianism Consensus 
• re-enforcement of priorities following • effects of non-traditional SARS/tsunami- expansion of its multilateral 
security threats pro-activity aimed at enhancing its Asian 
• growth of own markets and leader status 
need for more wide scale 
I 
markets Internationalism I 
I 
• increased global activities • distinct shift towards displaying greater 
responsibility by increased uptake of 
norm/involvement in institutions 
• reshaping of attitude towards moral 
legitimacy 
i 
I 
Sovereignty 
• involvement in global institutions and 
enhanced addressing of human rights issues 
is gradually reshaping the norm, despite 
considerable resistance 
• increased involvement in multilateral efforts 
such as UNPKO, reshaping/negatively 
affecting non-interference policy 
Deveiopmentalism 
• further shift towards presenting its own 
successful development as a more 
successful alternative to Western models, 
norm internalisation in early 2000s 
• adherence to mutual and multilateral 
'win-win' solutions to development 
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ApPENDIX 3 
The following data was used to construct Figures 4.l-4.5, 5.l-5.3 and 6.l-6.3. 
Asianism Data 
Figure 4.1 showing the number of ASEAN meetings per year/decade was 
generated from the following data, as reported on the ASEAN website 
(www.aseansec.org). 
Year Summit 
1976 ASEAN Summit 
1977 ASEAN Summit 
1987 ASEAN Summit 
1992 ASEAN Summit 
1994 ARF 
1995 ASEAN Summit 
1995 ARF 
1996 ASEAN Informal Summit 
1996 ARF 
1997 ASEAN Informal Summit 
1997 ARF 
1998 ASEAN Summit 
1998 ARF 
1999 ASEAN Informal Summit 
1999 ASEAN+3 
1999 ARF 
2000 ASEAN Informal Summit 
2000 ASEAN+3 
2000 ARF 
2001 ASEAN Summit 
2001 ASEAN+3 
2001 ARF 
2002 ASEAN Summit 
2002 ASEAN+3 
2002 ARF 
2003 ASEAN Summit 
2003 ASEAN+3 
2003 ARF 
2003 ASEAN Commemorative Summit (Japan) 
2004 ASEAN Summit 
2004 ASEAN+3 
2004 ARF 
2005 ASEAN Summit 
2005 ASEAN+3 
2005 EAS 
2005 ARF 
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2006 ASEAN+3 
2006 ARF 
2006 ASEAN Commemorative Summit (China) 
2007 ASEAN Summit 
2007 ASEAN Summit 
2007 ASEAN+3 
2007 EAS 
2007 EAS 
2007 ARF 
2008 ASEAN+3 
2008 ARF 
2009 ASEAN Summit 
2009 ASEAN Summit 
2009 ASEAN+3 
2009 EAS 
2009 ARF 
2009 ASEAN Commemorative Summit (ROK) 
The r:umber of agreements/declarations ratified was determined from the 
statistical data on the ASEAN website (http://www.aseansec.org/20185.htm). 
Number Signatory Year Agreements/Declarations country 
1993 1 China 
2002 3 China 
2002 1 Japan 
2003 1 China 
2003 3 China 
2003 5 Japan 
2004 4 China 
2004 3 Japan 
2004 1 ROK 
2004 3 ROK 
2005 1 ROK 
2005 2 EAS 
2006 1 ROK 
2007 4 China 
2007 3 ROK 
2007 2 EAS 
2009 2 ROK 
Internationalism Data 
The following list of international organisations that China has joined is from the 
CIA World Factbook and is cited as accurate as of February 2010 
(https://www.cia.gov/library /publications/the-world-factbooklfie Ids/21 07 .html). 
Caveat: The source of the data in the diagram is the CIA World Factbook. It 
should be noted though, that the list of organisations fails to reflect China's 
association with notable Latin American institutions such as ALADI, ECLAC, 
FEALAC and MERCOSUR. As such this list represents the minimum number of 
international organisations that have accepted the PRC as a member or observer. 
The region identifies where the organisation is most active, those organsations 
listed as International are considered to have a global multilateral role, with an 
equal level of activity in all regions. 
Institution Name Year PRC joined Region 
ADB Asian Development Bank 1986 SEA 
AIDB (nonregional member) African Development Bank 1985 Africa 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 1990 SEA 
APT Asia Pacific Telecommunity 1979 SEA 
Arctic Council (observer) 2007 International 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 2002 SEA 
ASEAN (dialogue partner) Association of SE Asian Nations 1991 SEA 
ASEAN+l ASEAN+ China 1997 SEA 
ASEAN+3 ASEAN+ China, Japan, Korea 1997 SEA 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 199611998 International 
CDB Caribbean Development Bank 1998 LA 
EAS East Asian Summit 2005 SEA 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of 194511971 * International 
the UN 
G-20 Group of20 2005 International 
G-24 (observer) Group of24 International 
G-77 Group of 77 1981 International 
IADB Inter American Development Bank 2009 LA 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 1984 International 
IBRD International Bank of Reconstruction 2000** International 
and Development 
ICAO International Civil Aviation 1953 International 
Organisation 
ICC International Chamber of Commerce 1994 International 
ICRM Institute of Crisis and Risk International 
Management 
IDA International Development 194511980 International 
Association 
IFAD International Foundation for 1981 International 
Agricultural Development 
IFC Institute of Foreign Affairs 194511980* International 
IFRCS/ICRC International Federation of Red Cross 2005(Beijing International 
and Red Crescent Societies office opened) 
IHO International Hydro-graphic International 
Organisation 
")")" 
---' 
Decade 
1980 
1980 
1990 
1970 
2000 
2000 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
2000 
1970 
2000 
1980 
2000 
1980 
2000 
1950 
1990 
1980 
1980 
1980 
2000 
ILO International Labour Organisation 1919* International 1970 
IMF International Monetary Fund 194511980* International 1980 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 1973 International 1970 
IMSO International Mobile Satellite 1979 International 1970 
Organisation 
Interpol Interpol 1984 International 1980 
IOC International Olympic Committee 1979 International 1970 
10M (observer) International Organisation of 2001 International 2000 
Migration 
IPU International Parliamentary Union 1984 International 1980 
ISO International Organisation of 2001 International 2000 
Standardisation 
ITSO International Telecommunication 2000** International 2000 
Satellite Organisation 
ITU International Telecommunication 1972 International 1970 
Union 
LAIA (observer) Latin American Integration 1995 LA 1990 
Association 
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee 1991 International 1990 
Agency 
MINURSO UN Mission to Western Sahara 2009 Africa 2000 
MONUC UN Mission to DR Congo 2009 Africa 2000 
NAM (observer) Non Aligned Movement 1955** International 1950 
NSG Nuclear Supplies Group 2004 International 2000 
, 
OAS (observer) Organisation of American States 2004 LA 2000 
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of 1993 International 1990 
Chemical Weapons 
PCA Partnership for Cooperative 2001 International 2000 
Agreement 
PIF (partner) Pacific Islands Forum 2003 SEA 2000 
SAARC (observer) South Asian Association for Regional 2002** SEA 2000 
Cooperation 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2001 SEA 2000 
SICA (observer) Sistema de la Integracion ROC 
Centro Americana 
UN United Nations 1971 International 1970 
UN Security Council UN Security Council 1971 International 1970 
UNAMID African Union Mission in Dafur 2009 Africa 2000 
UNCTAD Conference on Trade and 2001 International 2000 
Development 
UNESCO Education, Scientific and Cultural 1971 International 1970 
Organisation 
UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees 2000 International 2000 
UNIDO Industrial Development Organisation 2008 International 2000 
UNIFIL Interim Force in Lebanon 2007 International 2000 
UNITAR Institute for Training and Research 2009 International 2000 
UNMIL Mission in Liberia 2008 Africa 2000 
UNMIS Missions in Sudan 2009 Africa 2000 
UNMIT Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 2008 SEA 2000 
UNOCI Operation in the Cote d'lvoire 2007 Africa 2000 
22.+ 
UNTSO Truce Supervision Organisation 1971 International 
UNWTO World Tourism Organisation 2000** International 
UPU Universal Postal Union 1972 International 
WB World Bank 1980 International 
WCO World Customs Organisation 2000? International 
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions 2000** International 
WHO World Health Organisation 1948* International 
WIPO World Intellectual Property 1980 International 
Organisation 
WMO World Meteorological Organisation 194711972* International 
WTO World Trade Organisation 2001 International 
ZC Zangger Committee 1997 International 
* shows date of China's first association with the organisation. Representation 
commonly defaulted to the ROC after 1949. Where a second date is displayed, 
this refers to the date that the PRC became recognised by the institution. 
** shows date or earliest recorded association with organisation. 
Sovereignty Data 
The following data shows the year that the PRC established diplomatic relations 
with countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
Country Year Decade Region 
Vietnam 1950 1950 SEAsia 
Indonesia 1950 1950 SEAsia 
Myanmar 1950 1950 SEAsia 
Cambodia 1958 1950 SE Asia 
Laos 1961 1960 SEAsia 
Malaysia 1974 1970 SEAsia 
Philippines 1975 1970 SE Asia 
Thailand 1975 1970 SEAsia 
Papua New Guinea 1976 1970 SEAsia 
Singapore 1990 1990 SEAsia 
Brunei 1991 1990 SE Asia 
E Timor 2002 2000 SEAsia 
Cuba 1960 1960 Latin America 
Chile 1970 1970 Latin America 
Peru 1971 1970 Latin America 
Mexico 1972 1970 Latin America 
Argentina 1972 1970 Latin America 
Guyana 1972 1970 Latin America 
Jamaica 1972 1970 Latin America 
Trinidad and Tobago 1974 1970 Latin America 
Venezuela 1974 1970 Latin America 
Brazil 1974 1970 Latin America 
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1970 
2000 
1970 
1980 
2000 
2000 
1970 
1980 
1970 
2000 
1990 
Barbados 1977 1970 Latin America 
Ecuador 1980 1980 Latin America 
Columbia 1980 1980 Latin America 
Antigua 1983 1980 Latin America 
Bolivia 1985 1980 Latin America 
Grenada 1985 1980 Latin America 
Nicaragua 1985 1980 Latin America 
Belize 1987 1980 Latin America 
Uruguay 1988 1980 Latin America 
Costa Rica 2001 2000 Latin America 
Dominica 2004 2000 Latin America 
Egypt 1956 1950 Africa 
Sudan 1959 1950 Africa 
Guinea 1959 1950 Africa 
Ghana 1960 1960 Africa 
Mali 1960 1960 Africa 
Somalia 1960 1960 Africa 
Congo (DRC) 1961 1960 Africa 
Uganda 1962 1960 Africa 
Kenya 1963 1960 Africa 
Burundi 1963 1960 Africa 
Tunisia 1964 1960 Africa 
Republic if Congo 1964 1960 Africa 
Tanzania 1964 1960 Africa 
Central Africa Republic 1964 1960 Africa 
Zambia 1964 1960 Africa 
Benin 1964 1960 Africa 
Equatorial Guinea 1970 1970 Africa 
Ethiopia 1970 1970 Africa 
Nigeria 1971 1970 Africa 
Cameroon 1971 1970 Africa 
Sierra Leone 1971 1970 Africa 
Rwanda 1971 1970 Africa 
Senegal 1971 1970 Africa 
Mauritius 1972 1970 Africa 
Madagascar 1972 1970 Africa 
Chad 1972 1970 Africa 
Burkina Faso 1974 1970 Africa 
Guinea Bissau 1974 1970 Africa 
Gabon 1974 1970 Africa 
Niger 1974 1970 Africa 
Gambia 1974 1970 Africa 
Botswana 1975 1970 Africa 
Mozambique 1975 1970 Africa 
Sao Tome 1975 1970 Africa 
Liberia 1977 1970 Africa 
Zimbabwe 1980 1980 Africa 
Angola 1983 1980 Africa 
Cote D'Ivoire 1983 1980 Africa 
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Namibia 
South Africa 
Malawi 
1990 
1998 
2007 
1990 
1990 
2000 
Africa 
Africa 
Africa 
Statistically speaking, the conditional probability of exposure to an event may be determined by 
calculating the ratio of the number of entities exposed to an event to the combined number of 
exposed and protected entities. In this case, the number of exposed entities may be inferred from 
the number of bilateral relations, and the number of protected entities may be inferred from the 
number of multilateral relations. Though the scale of the exposed and protected entities may differ 
significantly from the numbers of bi- and multilateral relations, the ratio of these terms will be 
proportionate. 
The coefficient of non-interference was determined as follows: 
For a given decade and region 
Non-interference coefficient = 1 - (2: B /(2: B + 2: M)) 
where 
B = number of bilateral relations between the PRC and the respective region at that period in time 
M = number of institutions joined by the PRC within the respective region (including globally 
multilateral organisations) at the period in time 
Developmentalism Data 
The following data outlines the estimated aid distributed across each region by the 
PRe during a given year (source: CRS report T. Lum) and the number of high 
level regional visits, or in the case of SE Asia, the cumulative number of 
cooperative summits held in the region at that point in time. When plotted in 
Figures 4.5, 5.3 and 6.3, these display the norm intended rhetorical dimension 
versus the norm intended practical dimension for developmentalism. 
Data for 2008 aid distribution was calculated from the same paper from the 
agreed project budgets during Q 1 of 2008. 
Year African Aid (million $) Visits 
2002 10 0 
2003 848 2 
2004 3130 6 
2005 6083 6 
2006 15171 17 
2007 33133 23 
2008 55626.5 23 
Year Latin America Aid (million $) Visits 
2002 4 0 
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2003 5 0 
2004 7005 3 
2005 9936 3 
2006 26361 3 
2007 26762 3 
2008 42035 6 
Year SE Asia Aid (million $) Summits 
2002 36 25 
2003 680 29 
2004 1873 32 
2005 6094 36 
2006 8098 39 
2007 14833 45 
2008 19013 47 
The following table combines the data from the above three tables. 
Year Combined Aid (million $) Number ofvisits/summits 
2002 50 25 
2003 1533 31 
2004 12008 41 
2005 22113 45 
2006 49630 59 
2007 74728 71 
2008 116674.5 76 
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